TRANSFORMATION OF

JIHAD

DERADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT OF MUSLIM EXTREMISTS IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

SURATNO

TRANSFORMATION OF JIHAD:
DERADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT
OF
MUSLIM EXTREMISTS IN CONTEMPORARY
INDONESIA

Inaugural Dissertation

**Zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der
Philosophie
im Fachbereich Philosophie und
Geschichtswissenschaft
der Goethe Universitaet zu Frankfurt am Main**

vorgelegt von:

**Suratno
wohnhaft in Jakarta
geboren am 13.01.1977 in Cilacap, Indonesien**

**2016
(Einreichungsjahr)**

Erste Gutachterin: Prof. Dr. Susanne Schroeter
Zweite Gutachterin: Prof. Dr. Edwin Wieringa

Mitglieder der Pruefungskomission:

Prof. Dr. Susanne Schroeter (1. Gutachter)
Prof. Dr. Iris Gareis
Prof. Dr. Friedemann Buddensiek (Vorsitz)
Prof. Dr. Arndt Graf / FB 09
Jun. Prof. Dr. Elsa Clave / FB 09
Prof. Dr. Holger Jebens (Ersatzmitglied)

**Fachbereich / FB 08—Philosophie und
Geschihtswissenschaften**

Acknowledgments

This dissertation is the result of a long journey and was made possible with the support of many people, some of whom unfortunately need to remain anonymous. Even for those who agreed to be mentioned here, the available space and words are not enough to express their invaluable significance to this dissertation. Despite these limitations, there are some whom I would like to mention below.

I must express my greatest appreciation to Professor Susanne Schroeter, my PhD supervisor. Professor Schroeter is a seasoned and warm-hearted scholar who supported my doctoral study from its very beginning and especially during theearly years when I felt lost in the "forest of anthropological research" with narratives and theoretical frameworks veering in opposite directions. Her patient and tireless support and constant encouragement meant a lot to me over the trajectory of this dissertation. Many thanks also go to Oliver Bertrand, Professor Schroeter's secretary, who assisted me in not only fulfilling my needs as a PhD student at Uni-Frankfurt but also as a father who brought his family from Indonesia to Germany.

Professor Edwin Paul Wieringa, my second supervisor, also played an important role, particularly during the final writing stage of this dissertation. His assistance helped shape my critical engagement with conceptual and theoretical issues that would later form the dissertation's theoretical framework and sharpened its analytic lens. I am also grateful for the insight provided to me by the member of my examination committee during the defense, Professor Susanne Schroeter, Professor Iris Gareis, Professor Friedemann Buddensiek, Professor Arndt Graf, Professor Elsa Clave and Professor Holger Jebens.

My thanks also goes to the Indonesian Ministry of Education and Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs for their scholarship and research grant that enabled me to study in Germany and to carry out my fieldwork in several cities in Indonesia. My PhD study in Germany would also not have been possible without the consent of the rector of Paramadina University Jakarta, the vice-rector, directorate of fellowships, directorate of human resources as well as the financial department. My appreciation also goes to Anies Baswedan, Totok Soefijanto, Bima Santosa, Wijayanto Samirin, Kurniawaty Yusuf, Amy Suryani and Emy Rotua. My colleagues in the Department of Philosophy & Religion also supported me as I pursued my PhD studies. Here I would like to thank Abdul Hadi WM, Ahmad Nasruddin Latief, Ahmad Luthfi Assyaukanie, Abd Moqsith Ghazali, Abdul Muis Naharong, Aan Rukmana,

have helped me in many ways to make my life in Germany more cheerful.

Abstract

This study is mainly about the deradicalization of several Muslim extremists in contemporary Indonesia. Deradicalization may be generally understood as a process leading toward the decreased use of religious and political violence. Since the Suharto era, Indonesia has implemented three deradicalization programs: (a) a military-focused strategy implemented before Suharto's downfall in 1998; (b) a transitional strategy between 1998 and the Bali Bombing in 2002, which was characterized by disorientation; and (c) the establishment of a more formalized program after 2002. Rather than focusing on the Deradicalization program, this dissertation explores individual deradicalization from individual actor's perspectives. In this study, I endeavor to trace the life-histories of several former Muslim extremists using a biographical method. I apply a process-model to explore three routes of Jihad: introduction, radicalization/engagement, and deradicalization/disengagement/recidivism. I also apply the concept of liminality to provide an in-depth look at former Muslim extremists' personal situations, both during and after their decision to engage with and move away from the Jihadist ideology and activism. Pull-Push factors are also applied to analyze the reasons behind their decisions. Finally, a theory of colorful interpretation of Jihad and identity transformation will be used to elucidate the transformation of Muslim extremists in their post-liminal violent Jihad.

I found that the process and experience of violent Jihad up to the deradicalization period and eventual disengagement is a subjective and complex phenomenon; the reasons that drive radicalization and encourage an individual to join an extremist group may differ from the factors that influence continual involvement in the group, engagement in violent acts, and disengagement from the group and/or deradicalization vis-à-vis violent jihadism. Similarities in the trajectories of radicalization are evident across three factors: (a) rational-choice calculations and cost-benefit analyses; (b) socialization and interaction with the "other"; and (c) perceptional and psychological factors in which an extremist Muslim group modifies its world views as a result of severe crises, frustration, and dramatic changes. Therefore, the transition to violent Jihad, the liminal situation, is a form of cultural survival for Muslim extremists. Liminality marks a period of transformation for Muslim extremists: a process of taking on a new identity and initiated into a new power.

Post-liminal violent jihadists in Indonesia generally end up in prison, either for a life-sentence or a temporary sentence, in

which Muslim extremists enter a deradicalization program run by the Indonesian police. However, the deradicalization of individual jihadists is not always related to such programs. Post-liminal violent jihadists are influenced by a new interpretation of jihad, after which they take on a new jihadist identity. In post-liminal violent jihad, jihadist interpretations primarily shift from the Salafi-jihad to a pure Salafi interpretation of violent jihad, or simply from a violent to a less-violent jihad. They still hold onto their beliefs in violent jihad but limit the application of its rules. Only a few shift from violent jihad to moderate or even non-violent jihadism. When this happens, it is largely the result of personal reflection and not external persuasion. Accordingly, I conclude that the transformation of jihad does not guarantee that the potency of religious extremism will no longer exist. Instead, violent jihad will continue to exist as jihadists; they have merely shifted their beliefs as situations and conditions force them to recognize that it is unjustifiable to continue their violent jihad.

Finally, post-liminal jihad also brings about a new identity for jihadists, which has significant immediate and long-term impacts. The immediate impact shows that in the post-liminal violent jihad, they continue to be committed to jihad and call themselves jihadists, holding fast to jihadism and involving themselves in different activities. I also found that the deeper the knowledge and experience of violent jihadism, the more difficult it is to deradicalize the jihadist. Long-term impacts show, in contrast, that the commitment to jihadism weakens as they are incorporated into society. The challenge then is to keep former Muslim extremists away from recidivism and returning to the violent jihad group.

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Glossary and Abbreviations

Abangan	Nominal or non-devout Muslim. Muslims who still practice their traditional Javanese rituals in their everyday lives.
Abdulah Azzam	Teacher at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah and former mentor to Osama bin Laden, who disseminated militant perspectives such as "No negotiations, no conferences, and no dialogue." He had earlier been a member of the Egyptian Brotherhood. He fought, with financial support from Osama bin Laden, against the Soviets in Afghanistan. He and two of his sons were killed in 1989, during the last months of this war.
Abdullah Sungkar	With Abu Bakar Bashir, founder of Jemaah Islamiah in 1993. He developed contact with the Al-Qaeda network soon afterwards.
Abu Bakar Bashir	With Abdullah Sungkar, officially founded Jemaah Islamiah in 1993, in Malaysia, while hiding from the Suharto Government. He and Abdullah Sungkar returned to Indonesia after the Suharto's death.
Abu Dujana	Former military leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and a key figure in several terrorist bombings. In rehabilitation sessions, according to Professor Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, he maintains that jihad is appropriate, although expresses different opinions about violence in private.
Abu Jibril	A leading figure and recruiter from Jemaah Islamiyah. He had spent three years in prison during the 1980s and fled to Malaysia during 1985 when Soeharto attempted to capture Islamic militants. During the 1990s, he resided in Malaysia, establishing Jemaah Islamiyah with Ba'asyir and Sungkar, returning in 1998. His son Muhammad was later arrested as well.
Abu Sayyaf Group	A militant separatist group, based in the southern Islands of the Philippines. Their objective is to create a Muslim state, independent of the majority Catholic state. Abu Sayyaf denotes father of a sword-smith. They have undertaken assassinations and bombings as well as extortion to attract

	funds, in their attempt to establish a pan-Islamic state in South East Asia. The group is regarded as small but powerful and is estimated to comprise 200 core members and 2000 or more extended members. They might have developed connections with Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist group operating in Indonesia.
Al-Mukmin Pesantren	Pesantren founded by Abu Bakar Baashir, a spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. Currently, the school houses 2000 students. Several of the graduates, such as Amrozi and Mukhlas, were involved in the 2002 Bali bombings. Another former student was Muhammad Rais, who was convicted for storing the explosives that were used in the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, which killed 12 individuals, as well as Asmar Latin Sani, the suicide bomber for this attack.
Ali Ghufron	Also known as Mukhlas, executed by a firing squad in 2008, after his conviction for involvement in the 2002 Bali bombing. He was an older brother of Amrozi and a senior leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. He had fought in Afghanistan.
Amrozi	Executed by a firing squad despite his preference for beheading in 2008 for his involvement in the 2002 Bali bombing, which killed 202 individuals, 152 of which were foreign nationals. His brothers Ali Ghufron, also known as Mukhlas, and Ali Imron were also involved. Amrozi was the fifth of 13 children, born in 1962.
Bai'at	Religious oath of Muslims.
BAKIN	*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara* (National Intelligence Coordination Agency)
Bid'ah	Misguided religious innovation
Brimob	*Brigade Mobil* (Mobile Police Brigade)
Da'wah	Religious proselytizing. Arabic word, which implies preaching Islam through dialogue and discussion.
Dhimmi	Arabic word that translates to "protected person," denoting someone from another faith, often Judaism or Christianity, for which the right to practice is tolerated under Sharia law.

Densus 88	*Detasemen Khusus* 88 (Special Counter-Terrorism Police Department 88)
DI	Darul Islam (literally Islamic Abode, a rebellion movement)
Dulmatin	One of the most prominent terrorist leaders in Southeast Asia until police shot him in 2010. His former name was Joko Pitono and he was born in Pemalang, Central Java. He fathered four children with his wife Istiadah. With Umar Patek and Heru Kuncoro, he established training camps. He was the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings. He was also involved in the Christmas Eve bombings in Jakarta and Mojokerto in 2000, the bombing at the Atrium shopping center in 2001 as well as the first Marriott bombing in 2003. After these bombings, he sought sanctuary with the Abu Sayyaf group. He returned to Indonesia, disguised as a preacher, Muhammad Yahya. The preacher was then under surveillance. This man, which police did not realize was Dulmatin, seemed friendly, but was developing a terror network, procuring equipment from Ambon and Poso. He was eventually killed in a shootout, in an internet cafe.
Farihin	Former member of Jemaah Islamiyah, he was detained for smuggling ammunition to the conflict in Palu, a Christian village in Sulawesi. Even after undergoing extremist rehabilitation in Indonesia, he maintains that the Bali bombing was justified. He claims to renounce violence but is also eager to fight in Afghanistan.
Fiqh	Translates to "deeper understanding" and refers to Islamic jurisprudence that extends Sharia law, which is derived from the Quran and Sunnah, with evolving rulings and interpretations around rituals, morals, and social legislation.
FKAWJ	*Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jama'ah* (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet SAW)
FPI	*Front Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Front)

Hambali	Although his real name is Riduan Isamuddin, Hambali, as he is often known, was born in 1966 and was a former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah but captured by the CIA when working with Thai police and sent to Guantanamo Bay. He was perhaps the main link between Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qa'eda as well as a close friend of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He planned to rule as a Caliph or leader an Islamic state throughout Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia. He was the second of 13 children.
Hijrah	Religious migration
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Party of Liberation)
I'dadiyah	Preparation for the holy war.
Ikhwanul Muslimin	Literally means Muslim brotherhood: Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, this transnational organization established in Egypt promulgated many Islamic fundamentalist beliefs. The brotherhood is often the main political opponent in many Arab nations; the southern branch in Israel has attracted seats in the Knesset. Because the organization is often banned, candidates often represent themselves as independent candidates. They officially renounce violence, with some exceptions, although this assertion is often regarded as contentious. Sayyid Qutb's, a key member, writings such as "Milestones" underpins many of the tenets and beliefs of Al Qa'eda.
Imam Samudra	Previously known as Abdul Aziz, he was born in 1970 and executed by a firing squad in 2008 despite his preference to be beheaded after his conviction for involvement in the 2002 Bali bombing, which killed 202 individual and involved three bombs: a suicide bomber near Kuta, a car bomb near Kuta, and a smaller detonation outside the US consulate. He had been imprisoned first at Denpasar and later at Nusakambangan.
Iman	Religious faith

Jahiliyyah	Arabic words, referring to the absence of believe in the truth. For example, individuals might concede they had lived in *Jahiliyyah*.
Jama'ah	Religious community
JI	Jama'ah Islamiyah (Islamic Community). Translates to Islamic Congregation, a militant organization that is striving to establish an Islamic state throughout Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei. This organization was spawned from Darul Islam, which as a radical movement, operating primarily in the 1940s. Although initially focused on conflicts in Maluku and Poso, Indonesia, their primary target was Western states after the putative war on terror commenced. Local authorities foiled potential attacks in Singapore. They also organized the suicide bombings in Bali, which killed 202 individuals. They might have been responsible for the Marriott hotel bombing in Kuningan, Jakarta in 2003, the Australian embassy bombing in 2004, and the Bali bombing of 2005.
Jihadism	Jihad ideology
John Horgan	An academic at Pennsylvania State University, director of the International Center for the Study of Terrorism. He has undertaken significant research into the IRA and Provisional IRA. His research now focuses more on disengagement and deradicalization from terrorist collectives.
Kafir	Religious unbelievers. Arabic term refers to anyone who does not believe the truth-that is, Islamic truth-or is ungrateful towards God.
KMM	Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia: Islamic terrorist organization based in Malaysia and established by 1995. This organization, founded by Zainon Ismail who had fought in Afghanistan, seeks to overthrow the existing Malaysian government, to create an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines. Furthermore, 48 members have been detained, under the ISA/Internal Security Act.
LIPIA	*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa* Arab (Institute of the Study for

	Islam and Arabic Language)
LJ	Laskar Jihad (Jihad Militia Force)
Masyumi	*Majelis Syura Muslimin Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Assembly)
Milestones	Book, written by Sayyid Qutb in prison, represents one of the most influential contributions to jihadism. The book was smuggled out of prison and published in secret during 1964. He maintains the world should be governed by the Qur'an by disregarding the culture of other groups. The book criticizes Christians and Jews, claiming that both religions enable priests and rabbis to set regulations and thus represent polytheist religions.
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI	*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly)
Muhammadiyah	A modern Muslim group in Indonesia
Nana Ihwan Maulana	Suicide bomber at the Ritz Carlton Hotel. The bomb exploded at a similar time to the bomb that exploded at the nearby Ritz.
NII	*Negara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islamic State, a new name of the DI)
Noordin M Top	A key figure in Jemaah Islamiyah, experienced in explosives, fundraising, and recruiting suicide bombers. He established a violent derivative of this organization called Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad. Together with Azahari Husin, he coordinated the 2003 Marriott bombing in Jakarta as well as the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, and the 2005 Bali bombings. He may have been involved in the 2002 Bali bombings.
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Association of Muslim Scholars), a Traditional Muslim group.
Osama bin Laden	Purported head of Al Qa'eda. He was born in 1957 in Saudi Arabia. His father founded the largest construction firm in Saudi Arabia, although he was reared as an impoverished migrant in Yemen and died in 1967 in a helicopter crash. Salem, the oldest

	of Osama's over 50 brothers or sister, developed relationships with the Reagan and the Bush families. In 1979, Osama fought with the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Invasion. In 1990, he offered support to King Fahd, if Iraqis attack. This offer was rejected, culminating in public tirades against the king and ultimately house arrest.
Pancasila	The Five Principles of Indonesian State Ideology
Pesantren	Islamic boarding school
Salafi	A Sunni Islamic movement, which holds certain pious ancestors, called the Salaf, as role models, and thus espouses a pure form of Islam. Adherents do not consider themselves to be members of Wahhabism, but nevertheless tend to respect Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab. This movement is not uniform and not all groups support jihadism.
Santri	Devout Muslims who study in Pesantren
Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono	*A professor of psychology at the University of Persada Indonesia.* Since 2005, he has worked as a counselor forderadicalization programs in Indonesia. His aim is to challenge jihad, takfir, and shuhada or martyrdom, rejecting violence. He concedes that leaders often dominate the debate and justify violence, although they are more conciliatory in private discussions.
Sayyid Qutb	Intellectual in the Egyptian Brotherhood Movement. Executed by the Nasser government and sometimes regarded as a martyr or *shahid*. One of his books, translated as the Shade of the Qur'an, is an extensive commentary on the Qur'an, which has contributed significantly to jihad. He was very critical of US materialism, after his extensive visits to this region. He believed Sharia law should be the sole basis of governance. His brother, Muhammad Qutb, a professor of Islamic Studies, taught Ayman Zawahiri, a mentor of Osama Bin Laden. While in prison, he was tortured and witnessed the murder of other members of the Muslim Brotherhood by guards. These acts amplified his belief that life represents a struggle between Muslims and everyone

	else.
Shahid	Shahid or shaheed, although literally denoting a witness, often refers to martyrdom. That is, this title is bestowed on Muslims who have died fulfilling a religious commandment. The female equivalent is called shaheeda. In Islam, martyrdom, or istishhad, is distinct from suicide, or intihar. The Qur'an considers martyrs as being alive, cared for by God.
Syariah	Islamic law
Takfir	In Islamic law, refers to a Muslim who depicts themselves as unbelievers, called a *kafir*/infidel. The sentence for this act can be execution. Usually, the abandonment of Islam is implied by some action or remark rather than something explicit. Salman Rushdie represents a prime example.
Tandzim Sirri	Underground movement
Terrorism	Although this term is difficult to define definitively, terrorism is usually assumed to entail the use of force or violence against civilians, intended to evoke fear as a means to influence the socio-political landscape.
TNI	*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian Armed Forces)
Tore Bjorgo	Professor at Norwegian Police University College. Bjorgo contributes to the Consortium for Research on Terrorism and International Crime. He has written and edited books on the radicalization process and the disengagement from violence.
Umar Patek:	Together with Dulmatin, one of the masterminds of the 2002 Bali bombings. After these bombings, he sought sanctuary with the Abu Sayyaf group.
Ummah	Muslim community. The worldwide community of Islam--the perspective that the Islamic world is united and members must protect one another.
Ustadz	Islamic cleric term used to address an Islamic teacher.
Wahhabism	A fundamentalist interpretation of Islam dating back to the 1700s, which flourishedin Saudi Arabia. In the early 1900s, the House of Saud combined various tribes to form

	Saudi Arabia, blending distinct sects such as Sunni, Shia, and Sufism, into the Wahhabist movement. Saudi Arabia has spread these teachings through the creation of mosques and madrasah around the world.

CHAPTER 1
FROM RADICALIZATION TO DERADICALIZATION

Introduction

This study is mainly about the deradicalization of several extremists Muslim in contemporary Indonesia. Deradicalization may be generally understood as a process leading toward the decreased use of religious and political violence. However, it cannot be separated from radicalization, which, by contrast, implies the increased use of religious and political violence. According to Della Porta and LaFree (2012; 1), taken together, the study of radicalization and deradicalization is central to answering the questions of how religious and political violence emerge, how it can be prevented, and how it can be contained.[1] Therefore, Chapter 1 focuses on from the topics of radicalization and deradicalization. The first part of the chapter presents the rise of radicalism as well as the factors causing radicalism and the botanies of radicalization. Under deradicalization, I will present the converse of radicalization, by focusing on the Indonesian deradicalization program in Indonesia, debates about suitable terminology, and a review of the literature on the subject, which underscores the lack of studies on individual deradicalization. I will also present the focus, hypothesis and significance of the research as well as the structure of dissertation.

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[1] Donatella Della Porta & Gary Lafree, 2012, "Guest Editorial: The Process of Radicalization and De-Radicalization", *in International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol. 6 No. 1/2012, p.1.

Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Rise of "Religious Violence"

According to Greg Fealy (2004), of the images generated by Indonesia since the downfall of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998, those of radical Muslims have been possibly the most vivid and enduring. These have taken various forms. They include white robed and turbaned Muslim militiamen marching through city streets and brandishing scimitars, exhorting Jihad against Islam foes; radical Muslims clerics threatening to sweep foreigners from Indonesia; and noisy rallies at the gate of the Parliament Building in Jakarta demanding the immediate implementation of the Islamic law (*Shariah*). Other images are even more dramatic: of a charred and mangled nightclub and hotels bombed by terrorists; the perpetrators smiling carelessly or shouting *Allahu Akbar* (God is Most Great) as they are captured by the Indonesian police and sentenced to death.[2]

Similarly, William Liddle notes that the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime after more than three decades in power was followed by unprecedented political freedom especially for radical Muslim groups that previously had been restricted in the public sphere. As a result, such groups flourished as they are now able to freely express and articulate their ideas in the public domain without fear of reprisals.[3] In short, Indonesia has been witnessing the rise of radicalism. In 2001, the Indonesian Crisis Group (ICG) published a report explaining that at least three forms of "religious" violence took place in Post-Suharto Indonesia: bombings, and local and communal violence.[4]

First is the bombing. The ICG report claims that throwing or planting of bombs to further goals, either political or religious, was not unknown in the past but since the fall of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998, bomb explosions have become more common.[5] The *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) was unapologetically

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[2] Greg Fealy, 2004, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?", in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004*, Singapore: ISEAS/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, p.1.

[3] William Liddle, 1999, "Indonesia's Unexpected Failure of Leadership," in Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (eds.), *The Politics of Post Suharto Indonesia*, New York: Council on Foreign Relation Press, p. 26.

[4] ICG (International Crisis Group) is a non-governmental organisation, workingthrough analysis and advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. Theorganisation currently operates twelve regional offices and has local field representation in sixteen additional locations.. See: www.crisisgroup.org (Accessed on October 30, 2009). See also; ICG, 2001, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, ICG Briefing Papers, 10 October 2001, pp 3-4.

[5] ICG, 2001, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, ICG Briefing Papers, 10 October 2001, pp 3-4

involved in those numerous bombing attacks,[6] claiming responsibility for a number while being the prime suspect in other still, including: (a) The attempted assassination of the Filipino Ambassador to Indonesia on 1 August 2000, which killed 2 people and seriously injured the ambassador; (b) A series of church bombings in Jakarta, East Java, Batam, Lombok, etc., on 24 December 2000, which killed 17 people and injured hundreds more; (c) The first Bali Bombing on 12 October 2002 that killed 202 people, including 88 Australians; (d) The Davao Airport bombing on 4 March 2003 and of the Sasha ferry wharf Bombing in the Southern Philippines as well as further bombings in Davao on 2 April 2003, involving JI and MILF operatives; (e) The suicide car bomb attack upon the JW Marriot Hotel in Jakarta on 5 August 2003, which killed 12 people including the suicide bomber; (f) The suicide bombingat the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, which killed 10 people and injured around 180; (g) The 3 suicide backpack bombs in Bali on 1 October 2005, which killed 20 people and injured approximately 90; and (h) The Marriot-Ritz Carlton bombings in July 2009, etc.

Second is local violence. Outbreaks of violence and intimidating involving Muslims have taken place occasionally. In some cases, radical Muslim groups have played a role but usually these conflicts are related to particular circumstances and issues, including: (a) Attacks on churches, much of which has taken place in Ambon and Poso where Christians are also destroying mosques; and (b) Anti-vice campaigns, which generally peak during the fasting month (*Ramadhan*), primarily orchestrated by *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defender Front),[7] and tending to escalate not only during *Ramadhan* but also at varying times throughout the year as attacks are launched against what the FPI refers to as "deviant Islam" such as the Lia Eden Group, Ahmadiyah, etc.; and (c) Political action in which radical Muslims continue to be concerned about the revival of communism in Indonesia, especially after President Gus Dur proposed lifting the political ideology's ban in 2000. The *Aliansi Anti-Komunis* (AAK, Alliance of Anti-Communism) comprising several radical Muslim groups embarked on a sweeping campaign aiming to rid bookshops of communist books and on a rally in the center of Jakarta in which banners were carried with

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[6] I will further explain JI in the next section of this chapter, "The Botanies of Radicalization."

[7] "Democracy is more dangerous than pig's meat" declared Rizieq Shihab the chief of FPI in many of his speeches. The FPI was established in 1998 and initially subsidized by the military and police as a part of street-level militia mobilized against the student-led reform movements. The FPI has recently expressed "alarm" and outrage at liberal democracy, representing it as threat to Islamic belief and practice. See Ian Wilson, 2014, "Resisting Democracy: *Front Pembela Islam* and Indonesia's 2014 Election, in *ISEAS Perpsective #10, 2014*, Singapore 20 Pebruary 2014.

slogans like "*We are ready to slay communists*" and "*We are ready to behead communists,*" etc.[8]

Third is communal Conflict. Apart from specific acts of violence, communal conflicts have also involved radical Muslim groups. The driving force in much of this conflict, however, is not firstly and directly religious although religious motivation is often closely entwined with ethnic, economic and cultural grievances. Most notable of such conflict is that of Ambon and Poso. In those areas, "virtual wars" have taken place between Muslim and Christian communities. In Ambon, the initial conflict that broke out in January 1999 involved Christian Ambon people and Muslims from nearby Sulawesi who migrated to Ambon during the previous three decades. The conflict was, however, transformed into a battle between Indigenous Christian and Muslims during a period when the Indonesian police lacked the capacity to maintain public order had drastically deteriorated. This conflict can only be understood in the context of entrenched rivalries between two communities that have committed atrocities against each other. In Poso, the vicious fighting that broke out between Muslims and Christians in 2000 took place in the context of large-scale migration of Muslims to what had previously been a predominantly Christian region. As the local Christians fell behind economically and lost their political predominance, the conflict broke out again and the police found itself again unable to maintain effective action to keep the violence from growing. The Ambon Muslims' primary motivations was not so-called radical Islam; but the same cannot be said of an Islamic militia, the *Laskar Jihad* (LJ, Jihad Troop),[9] which went to Ambon and Poso from Java to fight alongside the local Muslims whom they believed were coming out worst in the fighting.[10]

By the end of April and mid-May 2000, the LJ sent as many as 3000 fighters to Ambon where they participated actively in the violence conflict between Christians and Muslims. The LJ claims that the goal was to help Muslims who currently are in conflict with Christians. Another claimed goal was to eradicate the secessionist movement in the South Moluccas, the RMS (*Republik Maluku Selatan*). On 12 February 2002, Christian forces and the LJ signed a peace accord that was broken not long after it was signed. In late 2001, about 750 of the LJ fighters were sent to Poso of Central Sulawesi, another site of Christian and Muslim violence. However, what really caused uproar was when the LJ—at the behest of the implementation of Islamic law in

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[8] ICG, 2001, *op.cit,* pp. 8-9
[9] I will further explain LJ in the next section of this chapter, "The Botanies of Radicalization."
[10] ICG, 2001, *op.cit,* p. 10

those areas—stoned Abdul Rohim, a thirty-year-old member, who had admitted to committing adultery.[11]

FACTORS CAUSING RADICALISM

Why does radicalism appearin Indonesia? What leads to the emergence of such a radical ideology? Radicalism can be found in every religion; becoming radicalized is not a characterized reserved for flowers of Islam. Moreover, becoming a radical Muslim is not a sudden process. There are many reasons why people become radical, tolerant, peaceful, smiling, angry, etc.[12] Exploring the factors that cause radicalism, therefore, is an important step for understanding deradicalization.

Before going further, it is important to examine the relationship between radicalism and violence, which are separate but related phenomena. There may be types of radicalism that do not incorporate violence but that nevertheless have the potential to lead individuals to violence or other detrimental influences. In the Muslim world, the propensity for violence is certainly a defining characteristic of the most extreme spectrum of the radicalism—for instance, in terms of the definition of *jihad* as an armed struggle and as an individual obligation of the same standing as the *al-arkan al-Islam* or the five pillars of the religion (the profession of faith, prayer five times daily, zakat or almsgiving, fasting during Ramadan, and the hajj). Beyond violence, however, there is a much larger universe of radical Muslim groups which may not themselves practice violence, but propagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive of the values of democratic societies.[13]

Therefore, the willingness to use or justify violence to attain a religious or political goal is one element of what separates radical from moderate Muslims. Yes, it is a very important element, but only one element nonetheless. This is why in an analysis of politico-religious tendencies in the Muslim world, several experts

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[11] See 'Laskar Jihad (LJ)' in http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=10 (accessed on October 26 2009)

[12] Najib Burhani (et. all), 2004, *Factors Causing the Emergency of Radical Islam: A preliminary analysis*, Vo. 2 No. 4, Agustus 2005, Jakarta: ICIP. See: http://www.icipglobal.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=105&Itemid=85

[13] RRG (Religious Rehabilitation Group), 2012, *The Cause of the Radicalization of the Muslim,* see: http://www.rrg.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=64:the-causes-of-the-radicalization-of-the-muslim&catid=4:recent-articles&Itemid=9. The RRG that was formally established in 2003 was part of the deradicalization program run by Singapore police. It consistsof local Singaporean 'Ulama (religious scholars) and *Ustadz* (religious teachers) who volunteer their services to counsel detainees to assist them in understanding their religion correctly. The primary role of the RRG is to provide religious counseling to those who have been detained and those under restriction orders.

have taken a broader view of what constitutes radical Islam. The analytical framework developed here differentiates religious and political currents according to their overarching ideologies: their preferred forms of government (do they seek to establish an Islamic state or are they willing to accept non-sectarian forms of government?); their political and legal orientation (do they insist on the application of Islamic law, or do they accept other sources of law?); their attitudes toward the rights of women and religious minorities (do they deny women equal rights, including the right to political participation? Do they support the education and advancement of women? Would they allow freedom of worship?). Radical groups might not advocate violence necessarily, but might register significantly lower levels of tolerance. As Donald Emerson (2004) notes, this lack of tolerance may then lower these Muslims' reluctance to acquiesce with—or even take part in—the use of violence for Islamist ends. In this way, organizations such as the Hizbut-Tahrir that aim for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate have been identified as a gateway to terrorism.[14]

When we turn to the Southeast Asian experience, especially Indonesia, one of the assumptions is that violent extremism and the radicalization of Muslim communities are recent phenomena. While this is true, there have been some historical deviations from the norm. Similar to current radical Muslims in Indonesian, the Padri movement in Sumatra in the 1820s and 1830s involved an effort to introduce Wahhabism, sometimes using forceful methods, by preachers who had returned from Mecca and had been influenced by Wahhabi teachings during the al-Sauds' first occupation of the city at the beginning of the 19th century. With this exception along with uprisings against the colonial powers that combined ethnic and religious factors, the only major Islamist revolt in the modern history of Southeast Asia was the NII (also known as the DI/*Darul Islam)* rebellion from 1949 to 1962. The NII experience is important because it is one of the fountainheads of the regional terrorist group, the JI. A report from ICG (2003) on the origins of Islamist terrorism in Indonesiashows that Abdullah Sungkar, the co-founder of Jemaah Islamiyah, served as an officer in the NII leader Kartosuwirjo's Islamic Army of Indonesia and that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, although he did not participate in the rebellion, accepted the NII's ideological agenda. Individuals from families with the NII backgrounds continue to play an important role in terrorism in Indonesia. The point here is that while external factors provided the catalyst for radicalization and violent extremism in Southeast Asia, these phenomena have internal sources as well.[15]

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[14]*Idem*

[15]*Idem*

In 2004, Najib Burhani (et al) (2004) of ICIP conducted a research about factors causing radicalism and found that such factors can be traced from the five big themes: theology, politics, economy, socio-culture, and media. Political factor seems to be the most direct factor causing radicalism; however, these factors are intertwined. Radical actions cannot occur by relying only on political factor. Other factors play important roles, and each one must be given equal attention.[16]

Theology. Radicalism comes from particular methods of interpreting Islamic sources such as the al-Qur'an and Hadith. Khaled Abou El Fadl divides his model of interpretation into two types: historical or contextual and a-historical or textual. The first interpretation looks at current situations in a historical lens and compares both conditions. By doing so, Qur'an can always communicate with the current-day reality. The second interpretation does not consider the sociological and historical context. It is this interpretation that primarily catalyzes radicalism. Using this, the interpreter often forgets what the Qur'an means beyond the text.[17]

Below, I will elaborate on some verses of the Qur'an that are often used by radical Muslims as the basis of their ideology and action. Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)[18], quoting al-Qur'an (verse 5: 44-49) literally and scripturally, argues that all Muslims have to follow exactly what God has ordained (*Shariah*); that is, Muslims should not use secular laws that are produced by human beings because they will inevitably contradict the *Shariah*. According to this interpretation, each sentences of every verse found in the Qur'an, including stoning adulterers to death, cutting off the hands ofthieves, and flogging drinkers, have to be implemented by Muslims. Those who reject this prescription, in Qutb's view,

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[16] Najib Burhani (et. all), 2004, *Factors Causing the Emergency of Radical Islam: A preliminary analysis*, Vo. 2 No. 4, Agustus 2005, Jakarta: ICIP. See: http://www.icipglobal.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10 5&Itemid=85

[17] Najib Burhani, 2005, *op.cit*.

[18]Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) was an Egyptian author and the leading Islamic theologian of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and '60s. Author of 24 books, including novels, literary arts' critique, works on education, he is best known in the Muslim world for his work on what he believed to be the social and political role of Islam, particularly in his books *Social Justice* and *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq* (Milestones). His magnum opus, *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an* (In the shade of the Qur'an), is a 30-volume commentary on the Qur'an. Although most of his observations and criticism were leveled at the Muslim world, Qutb is also known for his disapproval of the society and culture of the United States which he saw as obsessed with materialism and violence. Views on Qutb vary widely. He has been described by supporters as a great artist and martyr for Islam, but by many Western observers as one who shaped the ideas of Islamistsand particularly of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. See: Robert Irwin, 2001, "Is this the Man Who Inspired Bin Laden?, in *the Guardian*, Thursday 1 November 2001, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/01/afghanistan.terrorism3

are not the true Muslims.[19] Abul A'la Maududi (1903-1979)[20] also insists that both the al-Qur'an and Hadith demand an apostate's execution. He might be faulted for misquoting the Qur'an(9:11-12) as it only says to fight against those who "violate their oaths," but is on more solid footing with the Bukhari's canonized Hadith: "*Man Baddala dinahu faqtuluhu*/Any Muslim who changed his religion, kill him" (Al-Bukhari, Vol. 9, p. 45).[21]

Politics. In Indonesia, radicalism is driven by booth national and international factors. Radical Islam, whatever the name, is a global phenomenon, not typical to Indonesia. It can be found in other Islamic countries, particularly in Iran and Egypt. Many observers say that the Iranian Revolution in 1979 was not only a political phenomenon but also religious. The success of Muslim groups in overtaking the Shah's regime in Iran is more understood as the awakening of such groups rather than a political change and a power shift. The revolution also raised Ayatullah Khomeni as the symbol of resistance against the West, especially the United States. It inspired many Muslims all around the world but in different movements. In Egypt, Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM) is also a typical form of the awakening of radical Muslim. Founded by Hasan Al Banna in 1928, IM represented Islamic concerns about western occupation at its foundation. It established branches in Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Kuwait, Sudan, and Yemen. Several IM activists began to be more radical beginning in the 1970s, highly influenced by Syaid Qutb and Abul A'la Al-Maududi. The intensification of radical Islam was also, in some ways, a response to an increased western hegemony and dominance, especially the US and Israel in the Muslim world.

At the national level, the rise of current radical Muslims took place over 2 phases: before and after Suharto era. During the Suharto era, radicalism started to rise in the 1980s, though historically it was initiated in the 1950s by the NII but its members were always chased and suppressed by the New Order making them operate in secret. In the 1980s, several identified groups were Islam Jamaah in Kediri, which was then changed into LEMKARI, Isa Bugis in Sukabumi, which later moved to Lampung, Jamaah Islam Qur'ani in Jakarta sometimes called

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[19] Sayyid Qutb, 1981, *Milestone* (Translated by Badrul Hasan), Karachi: International Islamic Publisher

[20]Abul A'la al-Maududi (1903-1979) was a Pakistani theologian and a major 20th century Islamist thinker. He was also a prominent political figure in his home country (Pakistan) and was the first recipient of King Faisal International Award for his services to Islam in 1979. He was also the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islamic revivalist party. See: Irfan Ahmad, 2009, *Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

[21] TBA

Inkar Sunnah, the Salman mosque movement of ITB Bandung, and Yogjakarta Islamic Group Movement, etc. Some cases in the 1980s, such as the riots in Tanjung Priok, Lampung, Haur Kuning, the Borobudur temple bombing, and the BCA bombing were assumed to be committed by such groups. Unfortunately, the Suharto regime did not completely eliminate radical Muslim groups prior to its fall in 1998. Many radical figures could not be arrested and arrested figure were released after completing their sentences. As such, their teachings and doctrines were not eliminated. Radicalism gained traction after the World Trade Center disasters, publicly-known as the September 11 Tragedy. This was followed by other attacks in Indonesia, such as the Bali bombing 1, Marriott bombing, etc.[22]

Economics. It cannot be denied that multidimensional crises, which have led to severe malaises, gave birth to many radical Muslim groups in Indonesia. The exclusion of religious ethics in national life became critical points for these movements. As an alternative, they appeal to those looking to return to religious doctrines. Quoting Lance Castell, Najib Burhani et al (2004), explains that, generally, radicalism arises from either individual or mass Muslim groups who feel deprived and disappointed because of multi-dimensional crises. By acting, they attempt to reconstruct new meanings and interpretations in social relationship networks that are currently looking for their direction by propagandizing the appeal for a common identity. Radical Muslims also consider global capitalism as it is associated with a perceived Western neo-imperialism project after independence and the process of growth in developing countries. It is also considered a project to protect and pursue the interests of particular classes. According to radical Muslims, capitalism has forced developing countries—which are predominantly Muslim—to liberalize their economies for foreign products and multinational companies. The companies then seek to accelerate the flow of their products and business by exploiting cheap raw materials and natural resources on a large scale, while taking advantage of cheap domestic workers to ensure that large-scale profits are brought to the companies' home country.[23]

Socio-Cultural Factors. Radical Muslims often report feelings of hatred toward the US and believe in the conspiracy to paralyze Islam. Their statements are all the same: the hatred is caused by American foreign policies that marginalize Islam. The United States even fights Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq and have blindly killed children, women, and the elderly; this has led to anger, humiliation, and revenge. Additionally, many radical Muslims are hostile to the West (especially the US) because they

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[22] Najib Burhani et al, 2005, *op.cit*.
[23]*Idem*

have negative feelings toward western cultures, such as hedonism, consumerism, and permissiveness. Permissive cultures diminish religious values and norms, increase free sex, prostitution, and drug abuse. For these radical Muslims, the West is a direct threat to the civility of Indonesian Muslims, and this value is starting to lose ground.[24]

Media. Media is the main tool for the propagation of religious doctrines resulting from the conservative interpretation by radical Muslim groups. Any Islamic publications, from books of Islam, magazines, to bulletins, have a huge role in the construction of views and religious life of Indonesian community. It is not surprising if those publications grow together with the rise of (radical) religious life. Any media, from those used for business/economic reasons to those with an ideological character, are massively published to disseminate ideas and points of view that they believe and understand as being part of society. The transmission of "radical" media (books, magazines, tabloids, and bulletins) was initiated by graduates from the Al-Azhar University of Cairo, who represented radical Muslim groups in the 1970s and 1980s. They were the initial gate for the dissemination of radical Islamic literature in Indonesia, transmitting the doctrines of Islamic movements from the Middle East, such as IM, Hizbut Tahrir, Jamaati Islami on the basis of some Muslim figures such as Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Taqiy Al-Din Al-Nabhani, Abu Al-A'la Al-Mawdudi and so forth, through their original works that were directly brought to Indonesia, or/and translated into the Indonesian language and published to Muslim society. It seems that books, magazines, tabloids, and bulletins are the most effective media to spread the ideas of radical Muslim groups, which in turn are able to bring quite a big change in the religious understanding of society. Media, therefore, is highly relied on for the socialization of Islamic understanding, as they believe it to be.[25]

THE BOTANIES OF RADICALIZATION

In this section, I will present the botanies of radicalization in Indonesia. According to Martin van Bruinessen (2002), the historical roots of contemporary radical Muslim groups in Indonesia can be traced back to Indigenous radical Muslim groups, namely Masyumi and the DI/Darul Islam (most recently known as the NII/Negara Islam Indonesia).[26] For this study, I choose three samples; not only the DI but also the two other radical Muslim groups, the JI/Jama'ah Islamiyah and the LJ/Laskar Jihad.

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[24]*Idem*

[25]*Idem*

[26] Martin van Bruinessen, 2002, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, in *Southeast Asian Studies* 37/2/2002, pp. 158-175.

The NII was chosen as it originally represents an indigenous radical Muslim group. It has as the "local aspiration" to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. As an indigenous group, the NII creates "their own interpretation of Jihad" especially that espoused by its leader SM Kartosuwiryo. The JI is a splinter group of the NII; it is not only inspired by its roots but also connected to transnational radical Muslim groups, particularly al-Qaeda under the former leadership of Osama bin Laden. Consequently, JI's interpretation of Jihad refers predominantly to that of al-Qaeda. The JI has the transnational aspiration of building a pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia comprising Indonesia, Malaysia and the Southern Philippines. At the same time, the LJ represents a middle-group, in-between the national and transnational radical Muslim groups. It has a "local aspiration" like the NII, especially the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia. Its interpretation of jihad as well as its existence, however, depends highly on similar Salafi groups in the Middle East, especially the *fatwa* (edicts) from several respected ulama from those groups. In the sections below, I will present these three samples of radical Muslim groups, including their origins, ideologies and activism.

Negara Islam Indonesia (NII): Origins, Ideology & Activism

Origins. No understanding of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia is possible without understanding Negara Islam Indonesia/NII and its efforts to establish an Indonesian Islamic State.[27] NII, also originally known as DI (*Darul Islam, an Arabic phrase for Islamic state*), is a Muslim group that aims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. It was started in 1942 by a group of Muslims led by a charismatic politician, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo (1905-1962), who later became the first *imam* (leader) of NII. In its beginnings, NII was divided into 7 KW (*Komando Wilayah* or regional-commands): KW 1 (Priangan Timur, based in Tasikmalaya but encompassing Jakarta, Purwakarta and Cirebon), KW 2 (Centra Java), KW 3 (East Java), KW 4 (South Sulawesi and its environs), KW 5 (Sumatra), KW 6 (Kalimantan), and KW 7 (Serang-Banten, Bogor, Garut, Sumedang and Bandung). It was only in the mid-1970s that two other regional commands were added; KW 8 for Lampung and KW 9 for the greater Jakarta metropolitan area.[28] The group only recognizes *Shari'ah* (Islamic law) as a valid source of law. The group has produced splinters and offshoots that range from JI/Jemaah Islamiyah to non-violent religious groups.

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[27] In this paper, I will use the terms DI and NII interchangeably.
[28] ICG, 2005, 'Recycling Militant in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing', in *Asia Research Report,* No. 92, 22 February 2005.

Ideology. NII's Islamic ideology is primarily defined in its constitution (*Qanun Asasi*) and its threefold concept of *hijrah-iman-jihad* (migration, belief and holy-war).

NII's *Qanun Asasi* consists of a *muqadimah* (introduction) followed by chapters dealing with a number of items. Chapter 1 states that NII has been granted as a gift by *Allah SWT* (God) to the Indonesian nation and it is in the form of republic (*jumhuriyyah*). Islamic law (*shari'ah*) is guaranteed by the state to be practiced for the Islamic community (*ummah)* and the Constitution states explicitly that the state would give the opportunity to followers of other religions to perform their own religious obligations. The Qur'an and Hadith form the highest sources of Islamic law for the State. *Majelis Syuro*/MS (parliament) is the highest legislative body of the state and in the time of emergency, the rights of MS could be transferred to the *imam* (leader) and *dewan imamah* (cabinet). Chapter 2 of NII's *Qanun Asasi* deals with basic regulations concerning membership, sessions and quorum of the MS. Chapter 3 deals with *Dewan Syuro*/DS, which is the executive body of MS. Its function is to carry out the decisions made at MS in meetings with the Government. Chapter 4 is concerned with the power of the state. For NII, its *Imam* holds the power of government in accordance with the *Qanun Asasi*. The *Imam* has power to make laws with the agreement of the MS. The *Imam* should be an Indonesian by birth, a Muslim, and loyal to Allah SWT (God) and His Messengers. The MS appoints the imam by a majority vote of at least 2/3 of all members. The following chapters deal with the planned state's *Dewan Fatwa* (Advisory-Council), *Dewan Imamah* (cabinet), finance, law and justice, Indonesian citizenship, defense, education and economy.[29]

NII also strongly supports the application of three doctrines: *iman* (belief), *hijrah* (migration), and *jihad* (holy-war). This is also a step and strategy to realize an Islamic community (*ummah)* by the mobilizations of three strengths; *quwwatul-aqidah* (the power of faith), *quwwatul-ukhuwah* (the power of brotherhood), and *quwwatul-musallahah* (the power of military). In NII, these three elements or strength are essential in order to establish an Islamic State, especially by means of Jihad.[30]

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[29] This *Qanun Asasi/*constitution was formulated and signed by the *Dewan Imamah* which consisted of following figures: SM Kartosuwiryo (Imam and head of defense), Sanusi Partawidjaja (head of ministry for home affairs and finance), KH Godjali Tusi (head of ministry of justice), Thoha Arsjad (head of ministry of information), Kamran and Raden Oni as members of *Dewan Imamah*. See BJ. Boland, 1982, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia,* The Hague, Netherlands: Nijjhoff, pp. 256-263.

[30] Al-Chaidar, 2002, *Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism, The Darul Islam'a Response Toward Indonesian Democracy, 1949-1982.*

Activism. During the Indonesian revolutionary period, Kartosuwiryo founded his own band of freedom fighters in West Java, called the *Hizbullah* and *Sabilillah*. As a protest against the Renville Agreement signed by Indonesian leaders in 1948, which ceded West Java to the Dutch, Kartosuwiryo proclaimed the NII in West Java on August 7, 1949. The NII did not disband itself after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, which resulted in a clash between the group and the Indonesian government. Rebellious groups in several provinces, including South Sulawesi and Aceh, joined the NII respectively in 1951 and 1953. The NII in South Sulawesi was led by army deserter Kahar Muzakkar (1921-1965), while in Aceh it was led by Teungku Daud Bereueh (1899-1987).

The NII flourished in the 1950s due to chronic instability in the central government during the Liberal Democracy Era. In 1957, it was estimated that the NII controlled one-third of the West Java region and more than 90% of South Sulawesi and Aceh provinces where the government only had control over the cities and towns. At that time, the NII had 15,000 armed guerillas operating under the banner of "TII/*Tentara Islam Indonesia*" (Indonesian Islamic Army). In that year, the NII agents unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Sukarno by throwing grenades at him during a school function in Cikini, Central Jakarta. The implementation of martial law in 1957, followed by the declaration of Guided Democracy by Sukarno in 1959, marked the reversal of fortunes for the NII. Smaller NII bands operating in Central Java under Amir Fatah were crushed by Colonel Ahmad Yani's Banteng Raiders in 1954-1957. The NII army in South Kalimantan under Ibnu Hadjar was forced to surrender in 1959. Amir Fatah was killed in 1954, while Ibnu Hadjar was eventually executed in 1962.

Three years of negotiations (1959–1962) led to a peace agreement that ended the conflict in Aceh, duringwhich Aceh was restored as an autonomous province with special rights for Islamic law (*Shari'ah)*. The introduction of the effective 'fence-of-legs" method of encircling rebel mountain hideouts in 1959 succeeded in breaking the strong rebel grip on rural areas of West Java. In June 1962, Kartosuwiryo was captured in his Geber Mountain hide out near Garut. In captivity, he issued an order for all his followers to surrender, after which he was quickly tried and executed. The last NII band in West Java surrendered in August 1962. Successive military operations also crushed the NII in South Sulawesi. In February 1965, its leader, Kahar Muzakkar, was killed in a military ambush in the interior of Southeast Sulawesi province, marking the end of the NII insurgency in Indonesia.

Despite the group being dismantled, however, underground networks persisted. In the 1970s and 1980s, there were incidents

of "Islamic" terrorism attributed to a group known as the *Komando Jihad* (command of holy-war), the leaders of which were the NII veterans. The period from 1998 on came to be known in NII circles as "the time of many *imams* (leaders)." It generated a new phenomenon: NII group members with no structural affiliation at all. They were different from the "Rings" such as Ring Condet, which operated outside their geographic area but continued to be affiliated to a particular KW. These new groups were loyal to an individual, considered themselves to be part of the NII, but operated entirely outside the formal group.[31]

Jemaah Islamiyah/JI: Origins, Ideology & Activism

Origins. The NII became the core group that led to the birth of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a radical Muslim group established by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. Over the last five decades, the NII has produced splinters and offshoots that range from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to non-violent Muslim groups. Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants inspired by NII's history and the mystique of an Islamic state in Indonesia emerges to give the group a new lease on life.[32]

As I described above, historically NII was established in 1948 in response to the unfavorable Renville Agreement in January 1948. Following the transfer of state authority from the Dutch colonial state to the national government in 1949, NII became involved in violent conflict against the Indonesian military due to its goal to establish an Islamic State. By the mid-1950s, NII was joined by two other groups from Aceh and South Sulawesi; the Indonesian army defeated all three, only to see them revived in the mid-1970s with the help of the Indonesian intelligence. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir joined NII at this time in reaction to Suharto'ssuppression of political Islam. They were arrested in 1979, released in 1982, and fled to Malaysia in 1985 where they developed a community of Indonesian exiles, a majority of whom were NII members. Sungkar also organized the recruitment of NII members to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Suffering from serious internal fractions, NII was fragmented into many factions including the notorious JI. When Sungkar established the group in 1993, he, Baasyir and Hambali became prominent leaders of JI. Social networks linked to JI- and NII-affiliated schools remained

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[31] ICG, 2005, 'Recycling Militant in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing', in *Asia Research Report,* No. 92, 22 February 2005.
[32]*Idem.*

recruiting grounds for new members and shelters for wanted terrorists.[33]

Ideology. According to JI's manual,"PUPJI" (*Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyah*/General Guidelines on the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah), the organization's objective is to create a transnational Islamic state (*Daulah Islamiyah*) comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Southern Philippines. The sources of JI's ideology are therefore both local and international. ***The first source*** is NII's vision of an Islamic state in Indonesia and of armed struggle as the means to attain that end. Sungkar had served as an officer in the NII's leader', Kartosuwiryo's, Islamic Army of Indonesia (TII/*Tentara Islam Indonesia*). Despite the fact that Ba'asyir did not participate in the rebellion, he accepted NII's agenda. ***The second source*** is Middle Eastern Islamic radicalism. Contacts with al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, a terrorist splinter group fromthe Egyptian *Ikhwanul Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) could have influenced JI's move beyond the goal of realizing anIslamic state in Indonesia to the concept of a pan-Islamic caliphate. ***The third and most decisive source*** is the Afghan Jihad and the influence of Afghan war veterans, of whom Hambali was the most prominent, but by no means the only one. The Afghan connection infused the group with the al-Qaeda concept of global jihad and its method of terrorist attacks against the US and Western targets.

The commitment of JI to global jihad is tied to intense feelings of hatred for the US and the West. It is striking that the reasons alleged for the atrocity are of a moral and social order—Westerners corrupting a Muslim country, with the US foreign policy ("crusade under the leadership of America") almost as an afterthought, after some tactical considerations ("a relatively soft target"). It could be that from JI's standpoint, violence is its own justification. The concept of purifying violence is central to JI's ideology. Religious violence is seen as an act of cleansing sins, particularly important in the case of JI members who are former criminals seeking redemption. The militants' commitment was strengthened by having them take an oath of allegiance (*bayat*) to their *emir* or spiritual leader (also an al-Qaeda practice).

The legitimacy and obligation of armed jihad against the West and "apostate" Muslim rulers—a central theme of the teachings of Sayyid Qutb and Mohammed Faraj taken on by Ayman al-Zawahiri and other ideologues of modern radical Islam and assimilated by al-Qaeda—is the ideological intersection of JI

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[33] For further history of DI/NII see Cornelis van Dijk, 1981, *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; Chiara Formichi, 2012, *Islam and the Making of the Nation:Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in the 20th Century Indonesia*, Leiden NL: KITLV.

with the global jihadist movement. The JI members were taught that Muslims who did not subscribe to the group'sideology were to be considered infidels (*kafir)*, as was anyone who left the group. Those who remained enjoyed a sense of exclusivity and commitment and believed that they were closer to Allah SWT (God) and in possession of the truth. Militants were promised martyrdom if they died while engaged in jihad. In adopting this worldview, the members of JI departed not only from the teachings of mainstream Southeast Asian Islam, but also from the mainstream Sunni view that Muslims are not permitted to rebel against a Muslim ruler, and that armed jihad (except when strictly defensive) is not lawful in the absence of a caliph to legitimize it.[34]

Activism. In the beginning, JI's activities were just support operations for al-Qaeda sponsored operations in the Southern Philippines. Another part of their group's activism included funneling financial support to a network of Southeast Islamic extremist groups. Between 1999 and 2001, JI's members were also involved in the bloody conflict between Christians and Muslims in Eastern Indonesia, particularly Ambon and Poso. Thousands of people were reportedly killed during the conflict.[35]

Subsequent terrorist attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by or reliably attributed to JI, as I described in the beginning of this chapter, include an attempt to assassinate the Filipino Ambassador and several bomb attacks on churches in Jakarta, East Java, Batam, Lombok in 2000, Bali Bombing 1 in 2002, the Davao Airport Bombing in the Philippines in 2003, the Marriot Hotel Bombing in Jakarta in 2003, the Australian Embassy Bombing in 2005, Bali Bombing 2 in 2005, and the Ritz Carlton Bombing in 2009.

Laskar Jihad (LJ): Origins, Ideology & Activism

Origin. Laskar Jihad/LJ, established by Ja'far Umar Thalib on 30 January 2000, is the military wing of a group called the FKAWJ/*Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah* (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunna and the Congregation of the Prophet). The group seeks to provide assistance to Muslims in Ambon as the conflict between Christians and Muslims grew, and to establish an Islamic society there. They also claim that they provide humanitarian aid, such as

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[34] Angela Rabasa, 'Radical Islamist Ideology in Southeast Asia', in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 1, 19 May 2005, Washington DC: Hudson Institute.

[35] See 'Indonesia Conflict History' in http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/indonesia.aspx (Accessed on 14 Agustus 2010).

running a hospital in Ambon.[36]According to Thalib, quoted by Greg Fealy (2001), the decision to form LJ came after FKAWJ dispatched a team of researchers to Maluku in late 1999 to gather data on the conflict. It found evidence that Protestant churches had plans to form a breakaway Christian state comprising Maluku, West Papua and North Sulawesi. Remnants of the former Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) based in the Netherlands were actively involved in this movement. A key part of their plan was to wage war on Muslims in those provinces in order to drive them to other areas. Thalib accused it of being a plan for "religious cleansing." When pressed on what evidence there was to support this, he referred to the testimony of Christians "loyal to Indonesia" who had leaked documents detailing the Protestant churches'plans.[37]

Ideology. LJ's doctrines as well as its umbrella, FKAWJ, are well known for its narrow exclusivism. Although the majority of Indonesia's mainstream Muslim groups also consider themselves *Ahlussunnah wal jamaah*, LJ believe that only they can rightly use this ascription. For example, Thalib explains that neither the NU/Nahdlatul Ulama nor the MD/Muhammadiyah, two of the biggest Muslim groups in Indonesia, can claim to be genuinely *Ahlussunnah wal jamaah* because according to Thalib they have deviated from the al-Qur'an and Hadith and have doctrines corrupted by non-Islamic sources as well. LJ also rejects democracy as being "incompatible with Islam" and refuses to support any political party, including more Islamist parties. According to Thalib, in democracy, people who do not understand anything, if they are the majority, can elect their leaders without any educated considerations at all. They only elect those who give them money or say what they want to hear. By these means, religious minorities and nominal Muslims have been able to thwart the application of Islamic law (*shariah*) in Indonesia. In a genuine Islamic society, it is God's law rather than the will of people that is supreme; therefore, LJ calls for democracy to be replaced by a council of experts (*ahlu al-halli wal-aqdi*) dominated by Muslim clerics who are trained in Islamic law. The council would have the power to appoint the head of state and control government policy. Accordingly, LJ declared those Christians in Maluku who were attacking Muslims "*kafir harbi*" (belligerent infidels), the most dangerous category of unbelievers, and, according to Islamic law, Muslims are obliged to wage war against them. In the case of LJ, labeling Christians *kafir harbi* gave a powerful religious license to kill. LJ

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[36] Amy Zalman, 'Laskar Jihad (Indonesia)', in *Terrorism Issue*, See: http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/LaskarJihad.htm
[37] Greg Fealy, 'Inside The Laskar Jihad: An interview with the leader of a new, radical and militant sect ', in *Inside Indonesia,* Edition 65 Jan-March 2001.

subsequently declared the current Islamic year to be the "Year of Jihad" (literally "religious struggle" but also with the connotation of holy war) and stated that any Muslim killed fighting Christian *kafir harbi* would die as martyrs (*syahid*). Thalib explained that in mobilizing LJ, he was merely doing his duty as a Muslim, as, in his opinion, President Abdurrahman Wahid's government was unable or unwilling to protect the Islamic community. If the state was unable to protect Muslims, as Thalib said, then Muslims must do it themselves. Therefore, Abdurrahman's government was anti-Islamic, positioned to suppress Muslim interests and protect those of the infidels. LJ is clearly committed to bringing it down.[38]

Activism. Although established officially in 2000, LJ had already appeared in public in November 1999, when it functioned as part of the protection militia for the parliament, which was put in place by the military. After recruiting its members, LJ conducted military training in several cities, including Surabaya, Malang, Madiun, Jombang, Gresik, and Solo. After the April-mass rally in Jakarta on 6 April 2000, LJ conducted the LGN/*Latihan Gabungan Nasional* (Consolidated National training) in Bogor from 7 to 17 April 2000. This was followed by the deployment of as many as 3000 fighters by the end of April and mid-May 2000 to Maluku where they participated actively in the violent conflict between Christians and Muslims. The goal was to eradicate the RMS (*Republik Maluku Selatan*), the secessionist movement in South Maluku. On 12 February 2002, Christian forces and the LJ signed a peace agreement; it was broken soon after. In late 2001, LJ sent about 750 LJ fighters to Poso Central Sulawesi, another site of Christian and Muslim violence. At that time, LJ also maintained a presence in the Papua region installed in Sorong, Fakfak, Timika, Nabire, Manokwari and Merauke.[39]

LJ was officially dissolved on 7 October 2002. The public was not aware of this, however, until 16 October 2002, a few days after the Bali bombing 1 (BB1) on 12 October 2002. According to Thalib, the dissolution of LJ was decided by its umbrella organization's FKWAJ, legislative board at a meeting in Yogyakarta, from 3 to 7 October 2002. This decision was primarily driven by concern about a growing trend of political involvement among the members. A second reason was a fatwa

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[38] Greg Fealy, 'Inside The Laskar Jihad: An interview with the leader of a new, radical and militant sect ', in *Inside Indonesia,* Edition 65 Jan-March 2001.

[39] See 'Laskar Jihad (LJ)' in http://www.armed-groups.org/6/section.aspx/ViewGroup?id=10 (accessed on October 26 2009). See also Noorhaidi Hassan, 2006, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New-Order Indonesia,* Ithaca NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program; Gerry van Klinken, 2007, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*, London: Routledge.

from Sheikh ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, one of the 7 Salafi *ulama* (Muslim clerics), who had previously endorsed the Jihad in Maluku. The dissolution was very abrupt and many people were surprised; when it happened, thousands of *Mujahidin* (fighters) were still in Ambon. This resulted in an assumption that the decision had resulted from government persuasion or suppression. In addition to this dissolution, LJ also withdrew its *mujahidin* from Maluku.

COUNTER-RADICALISM AND THE DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM

Indonesian government policies on counter-radicalism have changed markedly since Bali bombing1/BB1 in October 2002. Before this, successive post-Suharto governments were either doubtful of the nature of the terrorist threat or reluctant to act against it for fear of backlash from the Muslim community. Following BB1, the Megawati Government's response improved dramatically. The government has allowed unprecedented cooperation between the Indonesian police and intelligence agencies and their foreign counterparts, particularly Australia and the US, and over the past 2 years has prosecuted and convicted more terrorists than any other national government. Other, more politically-sensitive aspects of counter-terrorism have, however, been less adequately dealt with.[40]

Since the Suharto era, Indonesia has historically, according to Tito Karnavian (2010), has employed three strategies of counter-radicalism, with each strategy taking on specific characteristics associated with the specific period and political environment in which it was used. **The first period** was before the fall of Suharto regime in 1998, during which the strategy was military-focused as its dominant role in the regime allowed the army in particular to lead counter-radicalism efforts. In fact, army generals chaired an extra-ordinary institution, Kopkamtib/*Komando Pemulihan Ketertiban dan Keamanan* (Commando for Restoring Security and Order) that was subsequently superseded by Bakorstanas/*Badan Koordinasi Stabilitas Nasional* (Coordination Bureau for National Stability). Under the banner of national stability, this agency had super-powers, with the ability to investigate anything or anyone perceived to pose a threat to national stability, including violent acts and political dissidents. The draconian 1963 *Anti-Subversion Act* further enforced this position. This strategy was quite effective in suppressing radical Muslims groups since some of its leaders such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir fled to

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[40] Greg Fealy & Aldo Borgu, 2005, Local Jihad: Radical Islam & Terrorism in Indonesia, in *Strategy*, ASPI (Australian Strategy Policy Institute), September 2005.

Malaysia for sanctuary. During this period, attacks were rare as most were uncovered. The drawback of this strategy was, however, allegations about human rights abuse and the failure to address the underlying causes of radical Muslim groups, making it possible for the group to revive itself in the future.

The second period was a transitional one between 1998 and 2002 when BB1 took place. During this period, according to Tito Karnavian (2010), there was a sort of disorientation in the counter-radicalism strategy as the strategy was ambiguous. The political role of military had been scaled back and practically did not take on any significant role in counter-radicalism. However, the Indonesian police, which had been expected to take over the counter terrorism role, was not prepared to meet this expectation. The incomplete intelligence data base and the relatively weak capacity to deal with radicalism and even terrorism were the main factors behind this failure. The powerful 1963 *Anti-Subversion Act* was revoked during this period due to overwhelming political pressure from human rights and democratic groups. In fact, the Indonesian police only relied upon the existing, yet less powerful, Criminal Code to investigate the increasing number of terrorist attacks in this period. As a result, many major attacks were not resolved immediately, such as theattack on the Philippines Ambassador and the church bombings in 2000. Although some foreign intelligence counterparts had raised the alarm on the presence of Islamic terrorist networks in the country, Indonesia was not immediately successful in identifying them, let alone prosecuting their leaders.

The third period according to Tito Karnavian (2010) has been ongoing since 2002. BB1 in 2002 had clearly galvanized the Indonesian government to take stern actions against radicalism and even terrorism, moving forward by tasking law enforcement apparatus to reveal the case, bring perpetrators to justice and unveil their networks. While this signifies the adoption of a law-enforcement-focused strategy with the Indonesian police at thefront, it does not mean that other counter-terrorism tools have been put aside. Accordingly, uncovering who was behind BB1 was able to be completed in the immediate aftermath of the attack. Since then, the Indonesian polices have been able to maintain a successful counter-terrorism program, leading many successful interrogative operations around the country. By 2009, more than 400 individuals have been arrested and convicted and the full terrorist and radical networks have been uncovered.[41] Furthermore, the Indonesia police through its 88 Anti-terror Detachment (known as *Densus 88)* has run certain programs specifically designed to halt or reverse the radicalization process,

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[41] Tito Karnavian, 2010, *The Soft Approach Strategy in Coping with Islamist Terrorism in Indonesia*, unpublished paper.

or to prevent it from occurring in the first place since 2005. The program is widely known as the Deradicalization Program.

DAKWAH AND SILATURAHMI:
The Indonesian Police Force's Soft Approach to Deradicalization

Following JI's First Bali Bombing, an experimental deradicalization program was developed and implemented by the leader of the *Densus 88* in the course of its interaction with the JI detainees. The Indonesian approach to deradicalization operates at two levels: (1) it seeks to develop intelligence on the terrorist network, and (2) to return detainees to society. In this program, police interrogators and former radicals play a leading role in disengagement efforts. A team of psychologists and Islamic scholars assist the Indonesian police develop interrogation methods.

The program aims at neutralizing the ideological foundation of Muslim extremists and is based on two key premises. **First,** the belief that extremists will only listen to other extremists is driven by the premise that while moderate Muslims may have role to play in counter-radicalization, there is no place for them in deradicalization as Muslim extremists reject them as they have failed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. What is needed therefore is a deradicalized extremist with a different view, in this case on suicide bombings, to talk to other extremists. **Second,** the belief that the police can change an individual's propensity toward jihad through kindness operates on the assumption that government officials are by definition anti-Islamic. This premise taps into one of the most deep-seated jihadist beliefs dating back to the NII rebellion of 1948-1965. It was these rebellions that pitted nationalist republican ideals against those of an Islamic state. The violence experienced by the NII fighters as the state crushed rebellions left lasting distrust and hatred of government institutions and officials. As the JI is deeply rooted in NII culture, it is not surprising that it sees the Indonesian government as infidel (*kafir)* starting with everyone who works for or with the government who are considered to be enemies while all products offered by the government are considered *haram* (religiously forbidden). The Indonesian police believe that if they could overcome this distrust and could get the prisoners to accept its assistance, then other deeply-held jihadists' tenets would also be questioned.[42]

In 2008, for example, there were approximately 170s jihadists in Indonesian prisons. These jihadists can be divided into three

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[42] Kirsten E Schulze, 2008, "Indonesia's Approach to Jihadist De-radicalization", in *Combating Terrorism Center*, 15 July 2008.

categories: the Afghan alumni, the JI members, and individuals from smaller groups who were involved in the Ambon and Poso conflicts such as the Mujahidin KOMPAK, the Laskar Jundullah and the Ring Banten (splinter of JI). Around 25 Afghan Alumni are mainly former prisoners and they have received the most systematic attention, partially driven by the fact that key deradicalizers, Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, come from this pool and selected their initial targets from the same circle. The deradicalization program, however, has been broadened since with Abas going around prisons across Indonesia, handing out money with the promise of increased perks for greater cooperation.[43]

The reason for choosing this soft power approach is because of applying "hard power" could not alone stop the production of new recruits with violent intentions; in fact, hard power methods would often led to greater radicalization in the small JI community. Additionally, the police simply lack the resources to find and arrest every JI member. With porous borders and weak identification and immigration systems, there was simply no way to use traditional methods to stop the operations and movement of geographically-savvy terrorists. What was also needed was a way to address the spread of the group's radical ideas. In the implementation of this approach, there is no formal interrogation and dialogue. The most appropriate individuals to interact with the terrorists are considered to be, paradoxically, those who are directly involved in the arrest and interrogation or ex-militants who can speak with the authority of experience in the terrorist group. The approach also requires the police and its team to treat the prisoners humanely and to develop bonds of trust. It is said that the deradicalization program is on behalf of a religious obligation to help the prisoners find peaceful Islam. The program, so far, is delivered in the form of *Dakwah* (preaching) and *Silaturahmi* (courtesy visit).

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[43]*Idem.*

DAKWAH & SILATURAHMI PROGRAM[44]

ISLAND	*LP/RUTAN/OTHERS*
Sumatra	*LP Tanjung Gusta Medan, Rutan Poltabes Medan, LP Bengkulu*
Java	*LP Cipinang Jakarta, Rutan Salemba Jakarta, Mabes Polri Jakarta, LP Paledang Bogor, Rutan Medaeng Surabaya, Marko Brimob Jakarta, LP Sukamiskin Bandung, Tahanan Narkoba Polda Jakarta, LP Nusakambangan Cilacap, LP Cirebon, LP Ambarawa, LP Kedungpane Semarang, LP Kalisosok Surabaya, LP Porong Sidoarjo, LP Wirogunan Yogyakarta, LP Lamongan, LP Malang*
Bali	*LP Krobokan Denpasar, Rutan Polda Bali*
Ambon	*LP Ambon*
Sulawesi	*LP Gunungsari Makassar, Rutan Poltabes Manado, LP Ampana, Rutan Maese Palu, LP Patobo Palu, Rutan Polres Poso*
Kalimantan	*LP Balikpapan*

In the *Dakwah* and *Silaturahmi* Program, Nasir Abas, a former JI leader who has recently helped the Indonesian police with its deradicalization program, has met around 200 militants, including some who are not in prisons. During the program, participants are persuaded to cooperate with the police and some actually agree, while others call him a traitor (*murtad;* apostate) and refuse. A number of ex-militants have joined him in trying to persuade others to renounce violence; most prefer to remain anonymous. In addition to Abas, other repentant extremists include Ali Imron and Mubarok, both of whom are serving life sentences for their role in BB1.[45]

At the heart of changing the image of the police is called soft power, which amounts to money and in-kind aid. From2003 to 2008, for example, the Indonesian police have assisted the families of the jihadist in the program, ranging from paying school fees to making sure that their children remain in school by providing their wives with money to feed and clothe the family, allowing greater family access to the prisoners, even providing plane tickets for family members, allowing prisoner's weddings, assuring that prisoners are treated well, and providing medical care. At the same time, the Indonesian police mix with prisoners, engaging in religious discussion, praying and breaking Ramadhan (*iftar*) together. Upon release, the prisoners are provided with identity cards and papers as well as start-up money.[46]

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[44] Petrus Golose, 2009, *Deradikalisasi Terorisme: Humanis, Soul Approach dan Menyentuh Akar Rumput*, Jakarta: Penerbit YPKIK
[45] Nasir Abas, Interview. Jakarta, October 2010.
[46]Similarly, the Saudi deradicalization program pays attention prisoners' social needs. The psychological and social sub-committee evaluates each participant

A critical part of the program is reuniting the inmates with their families, to remind them of their earthly responsibilities as husbands and fathers. The police pay for the families' travel expensesand give them some additional financial assistance. Nasir Abas explains that JI adherents practice *hijrah* (migration), leaving their families and their property to join the jihad. The deradicalization program's philosophy in response is to take them from *hijrah* and back to their families. He further explains:

> *The Indonesian police arrest a suspect and stay with him, pray with him, discuss family matters. Not Jihad. Not hijrah. The police tell him that he has not seen his family for many years. After the police gain his trust, they tell him that they can arrange a meeting with his mother, his wife, and his children.*[47]

In order to evaluate the program, the Indonesian police classify the level of detainees.

LEVEL OF DETAINEES[48]

Level 1	*Those who received financial and other assistance from the police, felt guilty, and cooperated with the police (encouraged others to cooperate or helped police to detect terrorist network).*
Level 2	*Those who received financial and other assistance from the police, felt guilty, but did not cooperate with the police.*
Level 3	*Those who received financial and other assistance from the police, but did not feel guilty, and did not cooperate with the police.*
Level 4	*Those who received financial and other assistance from the police, did not feel guilty, but cooperated with the police.*
Level 5	*Those who did not receive financial and other assistance from the police, did not feel guilty, and did not cooperate with the police.*
Level 6	*Those who are joining an on-going program or are not yet in one.*

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to determine how best the advisory-committee can assist them and their family. For example, once a breadwinner is incarcerated, the committee provides the family with an alternate salary. Other needs, including children's schooling and family healthcare are also provided. This is intended to offset further radicalization brought on by the detention family members. Kirsten E Schulze, 2008, "Indonesia's Approach to Jihadist De-radicalization", in *Combating Terrorism Center*, 15 July 2008.

[47] Nasir Abas, interview, Jakarta, October 2010.

[48] Petrus Golose, 2009, *op.cit*

Those involved in the program estimate that some 85 percent of the detainees respond positively in some fashion, ranging from accepting assistance to publicly recanting and becoming actively engaged in deradicalization and counter-radicalization activities.

LEVEL OF COOPERATION[49]

High Level	*Recant publicly and participate openly in the deradicalization of other militants*
	Cooperate privately in the deradicalization of other militants
	Provide information to the police
Low Level	*Accept assistance*

Further information about the result of the deradicalization program since2007 is as follows:

RESULT OF DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM (2007)[50]

LEVEL	NUMBER OF DETAINEES
Level 1	103
Level 2	12
Level 3	8
Level 4	3
Level 5	26
Level 6	86
TOTAL	238

According to ICG (2007), however, such deradicalization programs also reveal at least five weaknesses. **First,** while the idea that only radicals have the credibility to challenge other radicals makes sense, it has a limited shelf-life as any radical who is cooperating with the police will eventually become discredited. **Second,** the ideological deradicalization itself is limited. While the killing of civilians by suicide bombings is being challenged, the jihadist violence perpetrated in the Ambon and Poso conflicts has been condoned. **Third,** there is no structured, thought-out, or even government-funded rehabilitation program to deal with the jihadist prisoners who are released from jail. Many of them have few skills, no work, little money and few opportunities outside their familiar circles. That means effectively that they return into the jihadist community to which they are often tied by marriage links and are re-exposed to militant ideas. **Fourth**, the lack ofanofficial budget for this program not only leads to accountability problems, but if, as a result of financial difficulties, the police fail to deliver on promises for assistance after release, these JI members will look elsewhere, most likely

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[49]*Idem*

[50]*Idem*

within jihadist circles; moreover, disillusioned ex-prisoners will not be as interested in sharing information with the police. **Fifth**, the Indonesian prison system and prison corruption are undermining the deradicalization program. Jihadist prisoners have been able to spread their ideas to non-jihadists in integrated prisons and have been able to radicalize moderate jihadists in segregated prisons. Prison corruption has allowed for the proliferation of mobile phones and laptops among jihadists who have been involved in the planning of further operations as well as the translation of Arab jihadist literature and its dissemination. The prison system is therefore undermining the deradicalization program to such an extent that the Indonesian police are doing their best to keep top terrorists at police headquarters, out of the normal prison system, because the chances of backsliding are so high.[51]

Despite these weaknesses, the program, according to Kirsten Schulze (2008), has been hailed as a clear success story by the Indonesian police. In the Indonesian counter-radicalism context, with the military sidelined and the BIN/Badan Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Agency) having little if any grasp of the situation, it certainly is. Instead, the value of the program lies in the insight the police have obtained into the complexities of JI by talking to jihadist prisoners, which has allowed the police to fine tune its operations. Also, irrespective of whether anyone absorbs the religious counseling, the deradicalization program has created a link between the Indonesian police and the JI prisoners and ex-prisoners through which the force receives a steady stream of information about who is doing what. Most importantly, its value lies in the holistic approach to reaching out not only to prisoners but also to their families and their communities without stigmatizing them, while, at the same time, conducting more conventional counter-terrorism operations. That has been the real success, and that is the area that other countries contemplating the deradicalization programs should be considering.[52]

THE PROBLEM OF FINDING SUITABLE TERMINOLOGY: DERADICALIZATION, DISENGAGEMENT OR SOMETHING ELSE?

Deradicalization, according to Omar Ashour (n.d.) is a process of relative change, as an individual or extremist group reverses its radical behavior and ideology to abandon and delegitimize the use of violent methods to achieve their goals while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context. Ashour explains that deradicalization can either be an ideological or behavioral

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[51] ICG (International Crisis Group), 2007, "Deradicalization and Indonesian Prisons", in *Crisis Group Asia Report* No. 142, November 19 2007, p. 16
[52] Kirsten E Schulze, 2008, *op.cit.*

transformation away from radicalism. The first results from a change in beliefs, whereas the latter emphasizes changes in actions.[53]

Furthermore, Ashour (2009) explains that the deradicalization program is a process of working to combat extremism in groups that have already committed violence. There are three prevalent dimensions to deradicalization programs. **First** is the behavioral dimension, which requires the abandonment of violence. **Second** is ideological dimension, which delegitimizes the use of violence. **Third** is the organizational dimension, relating to structural changes within an organization's leadership. However, the deradicalization of extremist groups or individuals is not always limited to these three dimensions. For instance, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in Libya was deradicalized by altering its ideology and behavior, whereas the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in Algeria only deradicalized for pragmatic reasons and did not change its ideological views on the use of violence. The Islamic Group of Egypt was successfully deradicalized after changing all three elements. Based on his research in those three countries, Ashour comes to the conclusion that the success of any deradicalization process in North Africa depends heavily on three factors: the dynamics between the spiritual and organizational leadership within a group; the group's interaction with the society; and, third, the domestic political circumstance of the country in which the group operates. Experience shows that increased state-repression drives extremist groups or individuals to become more radicalized. However, in some cases, heavy state-repression can lead to the opposite and drive groups to give up violence against the state, most remarkably in the case of Egypt's Islamic Group. Ashour explains that the prison conditions play big role in helping to further radicalize individuals opposed to the state. While third parties like local clerics and Sheikhs are useful for supporting a deradicalization process and maintaining its success, deradicalization is most effective when it begins within the extremist group.[54]

Furthermore, Ashour also explains that previous research on deradicalization processes concludes that a combination of charismatic leadership, state repression, interactions with the "other" as well as within the organization, and selective inducements from the state and other actors are common causes of the deradicalization process. There is a pattern of interaction between these factors leading ultimately to deradicalization in many of the extremist Muslim as well as in non-Muslim cases. State repression and interaction with the "other" often affects the

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[53] Omar Ashour, No Year, *The Phenomenon of Islamist and Jihadist Deradicalization*, see: www.EzineArticles.com/?expert=OmarAshour.
[54] Omar Ashour, 2009, Deradicalization in Egypt, Algeria and Libya, see: www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1325&prog=zru.

ideas and behaviors of the leadership of extremist groups and possibly encourages them to begin three endogenous processes: strategic calculations, political learning, and ideology revision(s).[55]

John Horgan (2009) distinguishes deradicalization from disengagement. He emphasizes that deradicalization entails cognitive as well as behavioral aspects, which, as he argues, should be separated. Disengagement then focuses on the behavioral aspects.[56] Horgan explains:

> *While deradicalization has become the latest buzzword in counter terrorism, it is critical that we distinguish it from disengagement and stress that not only are they different, but that just because one leaves terrorism behind; it rarely implies (or even necessitates) that one become de-radicalized [...]. Disengagement might suggest critical cognitive and social changes, in terms of leaving behind the shared social norms, values, attitudes and aspiration so carefully forged while the individual was still a member of a terrorist network.[57]*

Furthermore, Horgan (2005) describes disengagement as a process in which an individual's role within an extremist group changes from violent participation to a less active role.[58] Horgan finds the process of disengagement is different for each individual.[59] He also underscores that disengagement alone does not necessarily bring about deradicalization and that deradicalization does not necessarily accompany disengagement.[60] However, the factors seen in disengagement may provide the tools to create a strategy toward deradicalization, including both physical and psychological factors. Physical factors in disengagement can consist of apprehension and imprisonment by security services, being kicked out of the group, or even a change of individual's role within the group.

[55] Omar Ashour, 2009, *The De-radicalization of Jihadist: Transforming Armed Islamist Movement*, London, New York: Routledge.
[56] Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan (Eds.), 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge. See also John Horgan, 2008, Deradicalization or Disengagement, in *Perspective on Terrorism.*
[57] John Horgan *op.cit*.
[58] John Horgan, 2009, *Walking Away From Terrorism*, New York: Routledge, p. 152
[59] John Horgan, Deradicalization or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarify and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation, in *Perspective on Terrorism 2*, No. 4 (February 2008), p. 5
[60] John Horgan, Individual Disengagement: A Psychological Analysis, in John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo (eds.), 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge, p. 28

Psychological factors may include negative influences from the group, the development of negative sentiments towards the group, changing priorities for individual, or disillusionment with the group'spolitical aims and actions.[61]

There has been recent debate about suitable term for the process. In the academic milieu, in addition to deradicalization and disengagement, there are also several scholars who pose different terms referring to certain motives, goals and forms, from former radical Muslims such as de-ideologization, rehabilitation, reeducation, de-programming. In the Indonesian context, these terms are not used and are predominantly rejected by many former radical Muslims as they have been allegedly introduced by the West and perceived as part of the Western propaganda to combat radical Muslim figures and group.

In this study, I prefer to use the phrase, "Transformation of Jihad," as it reflects what former radical Muslims regarding the change of their religious ideology and activism have suggested. Originally, this phrase was often mentioned by Nasir Abas in my interviews with him during my fieldwork and was accepted by other former radical Indonesian Muslims. In addition to using that term, however, to make it easier for the reader to understand the focus of this study, I still include and use the term of deradicalization and disengagement.

**DERADICALIZATION:
LESSONS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES**

The experience of deradicalization is, in fact, not a new phenomenon and is not an exclusively Indonesian case. We can easily find such phenomena from the past and from foreign-radical Muslims. According to Jacobston (2010),[62] for instance, over the past several years al-Qaeda leadership has faced increased pressure on the battlefield as the US and its allies have stepped up their efforts to track down and kill key figures in the group. What may be even more damaging to the long-term health of the organization is, however, the number of important leaders, clerics and ideologues that have begun to turn againstal-Qaeda. The most prominent is former Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) head, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl. Al-Qaeda often cited his treatises as ideological justification for its action. His book, *al-'Umda fi I'dad al-'Udda* (The Essentials of Being Ready [for Jihad]) was used as a jihadist manual in Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. However, Dr. Fadl has

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[61] John Horgan, 2005, *op.cit*, pp. 149-150.
[62] Michael Jacobson, 2010, *Terrorist Drop-Out, Learning from those who have left*, Policy Focus #101, January 2010, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

now firmly renounced Osama bin Laden and has written a new book rejecting al-Qaeda's messages and tactics.[63]

There are several other important high-level deradicalized figures. Sheikh Salman bin al-Awdahwas a radical cleric whose incarceration by the Saudis in 1990s reportedly helped inspire Osama to take action. In September 2007, al-Awdah went on television to decry al-Qaeda's actions, asking Osama: "*How much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly and women have been killed [...] in the name of al-Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions of victims on your back?*"[64] Similarly, Hassan Hatab, one of the founders of the Salafi group for Preaching and Combat (GSPCI, which is now called al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), has repeatedly and publicly called on the members of his former organization to disarm and accept the Algerian government's amnesty offer. Six leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a long time al-Qaeda ally, have also recently issued recantations challenging al-Qaeda's global vision for jihad in a book of more than 400 pages entitled, *Corrective Studies in Understanding Jihad, Accountability and the Judgment of the People.*

These recent and highly-significant developments involving former leaders and ideologues follow a long history of deradicalization that has plagued al-Qaeda since its early days, despite its reputation for ferocity, secrecy, and script de corps. Such de-radicalized figures include 3 former members who turned against the organization and later served as key US government witnesses in the embassy bombing trials in early 2001. They include: (1) Jamal al-Fadl, a Sudanese national who was one of the first al-Qaeda members and was involved in the unsuccessful efforts in the early 1990s to procure uranium for the organization; (2) Essam al-Ridi, an Egyptian who first travelled to Afghanistan in 1982 to fight the Soviet-Union and later purchased an airplane in the US for al-Qaeda; and (3) L'Houssaine Khrechtou, a Moroccan who joined the organization in 1991 and trained to serve as Osama personal pilot.

Deradicalization from al-Qaeda has continued since the September 11 Attacks. For instance, Sajid Badat, a young

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[63] During his imprisonment in 2004, Dr. Fadl wrote *Wathiqat Tarshid Al-'Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w'Al-'Alam* (Document of Right Guidance for Jihad Activity in Egypt and the World). The draft then was published as a book and in a serial form by al-Jarida Kuwait and al-Masri al-Yaum in Nopember to December 2007 under the title *Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World*. See. Lawrence Wright, 2008, "The Rebellion Within, An al-Qaeda Mastermind Questions to Terrorism", in *www.newyorker.com*, 2 June 2008.

[64] It was in 2007 around the 6th anniversary of 9/11 when al-Awdah addressed such questions to al-Qaeda's leaders on the MBC TV channel, a widely watched Middle Eastern television network.

Muslim from England trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan to use a shoe bomb to destroy aircraft, was assigned to target airliners travelling from Europe to the US. When his associate, Richard Reid, now better known as the shoe-bomber, unsuccessfully attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami, Badat abandoned the plot, leaving his dismantled bomb in his parent's house. Al-Qaeda is hardly alone among global radical Muslim groups in experiencing deradicalization. Some of its affiliates have had important losses as well, ranging from foot soldiers to key leadership personnel. Noman Benotman, a former leader of the al-Qaeda-affiliated LIFG who now lives in London abandoned the Jihadist cause, turning against al-Qaeda first privately, and then more publicly. Benotman also played a key role in facilitating the recent public deradicalization of other former LIFG leaders. In June 2008, Abu Hadhifa, a longtime veteran of the Algerian jihad who had risen to become commander of AQIM's forces in Eastern Algeria, dropped out of the organization and turned himself in to Algerian authorities.[65]

The phenomenon of deradicalization is not limited to al-Qaeda or its affiliates. Hamas has also experienced deradicalization. Anotable example is that of Mosab Hassan Yousef, the son of a prominent Hamas leader, who abandoned the group and moved to the US in 2006, converting to Christianity in the process. Less radical Islam groups are also far from immune. Hizbut Tahrir (HT) has been interfered with by numerous deradicalizations over the past several years. The most visible were those of Majid Nawaz and Ed Husain, who went public with their concerns about the group and founded the Quilliam Foundation, which they describe as Britain's first Muslim counter-extremism think-tank.

Ed Husain even released his memoir-book in 2007[66] entitled: *The Islamist, Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left*. This book, as its title suggests depicts the story of Husain's experience after his activism in an Islamist group. In his testimony he simply explains his story:

> *When I was sixteen I became an Islamic fundamentalist. Five years later, after much emotional turmoil, I rejected fundamentalist teaching and returned to normal life and my family. As I recovered my faith and mind, I tried to put my experience behind me, but as the events of 7/7 unfolded it became clear to me that Islamist groups pose a threat to this country that we,*

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[65] Michael Jacobson, 2010, *op.cit*

[66] Ed Husain, 2007, *The Islamist Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I saw inside and why I left*, London England: Penguin Books.

Muslims and non-Muslims alike, do not yet understand.

He also explains his objective forwriting his story:

Why are young British Muslims becoming extremists? What are the risks of another home-grown terrorist attack on British soil? By describing my experiences inside these groups and the reasons I joined them, I hope to explain the appeal of extremist thought, how fanatics penetrate Muslim communities and the truth behind their agenda of subverting the West and moderate Islam. Writing candidly about life after extremism, I illustrate the depth of the problem that now grips Muslim hearts and minds and lay bare what politicians and Muslim's community leaders do not want you to know. This is the first time an ex-member openly discusses life within radical Islamic organizations. This is my story.[67]

Deradicalization Programs: Experience from Several Countries

Similar to individual deradicalization, deradicalization programs are also, in fact, not exclusive to Indonesia. We can easily find some programs run by several foreign countries. These countries often come together to hold an annual event at which all representative of deradicalization programs from several countries meet to share their methods, progress, results and evaluation of the deradicalization program. In this section, I will present the experience of the programs run by several countries.

Any discussion about the decision to release imprisoned extremist back into society raises challenging questions, including: (1) Where will they go? (2) Who will monitor them?; (3) Will they re-offend?; (4) Can they be turned away from extremism while in prison?;and (5) Will any recidivism rate prove acceptable to the public? In addition to the security challenges raised by issues to do with changing extremist behavior, resentment and feelings of injustice among victims of extremism accompany even preliminary discussions about these issues. In recent years, however, a growing number of countries have come to accept the view, implicitly or otherwise, that their respective national security interests may be served by exploring how to facilitate and manage the re-integration of convicted extremist back into society. In specific cases, a perception has

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[67] Ed Husain, 2007, *The Islamist Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I saw inside and why I left*, London England: Penguin Books.

taken root that such efforts might be expressed through attempts to change extremist behavior, primarily by rehabilitating or otherwise deradicalizing those that have been detained as a result of their engagement in extremist operations. In some situations, these efforts have manifested through fully-fledged behavioral change programs with formal titles and specific terminology. They work in varied ways and carry context-specific expectations around what constitutes success. However, despite their heterogeneity, at the cornerstone of each of these programs is the idea that extremists can be engaged such that there is a subsequent reduced risk of re-engagement in extremism upon release.

Yemen. Following the attack of the USS Cole in 2000 and the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002, Yemeni President Saleh was widely criticized. It became clear that new-methods for countering extremism were necessary to suppress al-Qaeda within Yemen's borders. To this end, Saleh acted fast and implemented a new initiative whereby five religious scholars were selected to form what would become the RDC (Religious Dialogue Committee). Saleh appointed Hamoud al-Hitar, a widely-respected judge, as its head. The basis for RDC rests on the idea that since the political killing of civilians' has a **faulty intellectual foundation**, the core tenets of extremism can be disputed, thus weakening the attitudes presumed to underpin support for terrorist activity. To achieve this attitude change, al-Hitar and the rest of RDC debate extremism with those captured and imprisoned. Al-Hitar claims that many of the captured extremists have several parts of the Qur'an memorized as justification for their support of and participation in extremism. Accordingly, the RDC tends to challenge extremists not on the content but on their *understanding* of the Qur'an verses and Hadith. In a published statement explaining the philosophy and operation of RDC, al-Hitar explains that the subjects that he and other religious scholars invite the participants to discuss include the place of jihad in Islam and its justification, relationships between Muslim and others, the concept of a state, government and ruler rights in Islam, with the basis for debate being mutual respect. Al-Hitar engages captured extremist in a "dialogue at eye level." The meetings are small and intimate –between 5 and 7 extremists' per-session. Once the meeting concludes, participants document and sign off on what they have discussed and learned. After weeks of debate, if the prisoners renounce violence and (if applicable) their extremist group, they are released and offered vocational training and help finding employment. While tangible rewards offered at the conclusion of the program provide some of the basis for the program's claimed success, al-Hitar claims that argument-based-dialogue has become an essential element of Yeman's policy to countering extremism. Al-Hitar feels that most extremists are ordinary people who were led astray (they are "the

deceived") and that they can be led back to a non-violent existence if only they are approached with respect.[68]

Singapore. The RRG (Religious Rehabilitation Group) was established after the government's initial round up of 33 JI operatives in Singapore, which began in late 2002. Two ustadz assessed the detainees in conjunction with the government's Internal Security Department (ISD). Mohamed Ali, a member of MUIS, and Mohamed Hasbi bin Hasan, the president of PERDAUS, noted that the detainees possessed a dangerous misunderstanding of some basic Islamic concepts. In order to counter what the two scholars deemed a threat to the community as embodied in the JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) ideology, they established RRG with the concurrence of the government as an attempt to correct these misunderstandings through counseling. Volunteers from Singaporean Asatidz were solicited to administer the counseling with the goal of correcting their misinterpretation of Islam. Eventually, counseling family members (using the female ustadz to counsel detainees' wives) was also offered to break down the religious misunderstanding and ideological support in the detainees' household. This voluntary family counseling was tied to tangible support provided by the IACC (Inter-agency After Care Committee) in the form of skills training for the wife and financial support for their children in the form of school fees and spending money. Since 2003, RRG counselors have conducted more than 800 sessions, with each detainee seen once a week for two hours, with one Ustadz per detainee or family. RRG notes that detainees have a distorted view of Islam that plays upon their inability to cope with a pluralistic and secular society. They use the manipulated version of religion supplied by extremist teachers as an outlet for social frustrations. Many detainees, when given the choice to engage with the counselors from the *Ustadz*, ask specific questions about the morality of using violence in the name ofreligion. By securing support from the community to reform extremists, starting with the discussion with the *Ustadz* and gradually involving reintroduction into mainstream society, RRG claims some success in curbing extremism. To date, approximately 44 terrorist detainees (the total includes a small number of MILF members) have graduated from their DO (Detention Order) or imprisoned status and have been released into the community on RO (Restriction Order) status, which subjects them to close monitoring and regulates their actions. Those who are released on

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[68] Amanda Johnston, 2009, *Assessing The Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs on Islamist Extremist*, a published-master thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, USA: California.

RO status serve an average of only 3 years in jail. A few have been reformed to the extent that they have the RO status lifted.[69]

Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, the main approach to counter imprisoned extremists consists of a deradicalization-counseling program aimed at countering religious ideologies held by the extremists. Although it is similar to recent approaches applied by other countries, the Saudi program is known as the most comprehensive and well-funded program of all current deradicalization programs. It consists of religious reeducation, psychological counseling for participants, and reintegration processes after release from prison. A group within the Saudi Ministry of the Interior, commonly-known as the AC (Advisory Committee), is responsible for administrating the deradicalization program. The AC is composed of four sub-committees. The *first* is the Religious Sub-committee, which provides counseling through approximately 150 clerics and scholars who engage in dialogue and debate with prisoners. A primary factor in selecting clerics is based on their ability to communicate and whether it is conducive to dialogue. The *second* is the Psychological and Social Sub-committee, which is involved in the counseling process and is comprised of approximately 50 mental health specialists and social scientists responsible for assessing and diagnosing prisoner's psychological problems and behaviors. The subcommittee also evaluates whether a participantis sincere in his desire for rehabilitation and to evaluate the prisoner's family to determine what support they need. The *third* is the Security Sub-committee, which evaluates potential security risks among participants and makes recommendations on their release. It also monitors participants after their release. Released participants are required to check in with the subcommittee on a regular basis. The *fourth* and final committee is the Media Sub-committee, which produces educational materials used in counseling sessions and religious classes for prisoners. It also produces other materials to be used in Saudi schools and mosques and functions as an outreach and organizing education and training programs targeting young Saudi males who may be exposed to radical view points. The purpose of this subcommittee is to generate and reinforce the message against extremism and extremist thought. Besides this committee, the ability to segregate extremists from the general population is important in preventing radicalization. Saudi Arabia has addressed prison concerns by building 5 new prisons specifically to support their deradicalization programs. Each prison can hold approximately 1, 200 prisoners, designed to accommodate the program needs. Unlike typical Saudi prisons where large groups of individuals are housed together in large

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[69] Paul Pendelton, 2008, *Countering Terrorist Ideology: A Rational Actor and Game Theoretic Analysis of De-radicalization Programs for al-Jemaah al-Islamiyyah (JI) Prisoners in Singapore and Indonesia*, a published-master thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School , USA: California.

cells, the new prisons allow for the segregation of individuals. Saudi officials are careful not to house common criminals in the same locations as extremists to prevent radicalization of the former. The new prisons contain individual self-contained cells equipped with TV that can be used to transmit selected programs and lectures. The cells are constructed to minimize contact between the prisoners and the guards, and also to prevent communication among individual prisoners. All cells and interrogation rooms are equipped with cameras that serve the purpose of preventing abuse against prisoners. This new Saudi prison design is also accommodating for the prisoner's family. As family participation is considered a vital part of the rehabilitation process. The new prisons include designated locations to allow for visitation with family members, and married prisoners are allowed conjugal visits with their spouses in rooms set aside for the purpose.[70]

LITERATURE REVIEW: LIMITED STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL DERADICALIZATION IN INDONESIA

While increased government action is promising and several types of deradicalization programs have had some measure of success, governments have often fallen short because they fail to rely adequately on empirical evidence to determine which approaches are likely to work. Perhaps the most glaring deficiency is how little attention they have paid to why people who are radicalized, sometimes to the point of violence, decide to leave radical groups. Over the past several years, for example, al-Qaeda has been put on the defensive in the international context by a small but growing cadre of Muslims who are challenging its strategic use of violence, especially against fellow Muslims. Former terrorists are turning against their old groups, which is contributing to the expansion of existing groups fissures. While these are positive developments that may significantly help to prevent the next wave of potential terrorist from adopting terrorism, we must ask what effect these renunciations will have on current radicals and on others on the path or radicalism. What could turn a would-be radical away from this path? Would messages from former radicals carry particular weight? Unfortunately, the answers to these important questions are fairly limited at this point. In order to gain more insight into these issues and more effective answers to these fundamental questions, thereby creating an effective counter-radicalism strategy, we must explore real-life cases.[71]

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[70] Amanda Johnston, 2009, *Assessing The Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs on Islamist Extremist*, a published-master thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, USA: California.

[71] Micahel Jacobson, 2010, *Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from those who have left*, Policy Focus #101, January 2010, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

A review of the literature shows that there has been significant work on deradicalization and disengagement. However, regarding the study of both radicalization (and I think also of deradicalization), Zilfirdaus Adnan (2007) encouraged avoiding two things, namely approaches that betray mono-causal explanations and those with an imbalanced focus. Many studies use an approach that seeks to reduce the causes of radicalism and terrorism to a few overriding factors. Thus, some academics claim that radical and terrorist activities are encouraged chiefly by ideology, religious, political and economic zealotry. Hassan and Ramakhrishna, for instance, emphasize the role of Islamism in motivating suicide bombers. This argument was rejected by Pape (2005) who used demographic data on a greater number of suicide terrorists from around the world to argue that religion or ideology has a little to do with terrorist attacks. Instead, he argued that the underlying motivation for suicide attacks is an attempt to remove foreign troops from the homeland, or to overthrow governments installed by a foreign power. Finally, Barton (2005) and Sageman (2004) conclude that networks of family and friends are the most important factors in promoting terrorist activities. Some authors such as Post (1990) also have resorted to psychological explanations, but these often seek to account for terrorism in terms of an individual mental imbalance or abnormality; these studies are frequently inadequate with the common shortcoming that they are unable to fully account for the variety of factors that lead individuals to take up terrorism. Few human activities can be explained in simple terms, and most have a wide range of causal factors.[72]

Similarly, approaches that betray the complexity of the subject with mono-causal explanations and imbalanced focus have also been applied to the study of deradicalization. For example, Rene Garfinkel's (2007) study about seven deradicalization cases, across several religions (Muslim, Jewish and Christian), concludes that deradicalization can be as much of a spiritual experience, similar to a religious conversion, as the initial radicalization may have been. The decision to deradicalize was most often an individual decision, which subsequently isolated that person from his or her existing social group. The individual's relationship with role models was cited as important in making the move away from radical beliefs. One commonality with radicalization pathways was the experience of trauma preceding the decision or process of deradicalization as trauma acted as a precipitating event for the transformation of personal beliefs. In many cases, trauma coincided with the unexpected experience of

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[72] Zilfirdaus Adnan, 2008, *Understanding Security Issues in Southeast Asia: Understanding Terrorism through the Life Story of Ali Imron*, in Special Issue Migration and Security: Political, Social and Economic Contexts of Migration Paper Nos. 21-28, 2008.

compassion from those previously identified as enemies or others. Individuals who turned away from radical ideologies first experienced a perceived failure of their existing values and beliefs, which was similar to their experience of radicalization.[73]

Different from the above study that emphasizes internal factors, Zachary Abuza (2009) analyzes deradicalization by focusing on the importance of external factors. Writing about deradicalization in Southeast Asia, Abuza explains that the process of deradicalization is driven in large part by societal attitudes; will a former terrorist be welcome back into society, or will they be treated as an outcast?[74] Mark Juergensmeyer's (2001) study also explains that leaving an ideologically-based terrorist group may not be the same as leaving a non-ideologically-driven group such as a gang. His study on terrorism in 5 group religious traditions concludes that although religion by itself did not generally lead to violence, religion did in many cases provide the ideological foundation, motivation and organizational structure of the terrorist group and fostered group cohesion as well. Leaving a radical Islamist group implies a rejection of the radical ideology espoused by the group. The articulation by credible religious authorities of a theologically grounded imperative for renouncing violence could be an important factor in catalyzing the decision to leave the radical group.[75]A search for identity and the reward of belonging also have been identified as major influence that motivate radical behavior and encourage continual participation in radical groups. The effect of these factors on deradicalization has been explored in such historical case studies as the Red Brigades by Jameson (1990), the Baader-Menhof group by Post (1987), and the Irish Republican Army/IRA by O'Calaghan (1998). These studies reflect the internal pressures to stay competing with the external pressure to go, focusing specifically on psychological pressures and the spiraling commitment that often keeps a member with the group.[76]

Regarding the Indonesian context, although there is now extensive literature available on Islamic radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia, such figures and perpetrators have been relatively little studied. According to Greg Feally and Aldo Borgu (2005), much of the literature published to date has taken one of the two forms:(1) works written by terrorism experts and journalists, few of whom have a background in Indonesian or Islamic studies, and

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[73] Rene Garfinkel, 2007, *Personal Transformation: Moving from Violence to Peace,* United States Institute of Special Report, No. 186, April 2007

[74] Zachary Abuza (2009), "The Rehabilitation of the Jemaah Islamiyah in the Southeast Asia" in Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan (Eds.), 2009, *Leaving Terrorist Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge.

[75] Mark Juergensmeyer, 2000, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

[76] Taylor, 1988, *op.cit.*

who often rely heavily on intelligence documents and briefings; and (2) studies by Indonesian or Islamic experts based primarily on in-country, on-the-ground research.The first category is by far the largest and includes authors such as Rohan Gunaratna (2000), Zachary Abuza (2003) and Maria Ressa (2003). Sidney Jones and the ICG (International Crisis Group) dominate the second category.[77]

Academic research on deradicalization in the Indonesian context also displays a similar lack of interest in the motivation of individual recruits. In addition to these Indonesia-specific studies, there are numerous studies; these also, however, pay more attention on organizations rather than actors by focusing on the deradicalization program created by the Indonesian police, NGOs, etc. They include studies by Paul Pendelton (2008)[78], Amanda Johnston (2009)[79], Petrus Golose (2009)[80], and ICG (2007)[81], etc. The current literature on Indonesian deradicalization thus has a limitation in the understanding of terrorists' life stories and other lower rank members. Among this limitation, studies by Zifirdaus Adnan (2008)[82] about Ali Imron's life story and by Najib Azca (2011)[83] about the situation and networks of the post-jihad period have attempted to fill this gap.

However, Zifirdaus Adnan and Najib Azca's studies, are—in my opinion—trapped in the "processes perspective" that focuses mostly on what occurs during deradicalization. Adnan's study focuses on the case of Ali Imron and literally the process model theory proposed by John Horgan (2009) as its framework. The study attempts to "divide" Ali Imron's life story into three phases. By doing this, Adnan clearly ignores what the phases mean for Ali Imron as an actor of deradicalization. Similarly, but in a broader issue and context, Azca's study applies social movement theory especially on "communal violence and Islamic movement" and "from collective behavior to passionate politics."

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[77] Greg Fealy & Aldo Borgu, 2005, Local Jihad: Radical Islam & Terrorism in Indonesia, in *Strategy*, ASPI (Australian Strategy Policy Institute), September 2005.

[78] Paul Pendelton, 2008, *Countering Terrorist Ideologies: Rational Actors and Game Theory Perspective*, Master Thesis at Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey California, December 2008.

[79] Amanda K Johnston, 2009, *Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Program for Islamic Extremist*, Master Thesis at Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey California, December 2009.

[80] Paul Reinhardt Golose, 2009, *Deradikalisasi Terorisme: Humanis, Soul-Approach dan Menyentuh Akar*, Jakarta: Yayasan Pengembangan Kajian Ilmu Kepolisian.

[81] ICG, 2007, *De-radicalization and Indonesian Prison*, Jakarta & Brussel, Asia Report No. 142, 19 Nopember 2007.

[82] Zifirdaus Adnan, 2008, *op.cit*.

[83] Najib Azca, 2011, *After Jihad: A biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia*, Doctoral Dissertation at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, January 2011.

Azca pays more attention to the process post deradicalization by dividing the experience into three groups; from jihadist to holy-*kampung*, to prisoners, and to politics. Through his study, Azca tries to understand the processes how and why several Muslim extremists who possibly experienced similar and or even different trajectories as Muslim extremists but finally ended up in jail, in a society as preacher, businessmen, teachers, etc., and in parliament or at least in political parties as politicians. Similar to Adnan, Azca's study also ignores what the shift of ideology and activism during the deradicalization period means for the actors.

Based on above explanations, there are opportunities not only to engage in a critical examination of what deradicalization encompasses (as studied by Adnan and Azca), but also what deradicalization means for the extremist, how it has emerged in different contexts and applied to very different kind of movements or groups. To fill the gap, I choose to study individual deradicalization in different contexts and groups that focus mainly on the transformative process of their jihadism and activism from the actors' perspectives. As an anthropological study, it will apply a cultural approach to the study of deradicalization by using life histories of jihad trajectories and framing it with the concept of pre-liminal, liminal and post-liminal situations in the transformation of jihad. By using the theory of liminality, in each case study it has been important to achieve a sense of the complexity, uniqueness and nuances associated with each Muslim extremist from different groups. Tore Bjorgo (2009) explains that if terrorism is truly a product of its own time and place, it follows that an effort to understand the factors that drive or facilitate deradicalization and disengagement for each Muslim extremist will necessarily be based, or derive from, a particular context.[84]

FOCUS, HYPOTHESIS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

Focus. This study is more qualitative rather than quantitative research. It based on both ethnographic and library researches. According to David Snow (2001), the main reason for conducting ethnographic research is direct experience opposite the primary means for securing knowledge. The most vital criteria for research methods that seek the truth is that it yields an emphatic understanding of (individual) and social worlds by allowing field researchers to understand why members of those worlds act, think and feel as they do.[85] In order to gain a comprehensive

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[84]Tore Bjorgo, 2009, Introduction, in Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, London & New York: Routledge, p. 2.
[85] David A Snow (et all), "Fieldwork Roles and informational Yield: A comparison of Alternative Settings and Roles,

picture of the situation, therefore, I will use a cultural approach to thoroughly examine the issue. Rather than applying a macro-structural approach of organizational deradicalization that tends to search for a structural explanation of the phenomena, I will use a micro-anthropological approach instead as it provides more fertile opportunities for research.

In this study, I will look at the experience of several former Radical Muslims from JI (Jemaah Islamiyah), LJ (Laskar Jihad), and NII (Negara Islam Indonesia) as I previously described in the section,"The Botanies of Radicalization" through the lens of actors or perpetrators, tracing the biographies and documents related to the life stories of former Muslim extremists.

This study will try to answer the following primary question: ***What happens during the process of deradicalization and disengagement of Muslim extremists in Indonesia regarding their violent jihad ideology and activism?***

To answer above question, I conducted fieldwork consisting of interview and observation with several main informants and other parties as well as a document review. The keywords for conducting fieldwork of this study will be to listen to the actor's voice (main informant) and get the depth of their experience. I will elaborate on this process in the chapter, "Fieldwork" (Chapter 3).

Hypothesis. After establishing the focus of this study, I will present my main arguments which structure the dissertation and which will be elaborated on later in two empirical chapters (Chapter 4 and 5). I will present the arguments in line with the main questions presented above by following an actor-oriented approach, as I apply a biographical method by investigating the life history of actors. I argue that the process and experience of Jihad until its period of disengagement and deradicalization is a subjective but complex phenomenon. As such, the reasons for joining extremist group may be different from the factors that influence continuing involvement in the group, engagement in violent acts and disengagement from the group and/or the deradicalizationof their ideology. I will apply the "process model theory" proposed by John Horgan (2005), which involves a detailed look at the process of becoming a member of an organization, progressing toward and becoming engaged in violent activities, and finally the process of disengagement and deradicalization. This theory, according to Horgan consists of three phases:[86] ***Phase 1 introduction,*** *is the process of becoming*

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in Alan Bryman (ed.), 2001, *Ethnography*, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publication, p. 156.

[86]John Horgan, 2005, *The Psychology of Terrorism*, London & New York; Routledge.

*a member of an extremist group; **Phase 2radicalization-engagement** is being an extremist*; and ***Phase 3 is disengaging and de-radicalizing from extremism***. Horgan recognizes that this is the least researched phase of extremistactivities, so the factors are still hypothetical but likely comprise the emergence of the seed of psychological disengagement and deradicalization, and the presence of additional psychological influences, physical disengagement as well as group issues and the implications of leaving.[87]

Regarding the decision to disengage from an extremist group and deradicalize an extremist ideology during the transition period, I argue that this is likely motivated by specific reasons, conditions, and repercussions or a combination of these. However, it begins with three endogenous processes: strategic calculations, political learning, and *weltanschauung*(s) revision(s). **First,** the process is based on rational-choice calculations and cost-benefit analyses. **Second,** the process is a product of socialization and interaction with the "other" during which the leadership will update its beliefs and reassess its behavior based on the behavior of their interaction partners. **Third**, the process is based on perceptional and psychological factors;it is a process in which the leadership of extremist Muslim groups modifies its worldviews as a result of severe crises, frustration and dramatic changes in the environment. I will analyze this process under the lens of the theory of push and pull factors of deradicalization proposed by Tore Bjorgo (2009), whereby **push factors** are negative circumstances or social forces that make it unattractive to continue membership in a particular group, and **pull factors** mark opportunities or social forces that attract an individual to a more promising alternative.[88]

Regarding the transition period of jihad, I argue that such transition occurs in the so called a liminal-situation during the jihad period. The transformation therefore serves as a form of cultural-survival for former Muslim extremists. I will apply the concept of liminality by Arnold van Gennep (1960)[89] that was then expanded by Victor Turner (1969)[90], which identifies 3 phases of life crises; separation (pre-liminal), transition (liminal) and incorporation (post-liminal). In the radically-disjunctive group of an Islamic movement, the nature of liminal transition

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[87]*Idem*
[88] Tore Bjorgo, "Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right", in John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge, pp. 36-43.
[89] Arnold van Gennep, 1960, *The Rites of Passage: A Classic Study of Cultural Celebration*, Translated by Monika Vizedom and Gabrielle Caffee, Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press.
[90] Victor Turner, 1969, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, Chicago: Aldin Publishing House.

becomes paramount to cultural survival. Liminality marks a period of alteration for Muslim extremists: a process of becoming, being inscribed by a new identity and initiated into a new power. Therefore, according to Victor Turner (1969), all liminality must eventually dissolve, for it is a state of great intensity that cannot exist very long without some sort of structure to stabilize it, either the individual returns to surrounding social structure or else liminal communities develop their own internal social structure, or a condition Turner calls "*normative communitas.*"The post-liminal marks the end (or at least the beginning of the end) of the liminal phase and the re-integration (or incorporation) of the people involved in their new social role and identity.[91]

Generally, post-liminal violent-jihadists in Indonesia end up in prison, either for life-sentence or temporary sentence, during which extremist Muslims join a deradicalization program run by the Indonesian police. However, individual deradicalization and disengagement of Jihadist are not always related to such programs. Apart from this, in the Indonesian context, most cases of post-liminal violent-jihadists bring about a new interpretation of jihad and a new identity for the jihadist. Jihad in Islam, as described in Chapter 2, is clearly subject to interpretation, which has a mixed record in the history of Islam. Theoretically, there are at least 13 types of jihad that are divided into 4 categories: *jihad al-nafs* (jihad against oneself)*, jihad al-syaithan* (jihad against Satan)*, jiha al-munafiq wal kufr* (jihad against the hypocrites and disbelievers)*,* and *jihad al-taghut* (jihad against the oppressive leader). However, in practice, jihad has also been subject to manipulation, essentially for political reasons or in order to achieve certain political goals. It is also the subject of different interpretation in the four traditional Sunni *madzhabs*/schools (Syafii, Hambali, Maliki and Hanafi) as well as in the different Shi'ite doctrines. In contemporary approaches to jihad, the term has multiple explanations, ranging from radical, conservative, moderate and even liberal approaches.

Identity is the way in which people construct who they are and how they see themselves within the community and the social structure in which they live. In the post-liminal violent-jihad, according to Najib Azca (2011), the new-identity of jihadist take on about 3 possible forms. Those include: (a) identity-enhancement meaning that the attachment and commitment of jihadists to violent-jihad ideology and the strengthening of the group, (b) identity-shift meaning that the attachment and commitment of jihadists to violent-jihad ideology and their group is altered; and (3) identity-confusion meaning that the attachment and commitment of jihadists to violent-jihad ideology and their

[91]*Idem*

groupis confused.[92] Furthermore, the degree of personal-identity change, according to Guobin Yang (2000), may vary with the depth of the liminal experience as social movements like extremist Muslim groups are not liminal to the same degree. The relative liminality of extremist groups implies that they do not transform identities equally. As a hypothesis, we may assume that the degree of personal transformation depends on the extent to which jihadists are freed from previous structural conditions and on the depth and intensity of the new experience of jihadists. The stronger the contrast between pre-participation structural embeddings and the leveling effects unleashed by the groups, the greater the liminal effect and the more profound the transformative power of jihadists. Most studies on the biographical impact of post-participation in a Jihad group falls into 2 categories; immediate and long term impacts. Guobin Yang explains that studies about the immediate impact post-participation in social movements show that they still tend to be more committed social-activists. They strongly hold the group's ideology but participate with different activities than they had previously done in the social movement. However, research about the long-term impact of involvement shows that their attachment to the group's ideology declines over time and they tend to incorporate and re-integrate to society.[93]

Significance of Study. In this study, I attempt to elaborate the experience of deradicalization among former Muslim extremists in contemporary Indonesia. I will examine the life historiesof deradicalized Muslims by looking at the transition periods of pre liminal, liminal and post liminal jihad and what characterizes those periods in terms of the jihadism and activism. Accordingly, this study will use a generalized theoretical framework that explains the complicated understanding of how Indonesian radical Muslims change their radical ideology and behavior will be developed and this will be valuable for academic sources as well as for policy-oriented purposes in Indonesia.

According to Michael Jacobson (2010), developing a better grasp of this "deradicalized phenomenon" is critical to the counter-radicalism effort by the government for several reasons. Most importantly, the government could use the knowledge to shape their counter-radicalism programs. Though a review of deradicalized Muslim cases shows clearly that they do not have a common profile and that a wide array of reasons exists for their defections, the government could nonetheless learn many lessons from studying these varied groups. Additionally, understanding why people leave radical groups could help both the government

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[92] Najib Azca, 2011, *op.cit*.

[93] Guobin Yang, 2000, "The Liminal Effects of Social Movements: Red Guards and the Transformation of Identity", in *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 15 No. 3, 2000.

and NGO entities craft messages to draw away those already in such groups. This is an area of need since the deradicalization program was initiated and a new approach is needed. Without knowing why people become disillusioned with radical groups, it is difficult to determine what type of messaging would be most effective and who should deliver it. Understanding why people voluntarily leave radical groups may also enable the governments to do a better job predicting whether an individual or even a cell is likely to carry out an attack and may help determine which cell members are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by the government security service (police).[94]

STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION

I will structure this dissertation as follows;

Chapter 1 deals with radicalization to deradicalization: Radicalization will focus on the rise of religious violence, factors causing radicalism and the botanies of radicalization, while deradicalization presents the counter-radicalism and deradicalization program in Indonesia, debates about suitable terminology, and a literature review of current studies on deradicalization, which underscores the limited number of studies on individual deradicalization. This chapter also presents the focus, hypothesis and significance of the research as well as the structure of dissertation.

Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical framework of the study. I will present a biographical study of deradicalization by applying the process model theory proposed by John Horgan and the theory of push and pull factors by Tore Bjorgo. I will present the theory of pre-liminal, liminal and post-liminal jihad by borrowing the concepts of liminality proposed by Arnold van Gennep as expanded by Victor Turner. I will also present an explanation about colorful jihad in Islam from several authors, the theory of personal identity change proposed by Guobin Yang as well as the forms of new- identity of jihadist proposed by Najib Azca.

Chapter 3 deals with the process of completing fieldwork with several former Muslim extremists. I will present how I find and select the informants, and how I was able to conduct in-depth observation and interviews. This chapter also deals with presenting the personal narratives resulting from the whole fieldwork process.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 deal with the empirical aspects of the study and its analyses. In Chapter 4, I will present and discuss

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[94] Michel Jacobson, 2010, *Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from those who have left*, Policy Focus #101, January 2010, Washington DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

what characterizes the transition period of pre-liminal and liminal jihad in terms of jihadism and activism. Furthermore, in chapter 5, I will focus on what occurs during the periods of post-liminal jihad of several former Muslim extremists regarding their jihad ideologies and activism.

Chapter 6 consists of the concluding remarks. It presents the main findings of the study while revisiting its main arguments and drawing theoretical reflections on the topic. It also presents this study's contribution, both theoretically and empirically.

CHAPTER 2
A CULTURAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF DERADICALIZATION:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

According to Michael Taarny and Lars Hallundbaek (2008), the anthropology of Jihadism is a virtually non–existent field of research for a number of reasons: the inherent danger of conducting fieldwork, the fear of misused data, and the difficulties associated with being neutral and ethical debates within the anthropological community. The conspicuous absence of social anthropologists engaged in systematic studies on the community of jihadi groups espousing their interpretation of jihad has left the field to other disciplines. This is compounded by the fact that the eminent Russian ethnographer Valery Tishkov explains that an insufficient number of anthropologists have studied armed conflict, and there remains a serious lack of reliable ethnographic data amid an ocean of political science texts and enlightening journalism. This is regrettable precisely because jihadism at its core is a distinct cultural construct, an artificial socio–cultural frame of reference. The acclaimed originality of the bearers and guardians of the only true Islam, personified by jihadists, is in need of some serious questioning. That culture matters is evident from the fierce battle being waged on a global scale by disparate jihadistentities: in essence it is a deadly game of control overcultural symbols.[95]

Taarny and Hallundbaek (2008) explain that social anthropology is uniquely positioned to extract a deeper understanding of militant movements and individuals through the tried and tested practice of fieldwork. Such a tool is not available to political scientists or psychologists who have taken the lead in studies on terrorism, whether merited or not. The anthropological method of conducting fieldwork allows different types of conclusions and should therefore be considered complementary to a, for instance, political analysis. The data extracted from properly conducted fieldwork enables different views and interpretations of jihadi actors and their perceived role in a wider struggle to defend Islam in times of crisis.[96]

This chapter will consider what anthropology brings to the study of deradicalization. According to Jeffrey Sluka (1992), the hallmark of anthropology is that it combines empirical methods with a cultural approach, and from this perspective considers

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[95] Michael Taarnby & Lars hallundbaek, 2008, *Fatah al-Islam: Anthropological Perspective on Jihadi Culture*, in WP 6/2008, 12 February 2008.
[96]*Idem.*

deradicalization as an empirical reality and a cultural construct, belief system, or ideology. The discipline brings to the study of deradicalization what it brings to the study of human conflict and peace in all its forms:*a cultural perspective;* extreme topical and theoretical eclecticism; a cross-culturally comparative and holistic perspective; an ethnographic approach based on long-term fieldwork and direct participant-observation in the community studied; a scientific commitment to both objectivity and getting as close as possible to the subjective, participants, or an *emic* point of view; an appreciation of the impact of ethnocentrism and cultural relativity; and a humanist concern for ethics, the potentially negative effect research may have on those studied, and the enlightenment conceptualization that research should be applied for the improvement of the human condition.[97]

Forthe issue of terrorism, Sluka (2008) explains that more than any other social science, anthropologists have observed and studied terrorism and popular resistance at the grassroots level, particularly in the third world. Along with the evolutionary perspective, they have brought at least four important perspectives on the debate tothe study of terrorism. ***First,*** anthropologists have written detailed critical ethnographies of popular armed resistance movements described as terrorists. ***Second***, anthropologists are more aware than most of the fact that, historically, all indigenous and other nation peoples who have resisted state conquest and domination have been denounced and vilified by those states as in human savages. There is a clear correspondence between the former imperialist ideology of the savage other and the contemporary one of the terrorist other. ***Third****,* anthropologists have applied the core concept culture to the debate, developing new conceptual models of state terrorism and cultures of terror, where fear becomes a normal or part of people's everyday lives. ***Fourth****,* anthropologists have engaged in critical cultural deconstruction of the idea of terrorism and how it is used in society today.[98]

Regarding the study of deradicalization, in this study I will elaborate the life stories of several former Muslim extremists and explore their experience with transforming violent jihadism and activism into a less violent and even moderate jihad. Based on the hypothesis in Chapter 1, the materialization and perpetuation of such transformation occurs when there are gradual changes after their transition period to violent Jihad among several Muslim extremists caused by the movement form the so-called liminal situation of jihad to the post-liminal with pull and push factors behind the process. This transformation brings about new

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[97] Jeffrey A Sluka, 2009, "The Contribution of Anthropology to Critical Terrorism Studies", in Marie Breen Smith et al (Eds.), 2009, *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, London: Routledge.
[98]*Idem.*

interpretations of jihad and a new identity for the jihadist. To examine this hypothesis, I will explore the life histories of several former Muslim extremists by applying biographical methods.

In this chapter, therefore, I will present several concepts of life histories in anthropology. This chapter will also present the concept of "liminality" (along with its pre-liminal and post-liminal phases) proposed by Arnold van Gennep (1960) as expanded by Victor Turner (1969). This is important for analyzing how and why the transition occurred during the period of violent jihad. The work of John Horgan (2005) about the process model theory will also be explored in this chapter since it is important for understanding the jihadi trajectory of former Muslim extremists from their introduction, radicalization-engagement to deradicalization and disengagement. This chapter will also deal with the work of Tore Bjorgo (2009) about the theory of push and pull factors to understand what motivates deradicalization and disengagement. Finally, I will focus on the theory of identity transformation in terms of social movement participation proposed by Guobin Yang (2000) and the colorful interpretation of jihad in Islam that possibly leads Muslim extremists to first choose the violent jihad ideology and activism but also later encourages them to transform it into less or even non-violent Jihad.

(Written) Life-History:
Between the Self, the Social-Context and Historical
Consciousness

In anthropology, according to Roxana Watterson (2007) who quotes Behar (1992), life history has been described as a venerable but as yet little theorized genre of ethnographic writing. This remark comes 20 years after Mandelbaum (1973) had lamented that the study of lives for the purposes of social science has been more often advocated than practiced. In spite of some early and remarkable works, the research practice has remained distinctly marginal. One of the earliest examples is Paul Radin's work, *Crashing Thunder: the Autobiography of an American Indian* (1926), an account he elicited from a Winnebago man, which was written in the Winnebago syllabary and he directly translated it into English. This was presented as an absolutely unique document; the only account that has ever been obtained from a so-called primitive man, its presenter going so far as to propose that such personal accounts provided the only possible way into other cultures and worldviews. From today's perspective, Radin may appear to have been ahead of his time in drawing attention to the importance as well as the elusiveness of subjective values in the effort to grasp another culture. However, few seem to have taken him up on his challenge to adopt the life history method as the only possible way to proceed.[99]

Vinay Kamat (1999) explains that life histories have, historically, been marginalized and excluded from the positivist hegemony in psychology and the social sciences (Mishler 1995; 118, Crapanzano, 1984). More recently, anthropologists have also voiced concern over the "compromised" scientific rigor that some researchers have exhibited in their work on the elicitation and documentation of life histories. In response, there has been increased calls on anthropologists of life histories to use a far more sensitive and respectful treatment approach (cf. Behar 1993, 1995; Linde 1993; Peacock and Holland 1993;Ochs and Capps 1996;Krazt 1999). What is the life history/story as it is understood in anthropology? Is it a distinct genre that is universal? Life history scholars such as Linde (1993) have observed that, as a genre, the life history/story is not universal; that is, it is not a genre that is found in all cultures. Indeed, the life history is the product of a particular culture. Moreover, according to Linde (1993; 11), there exists considerable evidence to suggest that in many cultures, members do not conceive of themselves as having a life story.[100]

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[99] Roxana Waterson, 2007 , "Introduction: Analyzing Personal Narratives", in *Roxana Waterson* (Ed.)*, 2007, Southeast Asian Lives: Personal Narratives and Historical Experience"*, Singapore: NUS Press, p.4
[100] Vinay Kamat, 1999, *The Life History in Anthropology,* see: http://anthropology.emory.edu/FACULTY/Spitulnik/Linganth/history.html

In anthropology, the life history, or personal narrative of one's life, has long been recognized as an important vehicle for learning about how culture is experienced and created by individuals. Life histories have a special significance in our highly-technological, fast-paced, complex world. As we have become more isolated from one another, the life history offers a means of putting us back in touch with others, recognizing the intimacy results from listening to and telling stories. According to Roxana Watterson (2007) without some coherent memory of the past we should have no basis on which to act today. The account of lives takes many varied forms; some are, however, more formal that others, ranging from published biography or autobiography, to what researchers in psychology have termed "life-stories"—fragments of personal story telling or oral discourses that we all recount at various times in different ways for different audiences, sometimes purely for entertainment (Linde 1993;Miller 1994;Ashplant 1998). Watterson explains that somewhere in the middle of this range of genres lies the life history account elicited by ethnographers or oral historians, which may be seen as one rather peculiar and specific narrative, a collaborative product in which the dialogical relationship between teller and listener, and likely their mixed motives, shape the outcome. Autobiography as a particular mode of telling about the self is itself a distinctive genre with a relatively short history in European cultures. "Personal narrative" is a convenient term, which covers all of these genres and may be extended to include other forms such as letters and diaries (Caplan 1997).[101]

Whether the life history is a distinct, identifiable genre or not, it has remained a nagging question for some scholars. In recent years, however, anthropologists have come to an agreement on the definitional aspects of a life history/story, what it constitutes, the purpose it fulfills, the function it serves for story tellers themselves, their audiences, and their larger communities (Mishler 1995, 101-108). In its most basic understanding, the life history/story addresses the question of the form "what events have made me what I am," or more precisely, "what you must know about me to know me" (Linde, 1993; 20). A life history is the narrator's account of his/her life. It is a means by which the narrator tells others his/her sense of self, explicating who he/she is and how he/she got the way. As Linde (1993; 8) suggests, a life history is not just a simple collection of facts or incidents. There is sequencing involved in *storifying* one's experience and it is from this sequence that causality can be inferred. Therefore, when any new story is added to the repertoire of the life story, it must be related in some way to the themes of the other stories included in the life story, or at least it must not contradict them.

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[101] Roxana Watterson, *op.cit*, pp. 3-4

This means that the stories included in the life story constantly undergo revision, considering our current understanding of what our lives mean (Linde, 1993; 25). Simply, the life history/story is an open narrative that begins with and continues without a clear notion at any given time of what its final shape will turn out to be (Linde; 1993; 27). The *narratibility* of a given sequence of events is not fixed; rather it is crucially related to the potential speaker's ability to perceive that a reportable event had happened and that it can be seen as having a particular moral relevance.[102]

According to Roxana Waterson (2007), the central problem associated with life narratives from the anthropologists'point of view is the question of representativeness. What insight into generalities can be extracted from their uniqueness? Here we address, Waterson explains in a more acute form, the issue of subjectivity that has been so endlessly debated in anthropology. On one hand, personal narratives are intrinsically about the self, however constructed. On the other, the way in which this is completed has to be addressed comparatively in terms of differing social contexts and available genres. All life stories also present us with the intersection between a self and the social context in which that individual makes something of life with the resources available to them. Waterson explains that Rosenwald and Ochberg (1992) talk of life stories as an organization of experience and sometimes a process by which individuals become aware of their social predicaments and perhaps even find a means to transcend it, a possibility which points to the potentially transformative power of the narrative. Waterson also explains that Skinner et al. (1993) points to the link between identities, experience, and history and call for a new ethnography of personhood, one that will recognize the existence of a person in history and history in persons.[103]

In explicating the distinguishing features of the life history/story, scholars have recurrently emphasized one particular feature. "Life history, as a text is not meaningful in its self. It is constituted in its interpretation, its reading […] of cultural themes [which] are creatively constructed by the actor within a particular configuration of social forces and gender class contexts." (Behar, 1995; 152). More importantly, life histories are jointly produced by the teller and the listener in an interlocutory mode. Life history accounts are produced in response to questions from an interviewer, usually an anthropologist, and this account is produced in an interactional framework. The interactional process in which life histories are produced has important methodological implications for how we understand life histories/stories as being "situated" and subject to constant revision. Kratz (1996; 3) has

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[102] Vinay Kamat, 1999, *op.cit*.
[103] Roxana Waterson, 2007, *op.cit*.

identified methodological problems with not paying sufficient attention to the context in which life histories/stories are produced. Neglecting or side lining relevant contextual information draws a life history/story away from its moment and context of production, where it begins as a communicative exchange and situated interaction. As Kratz points out, typically, life history texts are edited at various levels, between the time (and in the communicative context in which they were produced), from the moment of production to moments of analysis, presentation, and publication (Kratz, 1993: 3). Cicourel (1992) also notes that the omission of apparent extra-textual information can be problematic to the extent to which it obscures information that was at some point relevant to the researcher during the collection and analysis of the material under discussion (p. 292). Thus, it is important that anthropologists completing life-history based research feels obliged to let the reader know, "just what the micro politics of the situation was in which the life history was obtained and the ways in which the anthropologist was personally involved in and even transformed by the intense one-to-one relationship of telling and listening (Behar, 1995: 149).[104]

In the Indonesian context, Roxana Waterson (2007) explains that historian John Smail (1993) pointed out decades ago the need for what he called an autonomous domestic history of Indonesia, one that would break from the Eurocentric perspective that had left "gaping lacunae in the understanding of the Indonesian past, and which would not be written only by the victors." She continues that in a more recent Festschrift (Sears 1993) revives his argument. When an authoritarian regime collapses, history is characteristically one of the first things to come under re-examination: just a few years after the publication of that book; the watershed of 1998 in Indonesia brought the abrupt closure of the Suharto era, and suddenly opened up this possibility. The new outburst of historical activity, publicly encouraged by President Abdurrahman Wahid during his brief and otherwise rather chaotic Presidency, has enabled Indonesian historians and the general public to re-examine for themselves many episodes of the recent past, as well as their often-dubious presentation under the New Order. In this new atmosphere, previously taboo subjects are revisited and it becomes possible for some people—former political prisoners (and former Muslim extremists), for example to tell their stories for the first time.[105]

Finally, giving importance to the context in which life histories accounts are produced is significant. However, in doing so, we may end up challenging the value of claims about the integrity of life histories/stories and their status as representing authentic

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[104] Vinay Kamat, 1999, *op.cit*

[105] Roxana Waterson, 2007, *op.cit*

voices but it does not challenge the value of exploring life experiences and narratives (Kratz 1999; 39). In the final analysis, no matter the definitional and methodological problems commonly associated with the life history, for cultural and linguistic anthropology, the life history remains one of the important methods of data collection and analysis.[106]

Jihad and the Liminal Situation

In anthropology, liminality, from the word "*limen*" meaning a threshold, is the quality of ambiguity or disorientation that occurs in the middle stage of rituals, when participants no longer hold their pre-ritual status but have not yet begun the transition to the status they will hold when the ritual is complete. During a liminal stage, participants stand at the threshold between their previous way of structuring their identity, time, or community and the new way, which the ritual establishes. The concept of liminality was first developed by Arnold van Gennep and was later taken up by Victor Turner. Van Gennep invented the term liminality in his *Rites de Passage* (1909), a work that is essential to the development of the concept of liminality in the context of rituals in small-scale societies. He began his book by distinguishing between those that result in a change of status for an individual or social group, and those that signify transitions in the passage of time. In doing so, he placed a particular emphasis on rites of passage, and claimed that such rituals marking, helping, or celebrating individual or collective passages through the cycle of life or of nature exist in every culture and share a specific three-fold-sequential structure. They include:(a) pre-liminal rites (separation), this stage involves a metaphorical death as the initiand is forced to leave something behind by breaking with previous practices and routines; (b) liminal rites (transition), this stage involves the creation of a tabula-rasa through the removal of previously taken-for granted forms and limits, which allows for considerable changes to be made to the identity of the initiand when the transition takes place implies an actual passing through the threshold that marks the boundary between two phases; and (c) post-liminal rites (incorporation), during which the initiand is re-incorporated into society with a new identity and a new "being."[107]

According to van Gennep, an anthropological ritual such as a rite of passage, involves some change to the participants, especially their social status. In the first phase, pre-liminal, separation comprises symbolic behavior signifying the detachment of the individual, from an earlier fixed point in the social structure.

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[106] Vinay Kamat, 1999, *op.cit*.

[107] Arnold van Gennep, 1960, *The Rites of Passage: A Classic Study of Cultural Celebration*, Translated by Monika Vizedom and Gabrielle Caffee, Chicago IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Their status thus becomes liminal. In the second phase, such a liminal situation the initiands live outside their normal environment and are brought to question their self and the existing social order through a series of rituals that often involve acts of pain, the initiands come to feel nameless, spation-temporally dislocated and socially unstructured. In this sense, liminal periods are destructive as well as constructive, meaning that the formative experience during liminality will prepare the initiand, and his or her cohort, to occupy a new social role or status, made public during the reintegration rituals.[108]

Turner (1969) explains that the attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (threshold people) are necessarily ambiguous. One's sense of identity dissolves to some extent, bringing about disorientation but also the possibility of new perspectives. Turner posits that if liminality is regarded as a time and place of withdrawal from normal modes of social action, it potentially can be seen as a period of scrutiny for central values and axioms of the culture where it occurs, one where normal limits to thought, self-understanding and behavior are undone. In such situations, the very structure of society is temporarily suspended. According to Turner, all liminality must eventually dissolve, for it is a state of great intensity that cannot exist very long without some sort of structure to stabilize it, either the individual returns to the surrounding social structure, or else liminal communities develop their own internal social structure.[109]

Turner (1967) states that the rite of passage also concerns entry into a new achieved status, whether this be political office, membership of an exclusive and secret group and society.[110] Turner (1969) later mentions that with the increasing specialization of society and culture with progressive complexity in the social division of labor, what was in tribal society principally a set of a transitional qualities betwixt and between defined states of a culture and society, has become itself an institutionalized state.[111]

Arthur Saniotis (2005) explains that the characteristics of Muslim extremists are similar to liminal beings because of the indeterminate and transnational nature of jihadism. This is also the case as extremist Muslims" violent jihads are diversifying and becoming increasingly creative and unpredictable, which requires the development of a new approach to understand the phenomenon. Saniotis refers to the liminal model posited by Turner because of its emphasis on ambiguity, fragmentation and

[108] Arnold van Gennep, 1969, *op.cit.*
[109] Victor Turner, 1969, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, Chicago: Aldin Publishing House.
[110] Victor Turner, 1967, *op.cit.*
[111] Victor Turner, 1969, *op.cit.*

the blurring of set boundaries and to the magical or transformative nature of this state in which new images are created as well as their extreme effects in the world. **First**, as Saniotis explains, Turner's model focuses mainly on ritual behavior, which according to him exhibits counter-logic to the everyday life world, which he refers to as liminality. For Turner, liminality is a magical state in which individuals are allowed to create new kinds of symbolism, unencumbered by the constrictions of status, privilege, and class often via a highly-symbolic performance. **Second**, Turner defines the marginal and the outsider as being liminal. For example, prophets, shamans, criminals, hippies, etc., are included in this group as they oppose the social structure or resist social classifications. Like rituals, the marginal are ambiguous, betwixt and between, as they exist on the social boundaries.[112]

Saniotis (2005) frames jihadist who seek to re-enchant the world via their symbolic and performative features. For example, Saniotis shares the story of Sheikh Mubarek Gilani who believed that the terrorist acts were caused by aninvisible force, specifically the Jinn.[113] The issue is not whether the Jinn are (or are not) a causative force in the war on terror, but rather how some people routinely ascribe supernatural force to the present war on terrorism. According to Saniotis, the parallel between the jihadists and the jinn fits nicely into Turner's concept of liminality. Liminality refers to a state during a ritual such as rites of passages, where an individual is symbolically transferred from one to another. The point is that the people who live on the social margins, or who blur social categories, are often categorized dangerous and mysterious. Jihadists, according to Saniotis, strategically position themselves as ambiguous not only as a distinguishing device, but also to enhance their belief in a cosmic war on earth. The increasingly liminal nature of jihadists means that a number of them will continue to elude counterterrorist operations. It is agreed that the absence of central command structures not only make jihadists more lethal, but also diminishes any previous inhibitions from inflicting widespread casualties.[114]

Najib Azca (2011) explains that a jihadist group can be seen as an example of high-risk activism based on the distinction proposed by Doug McAdam. In his study about the recruitment process of

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[112] Artur Saniotis, 2005, "Re-enchanting Terrorism: Jihadist as Liminal being" in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 28 November 2005

[113]*Jinn* is mentioned in al-Qur'an as being a race of supernatural beings having been created by God from the fire of a scorching wind (al-Qur'an 15:27), prior to the creation of human beings.

[114] Artur Saniotis, 2005, "Re-enchanting Terrorism: Jihadist as Liminal being" in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 28 November 2005.

the Freedom Summer Program in the US, Adam distinguishes two types of activism based on the cost and risk of participation in activism. Adam uses the term cost to refer to the expenditure of time, money and energy required of a person engaged in any particular forms of activism. Meanwhile, the term risk refers to the anticipated dangers whether legal, social, physical, financial, etc., of engaging in a particular activity. Looking through the two frames of cost and risk, participation in the jihadist group, according to Azca, can be clearly categorized as high-risk activism because it requires both a high-level cost and risk.[115]

Furthermore, being a jihadist in an extremist group is also a liminal situation since they are on the threshold of death, dedicating their life to martyrdom. The slogan *isy kariman au mut syahidan* (translated loosely as "you are your life noble under the auspices of shari'ah or die as a martyr") is strongly held and very famous among Muslim extremists. Therefore, participants in violent jihad groups generally end up in jail or may even be sentenced to death.

Deradicalization and the Process Model Theory

Regarding the experience of deradicalization, John Horgan (2005) proposes a process model theory, which assumes that that religious extremism is a complex phenomenon that is better understood as a process, and that process is systematic or carried out by individuals in extremist groups acting according to rational choices. As such, the reasons for joining an extremist group may be different from the factors that influence continuing involvement in the group, engagement in violent acts and the abandonment of religious extremism. This theory involves a detailed look at the process of becoming a member of an organization, progressing toward and becoming engaged in violent activities and finally the process of disengagement and deradicalization. This theory, according to Horgan consists of three phases.[116]

Phase 1	The process of becoming a member of an extremist group. In this phase a person decides to join an extremist group, often in the context of the presence of suitable preconditions, the occurrence ofacatalyst, identification in addition to other positive features of involvement, and increased involvement subject to timing, opportunity, pacing and progression.

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[115]Najib Azca, 2011, *After Jihad; A Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia*, PhD Dissertation at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
[116]John Horgan, 2005, *op.cit*

Phase 2	Being an extremist. This theory simply defines an extremist as the perpetrators of terrorism andradicalism. Normally actors do not operate alone but in an extremist group, so this phase is a group process. The groups play a significant role not only in forming the behavioral process but more importantly in maintaining involvement and encouraging extremism. The process is defined as sustained, increased and with focused involvement. This involvement mainly includes decision and search activities (targeting and pre-action), preparation or pre-actor activity, event execution, post-event-activity and strategic analysis.
Phase 3	Disengaging and deradicalizing from extremism. Horgan recognizes that this is the least-researched phase of extremism activities, so the factors are still hypothetical but likely include the seed of psychological disengagement and deradicalization, the presence of additional psychological influences, physical disengagement, and the presence of group issues and the implications of leaving.

PHASE 1, THE PROCESS OF BECOMING

During this phase, a person decides to join a radical group often in the context of following stages:

The Presence of a Suitable Condition	The conditions that may encourage an outbreak of radicalism if left unresolved, i.e., the lack of democracy, emergence of radical ideology, great economic inequalities, occupation by foreign forces, etc.
Occurrence of a catalyst	A catalyst is an event that pushes a person to get involved in a radical group. The event must be considered significant by a person, including incidents such as the mass-killing of innocent brethren, amassacre by an occupying force, etc.
Identification in addition to other positive features of involvement	A person has a deep identification with the victims of the catalyst event. Deep feeling or sorrow encourages a person to join a group that fights for a common cause. This feeling maybe strengthened by other positive factors, i.e., a degree of respect from the community, gradual progression toward increased

	involvement in radical activities, various forms of engagement within a group, etc.

Increased involvement subject to timing, opportunity, pacing and progression	Not all new members would be given the same opportunities to progress to a more senior position or to participate in more tasks such as a suicide bombing. These opportunities may be subject to timing, opportunity, pacing and progression or a requirement that has been structured by the group.
	
	The group normally assesses the capacity, commitment, skill of a person to determine their progression. Among the most committed and capable members, there is also different levels of currency to their progression. This is due to diversification of roles and functions within the group. Each function or role may require specific psychological qualities. Hence, many persons may have to be patient before being assigned a specific function or role.
	
	To progress to this level of involvement, a person needs to possess certain qualities such as:
	   a. Individual experience of and the degree and nature of previous radical engagement such as stone throwing at the enemy (Palestinian *intifadha*), attending protest rallies and emotionally experiencing the consequences, the amount of prior knowledge and understanding of the group activities or the conflict it is involved in.
	   b. Specific experiences of relevance, i.e., being victimized by the enemy force.
	   c. Society's attitude to the individual involvement, i.e., whether they highly value the involvement of the individual.
	   d. The nature and extent of adult socialization, i.e., giving priority to unmarried men to minimize the emotional effect on their loved ones, and also the so-called testosterone terrorist since the youth mostly due to

| | their age will have a higher interest in fulfilling the jihad. |
| | e. The nature of competing alternatives and opportunities, i.e., leadership of a terrorist group may envisage an alternative role such as financial backer, mentor, etc. |

PHASE 2, PROCESS OF BEING

The process model simply defines a radical as a perpetrator of a violent act. Actors do not operate alone, but in a group so it is a group process. The group plays a significant role not only in forming the behavioral process, but more importantly, also in maintaining involvement and encouraging engagement in violent acts such as bombings and armed robbery.

Decision and search activity – targeting and pre-radicalism	Well-planned and calculated, involving a leadership function, selecttarget, either criminal or political.
Preparation – Pre-radical activities	It may include identification and surveillance of a target, assessment of risk, identification and choosing personnel, training requirements, designing-constructing-manufacturing-testing the required equipment such as the bomb, weapon, etc.
Event Execution	A radical must deal with a number of issues; readying the logistics and the personnel, maintaining surveillance and related security inspection tasks, managing the dynamics of the actual events, finding escape routes (if appropriate), securing the weapon after the attack (if possible).
Post-event activities and strategic analysis	Escape, elimination of evidence, and post-event evaluation feeding into the post-event stage.

PHASE 3, PROCESS OF DERADICALIZATION

This is the least researched phase of radical activities, so the factors discussed below are still hypothetical.

Emergence of seeds of psychological disengagement	Several factors such as (a) **intense pressure** from outside the group which in turn create an untenable situation within the group and may lead to internal disputes;(b) **a sense of changing priorities** may arise and the

	individual may long for the life he/she had prior to involvement in the group; and (c) individuals may gain a **sense of disillusionment** with the activities and the group's direction.
Physical disengagement	This is different from psychological disengagement because a person is removed from his/her preferred position. Physical disengagement can take several forms such as:(a) apprehension by the security forces with the prospect of being jailed;(b) being moved to a position where the risk of being arrested is greater;(c) forced movement to another role as a punishment for disobedience;(d) an increase in other roles where the original role is no longer played;(e) being dismissed from the group;(f) changes in priority.
Occurrence of group issue	This may take several forms, such as operational and financial problems; alternatively, the group might lose its relevance due to political changes.
Implications of leaving	This relates to the potential existence of more favorable prospects outside the group such as the promise of a good job, a better life, etc.

Deradicalization and the Theory of Push-Pull Factors

Tore Bjorgo's (2006)[117] study explains a number of factors that lead individuals to disengage from an extremist group. He distinguishes between push and pull factors that affect an activist's decision to leave the group. Push factors are negative circumstances or social forces that make it unattractive to continue membership in a particular group, including criminal prosecution, parental or social disapproval, or counter-violence from oppositional groups. Alternatively, as the movement evolves, the extremist or radicals may find that some of his or her most deeply held political ideals, the ones that led them to become involved in the movement in the first place, are being compromised as a result of a new and often stifling group climate within the group or through the role of certain individuals within it.[118] In addition, the jihadist may discover that the original

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[117] Tore Bjorgo (eds), 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Disengagement from political violence,* New York: Routledge

[118] John Horgan, 2005, *The Psychology of Terrorism*, London: Routledge

ideological impetus for radicalization no longer resonates with the individual.

Pull factors are opportunities or social forces that attract an individual to a more promising alternative. These might include "longing for the freedom of a normal life," new employment or educational prospects that could be undermined if an individual's group membership were known, or the desire to establish a family and take on parental and spousal roles, one of the strongest motives for leaving a radical group.[119]

Bjorgo emphasizes that the effect of push factors can be difficult to determine in advance. Negative sanctions may lead more recent members to leave the group, but those same sanctions could also increase the member's solidarity with the group as it bands together to meet the outside threat. The latter is particularly a risk when negative sanctions do not match positive incentives.

One of the most common reasons for staying in the group is that the activist has nowhere to go because of the nature of the relationships he or she destroyed or abandoned when joining the group in the first place. The defector risks ending up in a social vacuum, isolated, alone and lonely.[120] Pull factors represent the shifting of a radical's priorities; these factors are often challenged by high barriers to exit, including concerns about the time and effort already invested in the group, fear of reprisals from the group, and the lack of protection against former enemies. Moreover, even if the activist no longer believes in the group's ideology or political goals, leaving the group is a kind to leaving a family, a community, and an identity. The table below lists a number of factors that fall under the categories of push and pull factors.

FACTORS	EXAMPLES
PUSH	Criminal Prosecution
	Parental or Social Disapproval
	Counter-violence from an oppositional group
	Loss of faith in the ideology or politics of the group
	Discomfort with group's violent activities
	Disillusionment with group's leadership
	Loss of confidence, status or position in group
	Ejection from group
	Exhaustion from tension and uncertainty as a member of a targeted group
	Increased activity in a competing role i.e. political activity that displaces the violent role

[119] Tore Bjorgo, 2006, *op.cit*
[120] *Idem*

PULL	Desire for a normal life
	Desire to establish a family and take on parental and spousal roles
	Other changing priorities
	New employment or educational opportunities that could be undermined if group membership were known
	New role model or social group
	New, more compelling ideology or belief structure

Furthermore, Bjorgo also examines the methods used by individuals to disengage. These include making a public break from the extremist group, breaking from groups while still maintaining their ideology and performing a gradual withdrawal from group. Regarding interests, Bjorgo explains factors that inhibit individuals from anti-social group disengagement. If the group provides positive characteristics such as friendship and social support, individuals often remain loyal even when they do not agree with ideology. Individuals may also resist leaving an anti-social group due to the lack of social bonds available outside of the group or the lack of employment opportunities as a result of their group membership. Fear of reprisal from the group may also inhibit individuals from leaving since they are often threatened with death or are subject to harassment from other members. Disengagement also involves losing the protection from the groups against potential enemies. Individuals who leave are also exposed to negative sanctions from security services that may target individuals in the hope of gaining information about the group.[121] Audrey Kurth Cornin (2009) explores disengagement factors of groups in her study. She finds seven explanations for the decline or ending of a terrorist group, including: (1) the capture or killing of the terrorist group leader; (2) the failure of a goal or cause to transition to the next generation; (3) achievement of the cause;(4) transition to legitimate political participation; (5) loss of popular support; (6) repression by the state: and (7) transition to other elements. The recognition of these factors can provide opportunities for the state to exploit these conditions and potentially lead to the demise of terrorist groups.[122]

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[121] Tore Bjorgo, "Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right", in John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge, pp. 36-43.

[122] Audrey Kurth Cornin, "How Terrorist Campaign End", in John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge, pp. 55.

Identity Transformation in Social Movement

According to Guobin Yang (2000) social movements transform the identity of participants. The construction of identity in social movements has become a prominent field of research over the past few decades. Yang explains that many scholars have studied the influence of identity construction on movement emergence. Others focus on biographical consequences of movement participation and study how movement participation affects identity and the subsequent activism of participants.[123]

From the literature review, it is indicated that various scholars have shown that movement participation change participant's identities and that this effect is related to the nature of social movement (for example as a counter hegemony). The construction of identity in social movements has become a prominent field of research over the past few decades (Touraine, 1971; Cohen, 1985; Mueller, 1987; Calhoun, 1991; Friedman & Mc Adam, 1992; Hunt *etal.,* 1994; Melluci, 1989; Cerulo, 1997). Many scholars have studied the influence of identity construction on movement emergence (Melluci, 1989; Taylor & Whittier, 1992; Johnson *et.all*, 1994; Giroud, 1995). Others focus on the biographical consequences of movement participations and study how movement participations affect participant's identities and subsequent activism (Fendrich, 1977; Morris, 1984; Rupp & Taylor, 1987; Fantasia, 1988; Mc Adam, 1989; Calhoun, 1991; Taylor &Whittier, 1993; Whittier, 1995; Lichtermann, 1996; Taylor, 1996, Downton & Wehr, 1997; Robbnet, 1997). It is to the second group of works that I know turn in order to situate my study and glean useful insight.[124]

Works on the biographical impact of movement participation fall into two categories. One category emphasizes immediate impact and includes the work by Morris (1984), Fantasia (1988), Calhoun (1991, 1994), and Lictermann (1996) among others. The other stresses longer term effects and includes the work by Mueller (1987), Rupp & Taylor (1987), Mc Adam (1988, 1999), Taylor & Whittier (1993), Robbnet (1997), Downton & Wehr (1997). Work in the first category (immediate term effect) show that the experience of involvement affects participants such that they tend to become more committed activists. Thus Lichtermann (1996) finds that various commitment practices among environmentalist help create activist identities. Calhoun (1994) shows how involvement in high risk protest transformed initially self-centered students in China into activists brave enough to face death. Fantasia (1988) argues that solidarity among workers is

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[123] Guobin Yang, 2000, "The Liminal Effects of Social Movement: Red Guards and the Transformation of Identity", in *Sociological Forum,* Volume 15 No. 3, 2000. Plenum Publishing Corporation.
[124]*Idem*.

created in the process of collective action. Finally, Morris (1984) shows that meaningful face-to-face social interaction transformed members of an oppressed group who appear docile into activist protesters. Meanwhile, research on the long-term effect of movement participation reveals a close relation between movement experience and sustained commitment to political activism. Follow up studies of students and the civil right movement in the US, for example, consistently demonstrates a powerful and enduring effect of participation (McAdam, 1989). In his influential study on Freedom Summer Activists, McAdam concludes that activism does indeed have the potential to trigger a process of alteration that can affects many aspects of the participant "lives" and that the consequence of this process may be lifelong or at least long term. Similar conclusions are found in studies of the US women's movements. Among others, the work by Rupp & Taylor (1987), Verta Taylor (1989), Taylor & Whittier (1993), Whittier (1995) suggest that even in a hostile political environment, the women's movements remain virtual partly due to activist long-term commitment. Thus Rupp & Taylor (1987) find that during 1945 and 1960s, a period conventionally characterized as the bleak and lonely years of the women movement, activists still saw themselves as the heirs of the suffrage movement, worked on activists to promote what traditionally had been defined as women rights and identified with feminism. Taylor and Whittier (1993) write that the most activist feminism in the late 1980s and 1990s have been women who became involved with movement during the late 1960s and 1970s, were transformed by their involvement, and formed a lasting commitment to feminist goals.[125]

From the above explanation, it is noted that research on the immediate and long-term effects of movement participation underscore the transformative power of participant experience, revealing how collective experience shapes individual identities. In explaining why collective experience can have such power, most authors emphasize social interaction since in collective experience such interactions deepen commitment (Morris, 1984; Fantasia, 1988; Lichtermann, 1996) and provide structural ties for sustained activism (Rupp & Taylor, 1987; Mc Adam, 1989, Whittier, 1995). Scholars emphasize different sources of the power of social interactions, however. Some consider pre-existing organizational structure as a crucial element. Morris (1984) for example suggests that local institutions with which people are affiliated heavily shape their attitude and activism. Others underline the emotional aspects of social interactions (Calhoun, 1994; Whittier, 1997; Robnett, 1997). As Robnett (1997) puts it emotions are the catalyst through which individual transformations emerge, new ideas are embraced, and actions are

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[125]*Idem.*

undertaken, that are against one's own self-interest, such as risking one's life for the movement. Still, others implicitly distinguish social movement from routine social and political processes. In this they seem to endorse the hypothesis that it is the non-routine character of social movements that makes participation a transformative experience. Thus, in his analysis of the identity practices in the Ridge Green Movements, Lichtermann (1996) finds that becoming a green did not mean being radicalized into established traditions and organizations, so much as individually being jarred out of taken-for-granted cultural pathways. Similarly, Fantasia (1988) maintains that the process of collective actions is crucial to identity construction because in this process previously dominant institutions and cultural practices are replaced by a counter hegemony and a new order emerges through collective actions. The implicit argument is that, channeled through existing structures, social movements paradoxically break the bounds of these same structures and bring about change.[126]

According to Najib Azca (2011), by quoting Poletta and Jaspers (2001) he remarks that if identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation (as shown in the introduction and engagement of Jihadist to the Muslim extremists group), they also help explain people's exodus from such group. Azca explains that Jihadists take different paths during their imprisonment or its aftermath. Each of them lost their basic human freedom of physical mobility under the exercise of power and authority by the state. It leads to their identity pressure in which their attachment and commitment to violent jihad ideology and to their groups was under pressure. Furthermore, Azca explains that such pressure brings about 3 possible effects to violent-Jihadist. Those include: identity-enhancement meaning attachment and commitment of Jihadists to violent jihad ideology and their groups increase, identity-shift meaning to become altered and identity-confusion meaning to become confused.[127]

The Colorful Jihad:
From Violent To Non-Violent Jihad and the Debate about the Rule of Jihad

The understanding of the term *jihad* is by no means a simple one. Therefore, due to the weight and direct correlation with radicalism & deradicalization, I will explain in detail the definition and different connotations associated with the symbols and conceptions of jihad. First and foremost it must be stated that there is no single doctrine of jihad that has always and

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[126]*Idem.*

[127] Najib Azca, 2011, *After Jihad; A Biographical Approach to Passionate Politics in Indonesia*, PhD Dissertation at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

everywhere existed or been universally accepted. The understanding of jihad by Muslims regarding what is required by al-Qur'an and the practice of Prophet Muhammad has changed over time. The doctrine of jihad is not the product of single authoritarian individual or organization but rather product of diverse individuals and authorities interpreting and applying the principles of sacred texts in specific historical and political context. Therefore, in order to attempt to begin to understand the phenomenon we must look at the various uses of the term in different settings and by different practitioners of Islam.

For example, some Muslims might say that Jihad is the struggle to lead a good Muslim life, praying and fasting regularly, being a good spouse and parent. Others might believe jihad to mean working hard to spread the word and message of Islam. But there are also some Muslims who perceive jihad to be supporting the struggle of oppressed Muslims people such as in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Kosovo, etc.[128] The symbol of jihad could mean working toward the fight to unify the Islamic community and the abolishment of all infidels who do not share the same vision of life as holy Muslims. Jihad is a key element in what it means to be believer and follower of Islam, and as a symbol, it acts as a defining concept of Islam and as a powerful vehicle to conceptualize Islamic self and group identity as well as Islamic spirituality.

While we do not wish for this to be an argument over words alone, we cannot understand the doctrines or the historical phenomena without understanding the words as precisely as possible. The Arabic word *jihad* does not mean "holy war" or "just war." It literally means, "striving." When followed by the modifying phrase *fisabili Allah*, "in the path of God," or when— as often—this phrase is absent but assumed to be in force, *jihad* has the specific sense of fighting for the sake of God (whatever we understand that to mean). In addition, several other Arabic words are closely related to *jihad* in meaning and usage. These include *ribat*, which denotes pious activity, often related to warfare, and in many contexts seems to constitute a defensive counterpart to a more activist, offensive *jihad*. *Ribat* also refers to a type of building where this sort of defensive warfare can take place: a fortified place where garrisons of volunteers reside for extended periods of time while holding Islamic territory against the enemy. *Ghazw*, *ghazwa*, and *ghaza'* have to do with raiding (from which comes the French word *razzia*). *Qital*, or "fighting," at times conveys something similar to jihad/ribat, at times not. *Harb* means "war" or "fighting," usually in a more neutral sense, carrying less ideological weight than the other terms. All

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[128] John Esposito, 2002, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*, Oxford; Oxford University Press, p. 6

these words, however, have wide semantic range and frequently overlap with one other. They also change with distance and time.[129]

In order for our semiotic understanding of the notion of jihad, we must look into how it is linked with other symbols. The practitioners of jihad often make a distinction between *jihad asghar* (lesser jihad) and *jihad akbar* (greater jihad). The first is the more common understanding of the term and jihad is seen as a war waged against unbeliever, while the second is a completely different struggle which is against the believer's own tendency to transgress the law of God. It is this mystical form of jihad (*jihad akbar*), which is seen as a battle with the ego in order to obtain inner purification that ultimately leads to the welcoming of Allah. According to the mystical view of *Jihad Akbar*, the ego is inclined to rebel against Allah. It is the ego's rebellious nature that prevents him or her from welcoming Allah. In order to embrace Allah, one must wage a war (so to speak) against this rebellious nature and embrace Allah and merge into Him. Unlike the radical notion of jihad Akbar the enemy is not an outside enemy but the inside force of the ego.[130]

Ibnu al-Qayyim explains that at least there are 13 types of Jihad that are divided into 4 categories:

First is Jihad al-nas (Jihad against oneself) that has 4 types: (1) Striving to learn the teachings of Islam without which one cannot attain success and happiness in this world or in the Hereafter. If this is missing, then one is doomed to misery in this world and in the Hereafter, (2) Striving to make oneself act in accordance with what one has learned. Simply knowing without acting even though it may not cause any harm is not going to bring any benefit, (3) Striving to call others to Islam, teaching those who do not know about it. Otherwise one will be of those who conceal the guidance and the teaching that God has revealed, and it will not benefit him or save him from the God's punishment, (4) Striving to bear patiently the difficulties involved in calling people to God and the insult of people, bearing all that for the sake of God.

Second is Jihad al-Shaitan (Jihad against Satan) that has 2 types: (1) Warding off the doubts that Satan stirs up to undermine faith, (2) Striving against Satan to ward off the corrupt desires that he provokes.

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[129] Michael Bonner, 2006, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
[130] Farhad Khoroskhavar, 2005, *Suicide Bombers: Allah New Martyr*, Translated by David Macey, London: Pluto Press. p. 14

Third is Jihad al-Munafiqin wa al-Kuffars (Jihad against the hypocrites and the disbelievers) which has 4 types: (1) With the heart, (2) the tongue, (3) one's wealth, (4) oneself.

Fourth is Jihad al-Thaghut (Jihad against the oppressor leader that has 3 types: (1) jihad with one's hand if one is able, (2) if not possible then with one's tongue, (3) if not possible then with one's heart.[131]

The vision of Jihad held by most radical Muslims is a more militant one which is more concerned with the battle fought against the external forces with threatens the religion and community (*ummah*) of Islam. Radical Muslims also believe there is an inner struggle but it comes second to the struggle against the infidel enemy which may call for the supreme sacrifice of martyrdom. For them, Muslims must be willing to fight the heretical enemy, and in this battle the Muslim who loves God inspires a desire to merge with him through martyrdom. The Qur'anic teachings have been significantly essential to Muslim self-understanding, piety, mobilization, expansion and defense. Both the non-violent and violent notions of jihad are discussed within al-Qur'an. Its characterization of Jihad does not solely depict the struggle of *Jihad akbar* (greater jihad) and depending on the circumstances of one's life, but also describe jihad ashgar, as fighting against injustice and oppression, spreading and defending Islam, and creating a just society through preaching, teaching, and if necessary, armed struggle or holy war.[132]

Besides the debate about Jihad *akbar* and Jihad *asghar*, there are also fields of debate about the criteria for Jihad. Michael Bonner (2006) explains that over the centuries, as Muslim jurists reiterated and refined the rule of jihad, they referred constantly to several underlying questions. We may begin by singling out two of these.

Who Is the Enemy? If we think of jihad first of all as a kind of organized warfare against external opponents, then who precisely are those opponents? How and under what conditions must war be waged against them? What is to be done with them once they have been defeated? Questions of this kind predominated in many of the juridical debates about the jihad, especially during the early, formative centuries of Islam. Once some sort of consensus has been achieved regarding these enemies from outside, then what about internal adversaries? All agree that war may be waged, at least as a last resort, against Muslims who rebel against a constituted Muslim authority. Is such war then a kind of jihad? And must these internal Muslim rebels be treated in the

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[131] Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah, 1986, *Madaarij al-Saalikin*, Beirut: Daar al-Kitabi al-Arabi

[132] John Esposito, 2002, *op.cit,* p. 117

same way as the external non-Muslim opponents just mentioned? Here we find that in actual historical experience, the contending parties in intra-Muslim conflicts did often have recourse to the doctrine and above all, the rhetoric of jihad. In juridical discourse, however, the matter is somewhat complicated. Organized armed action against the Muslim political rebel (*baghi*), as well as against two other types of malfeasor, the apostate (*murtadd*) who renounces his own religion of Islam, and the brigand (*muharib*) who threatens the established order while seeking only his own personal gain is indeed, often described as a form of jihad. Loyal Muslims who die in combat against these rebels, apostates, and brigands achieve the status of martyr. On the other hand, the status of the adversaries in these conflicts is considered to be different from that of the non-Muslim adversaries in the "external" jihad. Here we see differences in approach between Sunni and Shi'i jurists. For the most part, however, we find that these matters are actually dealt with under headings of Islamic law other than jihad. In fact, it is possible to provide a nuanced, theoretical discussion of political rebels and rebellion in Islam while referring to jihad only intermittently or even minimally. Thus, while the discussion of rebels is part of the juridical discourse on jihad, it is not, at least in a consistent way, at the heart of that discourse. Here, as elsewhere, we encounter the temptation of allowing the notion of jihad to apply to almost everything, a temptation that is best for us to avoid.[133]

The Quran and Tradition often speak of oppressors. What happens if oppressors arise within the Muslim community itself? Must we carry out jihad against them? Here, of course, we are looking at the problem of rebellion from the point of view of the ruled, instead of the rulers: is there a right to resistance against an unjust ruler? From very early on in the history of Islam, some Muslims have deployed the ideology and vocabulary of jihad against what they have seen as oppressive and tyrannous (though Muslim) rulers. From a later perspective, these oppressors might be described as political rebels or religious heretics—though here we run the risk of using the terminology and conceptual patterns of Christianity. The point for now is simply that jihad has a long history as an ideology of internal resistance. Finally, many have claimed that the authentic jihad, the "greater jihad," is not warfare waged in the world against external adversaries but is rather an internal spiritualized war waged against the self and its base impulses. What does it mean to have such an adversary and to make war against it? This question will be taken up again very shortly.[134]

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[133] Michael Bonner, 2006, *op.cit*.
[134] *Idem*.

Who Is in Charge*?* Early Muslim jurisprudence provided an answer to this question: the imam, which then meant much the same thing as the caliph, the supreme ruler and head (after God Himself) over the entire Muslim community and polity. The imam has ultimate responsibility for military operations, both offensive and defensive; in particular, offensive campaigns outside the Islamic lands, against external foes, require his permission and supervision. However, since the imam or caliph could not be everywhere at once, it was always necessary for him to delegate his authority in these matters. Meanwhile, over time, his power and authority diminished in the world, and rivals emerged. Furthermore, jihad was acknowledged to be not only a collective activity: it was also a matter of concern and choice for the individual, of great consequence for his or her personal salvation. Thus the jihad became the site of an argument over authority, and it has remained one right down to the present day.[135]

We have already mentioned the insistence, in many writings of our own day on jihad and Islam, on continuity. First of all, continuity in time: today's historical actors are often seen to be repeating or reenacting things that happened long ago. Second, continuity between doctrine and practice: so for instance, calls to warfare and martyrdom in Quran and Tradition are thought to provide explanations for today's violent behavior. This claim to continuity requires critical examination. However, there is no doubt that Muslims have often expressed a strong desire for continuity with their own past. In this case, does performing jihad establish continuity with the Prophet Muhammad, through literal imitation of the actions he took during his military campaigns in Arabia? Or does it involve immersion in the study of the divine law? Or does it mean identifying oneself with the organized authority, the Islamic state—which in the language of early Islam often means the caliph/imam himself? Or does performance of jihad establish continuity with that other great protagonist of early Islam, the community, which did, after all, forge its place in the world through warfare and campaigns? Other themes of debate can be expressed in the form of binary oppositions that recur in the writings of medieval and modern authors, jurists and non-jurists, Muslims and non-Muslims. These include the following.[136]

"Real" Jihad versus "Mere" Fighting*.* In the Hadith or Tradition (see chapter 3), as well as in some other sources, a distinction is often made between, on the one side, militant activity (usually called *jihad* or *ribat* or both) that has authentic status and, on the other side, fighting undertaken with no concern

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[135]*Idem.*

[136]*Idem.*

for divine commandments, divine reward, and so on. It is often stated that some people act in accordance with jihad, while others fight only for the sake of worldly things such as glory, plunder, and power. The distinction is polemical and perhaps applied arbitrarily or unfairly on some occasions.[137]

External and Internal Jihad. Most accounts of the jihad agree that it has both an external and an internal aspect. The external jihad is an activity in the world, involving physical combat against real enemies in real time. The internal jihad, sometimes called the "greater jihad," is a struggle against the self, in which we suppress our own base desires, purify ourselves, and then rise, to contemplation of higher truth. Most modern Western writings on the jihad consider that the external jihad, the physical combat against real adversaries, was the first to arrive in history and has priority in most ways. In this view, the internal jihad, the spiritualized combat against the self, is secondary and derivative, despite all the importance it eventually acquired in Muslim thought and society. However, much of contemporary Muslim opinion favors the opposite view. As a question of first origins, we can argue that elements of the internal jihad were already present at the beginning, including in the Quran itself, and that jihad has often been, in equal measure, a struggle against both the enemy within and the enemy without.[138]

Collective and Individual Jihad. This is a central issue in the classical doctrine of jihad. As we shall see, it corresponded to real problems that confronted Islamic governments, rulers, and military commanders, together with a wide array of individuals who, in their quest for salvation and religious merit, became involved in the activities of the jihad. The most original modern treatment of this ancient problem came in the doctoral thesis of the late Albrecht Noth. In Noth's analysis, warfare against external enemies is a concern for the entire Muslim community, under the leadership of its imam/caliph. This warfare requires resources and organization on a scale that only the state can provide. At the same time, this warfare may be holy, as it fulfills religious objectives by protecting and, where possible, expanding the community and its territory. Then, on the other hand, we have the individuals who volunteer to participate in this activity. They too are carrying out divine commands. They receive a religious reward for their activity; their motivation (the sincerity of their intention) is often a source of concern. However, even if their intentions are pure, these individuals are likely to be less concerned with public goals (warding off enemy invasion, conquering new territory for Islam) and more interested in achieving religious merit for themselves. Noth identified these

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[137]*Idem.*

[138]*Idem.*

two elements as "holy war" and "holy struggle"— both of them components of what I am seeking to identify as the jihad, and at odds with each other much of the time.[139]

An often over-looked notion of jihad is the correlation with the practice of Prophet Muhammad known as *hijrah* (migration or exodus). The relation with the two concepts stems from the hijrah of Muhammad who, after being harassed by unbelievers, left Mecca for Medina to work for Muslims supremacy, returned to re-conquer the city when he was in a position of strength. When group of Muslims feel that they are in a position of weakness, they often select a strategic retreat, planning their return to conquer later. The tactic of hijrah has 2 objectives; (1) leaving when in a position of weakness in order to find protection against the more powerful forces of evil, and (2) gaining new strength while in exile, returning in force, fighting the unbelievers, defeating them, and re-establishing the faith.

The association of hijrah with Jihad is important in the study of modern day Islamic martyrdom; members of different radical groups experience retreat either literally or sometimes figuratively from ever increasing secular ways of life of consumerism and individualism, from oppressive Muslims and non-Muslims states. It is through this retreat that radical groups from a community with other cells, strategically placed throughout the world in an attempt to regain power, and display it via methods of violent acts aimed at the infidels who caused them to hijrah in order to reform their ideal community (*ummah*).

Throughout the history of Islam, Muslims have been challenged to draw a careful line between self-defense and aggression, resistance and rebellion, reform and terrorism. In the 7th century Islam emerged into a region that was riddled with violence where war was the natural state.[140] Succumbing to this harsh environment, Islam too has a history of military engagement almost from its beginning.[141] It was this type of early religiously motivated tribal warfare practiced by those in the region, which first bore the name of Jihad, which would later come to mean for the cause of God and even later would be known as holy war. Islam with its birth and history rooted in both defense and violence promotes among its members multiple definitions of Jihad, which carry numerous conceptions for individual and group identity.

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[139] Michael Bonner, 2006, *Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
[140] John Esposito, 2002, *op.cit.*
[141] Mark Juergensmeyer, 2003, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, University of California Press.

With the ever-increasing secularization of the world communities, radical Muslims deny this movement and seek to unify their own community (*ummah*). Most radical Muslims view this as their struggle or Jihad, which is their calling from God and vow to form a unified Islamic community at any cost. Violence is necessary to destroy anything that stands in the way of Islam. Modern day radical Muslims accent and focus on the violent connotations of jihad. Radical Muslims adhere to the violent form of jihad as their life's primary struggle against an oppressive world. It is the violent notion of Jihad, which is subscribed by those that practice modern day martyrdom. Those who express their disgust with the world by mobilizing the sacred and designating the enemy they want to kill are willing to be killed.[142]

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[142] Farhad Khoroskhavar, 2005, op.cit.

CHAPTER 3
METHDOLOGY AND SCOPE OF FIEDLWORK

Introduction

After explaining the landscape and focus of the study in the Chapter 1 and the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, in this Chapter I will present the narratives of how I conducted the fieldwork. It deals with the methodology and scope of fieldwork; I conducted from August to December 2010 in several cities of Indonesia. In this study, I apply a biographical approach, collecting the life-stories of former Muslim extremists by conducting a series of interviews and participant-observations. Najib Azca (2011) by quoting Denzim (1989) explains that there are two different levels of life-story narrated by a person, namely the surface and the deep. At the surface level, a person is reflected in his/her individual everyday activities, routine, and daily tasks. At the deep level, a person is reflected in his/her feeling, moral, sacred and inner self. The deep, the inner self, may only rarely be displayed by a person to others, but may be captured in autobiographical or biographical documents and personal narratives.[143] In this study, I will discuss the transformation of Jihad among several Muslim extremists. Therefore, I will trace their violent jihad trajectories by focusing on the turning point moments in their jihad period during the so called liminal-situation of jihad. The periods of before and after these moments (pre and post liminal) also cannot be ignored in order to look deeply at the cause and the impact of violent jihad to their life.

During the fieldwork, I carried out participant-observation and life-story interviews with four primary–informants who are selected from former Muslim extremists.[144] To test the reliability of personal narratives by going beyond the facts and the events in order to grasp further meaning and subjectivity of the narrators, I also interviewed around 30 secondary-informants who are either directly or indirectly related to primary informants. They include existing Muslim extremists, other former Muslim extremists, families and fellows of primary informants, the Indonesian police and its deradicalization program team, the *ulama*, the experts and activists of deradicalization, and other informants who know about or have experience with the primary informants. A questionnaire was prepared before conducting fieldwork. This single sheet formed the basis of a number of semi-structured interviews. The questions formulated were deliberately kept in

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[143] Najib Azca, 2011, *op.cit.*
[144] Previously there was a plan to have around 10 primary informants. However, after a series of discussions with the supervisor I decided to choose 4 of them by considering the variety of groups as well as their level/position and role in the groups.

general terms so as not to interfere with the informant's formulation of their answer. The questionnaire is divided into two; for primary informants and for secondary informants but the contents are similar (with only modification of the questions for secondary informants). The questionnaire consists of several questions about personal background, participation in violent jihad group and more importantly the transition period in such group. The questions about "transition" include what was the decision making process, what was the influence and inspiration to decide, who or what persuaded, what were the important reasons and considerations, how long did it take, what did they feel after the decision, how they compare situation, opinion about violent jihad ideology and activism before and after the decision, etc. There are also additional follow-up questions to be used in the event an informant had extensive and detailed experience to relay.

A Well-Rounded Researcher: The Lecturer and Muslim with Pesantren Background

Before presenting the detailed story of my fieldwork, I will explain several strategies that I applied during the fieldwork. The main strategy concerned how I contacted and presented myself to informants or to prospective informants. I usually presented two sides of myself; I am a lecturer and a Muslim with strongly NU (Nahdlatul Ulama)[145] Pesantren/Islamic boarding school background (and even became a head of *Tanfidziyah*/executive of NU Branch in Germany in the period when I was conducting my fieldwork).

I am a lecturer at the Paramadina University, which is widely labeled as a campus for progressive and even liberal Islam. It refers to the founder of the university, the late Prof. Dr. Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005)[146] who was a vanguard of renewal Islam in Indonesia. He was widely known by his several slogans regarding his project of renewal Islam. They included

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[145] Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), established in 1926 is the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia with around 90 million members. NU members, or so-called *Nahdliyin,*are well known as traditional Muslims who accommodatelocal culture in their religious rituals. Mostly the *Nahdliyin* live in rural areas of Indonesia.

[146]Nurcholsih Madjid (1939-2005) in his homeland affectionately known as Cak Nur, was a prominent Indonesian Muslim intellectual. Early in his academic career, Madjid was a leader in various student organizations. He soon became well known as a proponent for modernization within Islam. Throughout his career he continued to argue that for Islam to be victorious in the global struggle of ideas, it needs to embrace the concepts oftolerance, democracy and pluralism. In 1986 he established Paramadina Foundation which runs training, discussion and book publicationswhich focused on spreading systematically the concept of tolerance, democracy and pluralism. In 2001, he established the Paramadina University where I have been the lecturer since 2005.

"*modernization means rationalization, not westernization*," "*Islam yes, Islamic party no*,"etc., these slogans helped combat the view that it was sinful for Muslims to become a modernist and to vote against Islamic parties. The label of progressive and even liberal Islam campus was sometimes an advantage but in other times a disadvantage for me during the fieldwork. It depended on whom I was talking to. I had to look at the characteristics of their Islamic background before asking them for interview. A few Muslim extremists in Indonesia held negative opinion about liberal Islam and they will deny interacting with those from that side, including me.

However, the fact that I am a Muslim with strongly NU Pesantren background (and even I became a Head of *Tanfidziyah* of NU Germany) helped me to make and develop contact with various kinds of people, including Muslim extremists. In the initial process of contacting informants, they always ask about my Pesantren. I have studied Islamic teaching in 3 different Pesantren, all affiliated to the NU, for almost 10 years. Those Pesantren include Pesantren al-Himmah in Cilacap, al-Huda and Salafiyah in Kebumen, all in Central Java. During the period in Pesantren, I have studied a wide range of Islamic teaching starting from *fiqh (*Islamic jurisprudence)*, aqidah* (Islamic theology)*, akhlaq* (Islamic ethics)*, Arabic language*, etc. The NU is the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia and possibly in the world. With approximately 90 million members, NU is identified as having a traditional Islam side while the second largest Muslims organization Muhammadiyah has a modernist one. While the NU people who also called the *Nahdliyin* mostly live in Indonesian villages, the Muhammadiyah people live mostly in the urban areas. Apart from these different backgrounds, the characteristics of both organizations, regarding their Islamic doctrines, is moderate Islam. They both are to some extent widely recognized as the pillars of Indonesian Islam. This fact and also the generally good image of NU among Indonesian people including among existing and former Muslim extremists (although a few of them possibly do not agree with Islamic opinion of NU but they still respect it) helped me not only to ask them for interview sessions and participant observation but also later-on to discuss any Islamic issues with them, including the core of my study, about transformation of jihad.

During my study in Germany, I have been the head of executive (*tanfidziyah*) of the NU branch of Germany. Following the suggestion from several NU elites in Jakarta before I went to Germany for PhD study, my colleague and I initiated the establishment of the NU branch of Germany at the end of 2010, one year after I arrived in Frankfurt in the end of 2009. Having this position, as well as the NU broader networks around Indonesia and even the world, helped me to connect with any

kind of informants I need to interview during my fieldwork. I also got benefits when travelled from one city to another city to meet the informants. I did not need to stay in hotels (and never once had to). The *kiyai* (leader of Pesantren) who lived in the cities I visited during my fieldwork, knowing that I am the *Tanfidziyah* of NU Branch in Germany, warmly invited and welcomed me to stay in their Pesantren. How lucky I am to see the *kyai* not only provide me with room but also food, vehicle, etc. However, during fieldwork the *kyai* would ask me to have a sharing-session with the *santri* (students of Pesantren). I used it to have discussion with the *santri* especially about the topic of Jihad related to my research as well as how to study abroad (in Germany).

The Primary Informants: Selecting Former Muslim extremists

Martin van Bruinessen (2002) explains that the rise of extremist Muslim groups in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 can be understood by tracing back its genealogy in the wake of Indonesian's independence and its transformation during the Suharto era. Furthermore, van Bruinessen explains that the historical roots of contemporary extremist Muslim movements can be traced back to two main "indigenous"movements, namely the Masyumi Party (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia/Council of Indonesian Muslim association) and the DI/*Darul Islam* (also known as NII/Negara Islam Indonesia). Although the two were separate political entities, they were nevertheless linked in certain ways.

While NII still exists, the Masyumi party has disintegrated and its proponents have fragmented into other Islamist groups and parties. The ICG (2005) explains that no understanding of jihad in Indonesia is possible without understanding NII and their tireless efforts to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.[147] Over the last 55 years, the group has produced splinters and offshoots that range from the terrorist group, JI, to non-violent religious groups. Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by NII's history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life.[148] NII became the core of a movement that led to birth of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a terrorist organization established in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. This reflected the shift from an

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[147] In this paper, I will use the terms DI and NII interchangeably.

[148] See ICG, 'Recycling Militant in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing', in *Asia Research Report,* No. 92, 22 February 2005, See: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/092-recycling-militants-in-indonesia-darul-islam-and-the-australian-embassy-bombing.aspx

Indigenous to a transnational movement since JI is closely connected to the international terrorist group al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden.

Based on above explanation, I decided to select former Muslim extremists from both groups, NII and JI. I chose Laskar Jihad (LJ) as an additional group since it is a unique extremist group. LJ is not only a contemporary and short-lived extremist group (established in 1999 and later dissolved in 2001), it also lacks roots in the history of extremist groups in Indonesia. It is, however, categorized as an indigenous groupsince its existence was highly dependent on similar groups abroad, particularly the Salafi groups in the Middle East through the *fatwa* (edicts) from their ulama. After identifying about 10 potential primary informants, I selected 4: Nasir Abas and Ali Imron from JI, Ja'far Umar Thalib from LJ, and Mataharitimoer from NII. I chose these individuals for several reasons: (a) They reflect all positions and roles in the extremist groups (Abas as a trainer, Imron as an operator, Thalib as a commander, and Mataharitimoer as a secretary and recruiter); (b) Due to media coverage on their previous backgrounds and current activisms, they have become very-well known among Indonesians as deradicalized figures; (c) They are, although in different levels, either actively involved or support the deradicalization program;[149] and, with the exception of Thalib, (d) they have openly written about their commitment to move away from their Muslim extremists groups and violent jihadism as well as activism.[150]

The Dynamic Trajectory

Name	Phase 1/ Introduction- (Pre-Liminal)	Phase 2/ Being a Radical (Liminal)	Phase 3/ Deradicalizati on (Post-Liminal)
Abas	-Teacher at MIS, -Joining Afghan Military Academy	-Commander of Wakalah (sabah Malaysia), Creating Uhud Project to support communal conflict in Ambon & Poso, -Leader	-Arrested by Indonesian police after Bali Bombing 1 but then freed, -Helping the police

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[149] Nasir Abas and Ali Imron have been helping Indonesian police run the deradicalization Program, Ja'far Umar Thalib is now a famous-preacher who condemns religious violence and MT is an NGO activist running ICDW (Indonesian Center for Deradicalization and Wisdom).

[150] Nasir Abas, 2005, *Membongkar Jama'ah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Ketua JI*, Jakarta: Abdika Press; Ali Imron, 2007, *Ali Imron Sang Pengebom: Kesadaran & Ungkapan Penyesalan*, Jakarta: Penerbit Republika; Mataharitimoer, 2007, *Jihad Terlarang: Cerita dari Bawah Tanah*, Jakarta: Kayla Pustaka.

		of Mantiqi 3 (Sabah, Mindanao, Tarakan, Nunukan, Palu)	
Imron	*-Teacher at Pesantren Al-Islam, -Joining Afghan Military Academy*	*-Support communal conflict in Ambon & Poso, -Actively involved in Church Bombing in East Java and Bali Bombing 1*	*-Arrested by Indonesian police and serving life imprisonment, -Helping the police*
Thalib	*-Studying in Pakistan & Yaman, -Leader of Pesantren Ihya'us Sunnah, -Leader of SalafiNetwork*	*-Establishing FKAWJ, -Commander of LJ, -Actively involved in Communal Conflict in Ambon & Poso*	*-LJ was disbanded by Ja'far, -Being a little-moderate preacher and back at his Pesantren in Yogyakarta*
MT	*-Unemployed man, Joining under-ground halaqoh (religious circle)*	*-Activist of NII (secretary leader of Jakarta regional division & actively recruiting cadres)*	*-Committed to move away from NII, Became a blogger and NGO activist concerned withcounter-radicalism based atPesantren Darul Ulum Bogor.*

Interviews with Former Muslim extremists

Nasir Abas

In October 2010 I began the first step of my fieldwork in Jakarta, the city where I have lived since 2002 until leaving for Germany at the end of 2009. Jakarta is a strategic site for this fieldwork since it is the location where Nasir Abas, Ali Imron and several secondary informants are based. Therefore, it was quite easy for me to meet those informants.

I previously met Nasir Abas when he was invited to speak at Paramadina University in 2007 at a discussion on the rise of

radicalism. At that time, Ja'far Thalib also participated in the discussion. Having this experience, when I was still in Germany about 3 months before my fieldwork, I contacted Abas via Facebook (FB) and asked him for his cellphone number and if he would be willing to be interviewed for my study. He replied immediately, answering that he was OK with the interview and gave me his number.

When I was in Jakarta, I called Abas to meet him for the interview. We met each other in the Pizza cafe (a suitable place offered by Abas for the interview since the place is not noisy) at 19:00 in Mampang, Jakarta. I came a little bit late at 19:15 since Jakarta was heavily flooded at that time and there were many obstacles on the street. Similarly, Abas was also late, arriving at came late at 19.20, which he explained was also due to the flood. He came with a man he claimed was his close friend. I guessed that based on the man's military-like appearance, the man is a member of the Indonesian police who accompanied Abas for security reasons.

After I shared a brief explanation of my study about the transformation of jihad through the life stories of former Muslim extremists, I asked each of the questions from my semi-structured questionnaire. Abas answered seriously, and the interview took almost 4 hours. It was 23.10 when we finished the interview. Before leaving the café, Abas explained how I could meet Ali Imron in the jail in Polda Metro Jaya (Jakarta Police Headquarter) three days later. He said someone will help me enter the jail and I should wait for a man on the western off side of the mosque in Polda Metro Jaya. Abas also suggested that I bring some cakes as well as sugar, coffee and tea when visiting Imron.

Ali Imron

Three days later, I came to Polda Metro Jaya and met the man in the mosque. After introducing ourselves, we went to Ali Imron's jail cell in the Security Detention Center for Drug and Narcotics Offenders in Polda Metro Jaya. One part of the building contains the terrorist block, occupied by prisoners who had been classified as agents in terrorist actions across the archipelago, including Ali Imron, Utomo Pamungkas a.k.a Mubarok, Abu Dujana, Zulkarnain also known as *Mbah,* etc.

When I met Imron at 11.00 I said *assalamu'alaikum* and he answered *wa'alaikumsalam*. We shook hands and I thanked him for his willingness to meet me and gave him a plastic bag of cakes, sugar, coffee and tea. I also introduced myself as a doctoral student in Germany (as well as my background as graduate of NU Pesantren) conducting research about transformation of jihad. Imron was wearing *baju koko* (also known as *baju taqwa*, *Islamic t-shirt* mostly worn for prayers) and plaid-motif-*sarung*. He looked brighter and a bit fatter than I had previously seen on media. He had a thin moustache with a trimmed beard.

Imron's cell was a room measuring about 4x5 meters and was divided into three; 2x3 meter bedroom partitioned by a small curtain, a small bathroom and toilet, and the rest of living space where I saw a number of items including a fan, a cellphone, a small table clock, and mostly his books.

We sat on the vinyl carpet of his cell floor and began to talk. He told me that he received a quantity of books and journals during the previous weeks, mostly from the Department of Religious Affairs and from the deradicalization program team. One of books that I saw clearly among the hundreds of his books was *Membumikan Quran* written by Indonesian expert of al-Qur'an exegesis Professor Quraish Shihab. When I asked Imron whether he had already read all those books, he answered 'not yet.' He preferred to read several books that support his plan to write his second book about jihad in Indonesia. After I shared a brief explanation of my study about the transformation of jihad through the life stories of former Muslim extremists, I asked each of the questions from my semi-structured questionnaire. Imron gave his answers seriously but sometimes made a joke regarding his time in Afghanistan and his process for the BB1, which made us laugh.

It was almost 13:00 when we were listening to the *adzan* (call to prayer) from the loudspeaker; I assumed from the mosque in Polda Metro Jaya. Listening to this, Imron asked me to break the interview to conduct *dhuhur* (afternoon prayer). I told him that I would join him in the prayer. I took *wudlu* (cleaning some parts of the body before prayer) in the bathroom in his cell.

The place for Imron and other prisoners to conduct *dhuhur* prayer in the *jama'ah* (collective) was on the block's balcony. While sitting on the *sajadah* (carpet) on the balcony and waiting for the prayer, I saw other "terrorist" prisoner such as Abu Dujana, Mubarok and Zarkasih. The prayer took about 5 minutes. After that I saw Abu Dujana was still sitting in the balcony. I asked Imron if I could quickly chat with Abu Dujana and he agreed. I went to Abu Dujana, introduced myself, and then we had short talk about jihad in Islam. When I asked him about violent Jihad, he defended that jihad like the BB1 was legitimate according to the rule of jihad in Islam (I will explore about this topic in Chapter 5). After about 20 minutes, Abu Dujana asked to go back

to his cell. I then went back to Imron's cell to continue the interview.

It was 15:00 when we finished the interview (The man who helped me to reach Imron's cell reminded me that I only had until 15:00 to conduct the interview). Before leaving Imron's cell, I told him that I planned to visit his Pesantren in Lamongan. Imron agreed and suggested that I meet certain people and also gave me their cellphone numbers to contact them and make appointments before visiting.

Ja'far Thalib

As mentioned above, before conducting fieldwork, I previously met Thalib at a seminar held on my campus. I therefore already had his cellphone number and was able to make an appointment to conduct his interview at his Pesantren Ihyaussunnah in Yogyakarta.

Unfortunately, while I was in Yogyakarta in November 2010, the Merapi volcano eruption that had begun in late October was still causing problems. Three hundred and fifty thousand people were evacuated from the affected area including the Pesantren Ihyaussunnah, which is located not away from the mountain. 353 people were killed during the eruption, many as a result of pyroclastic flows. The ash plume from the mountain also caused a major disruption to aviation across Java Island. When I called Thalib, he answered that it seemed impossible to conduct the interview in the Pesantren, as he was not in Yogyakarta because he had moved to avoid the eruption. In the end, we had a short interview by phone and Thalib also gave me information about how I could access the documentation about his involvement in jihad activism. When I tried to visit the Pesantren, the ash of from the eruption covered it heavily and Thalib as well as his santri (students) still had not returned there. Instead of doing fieldwork for my research, I helped the First-Aid team from UGM (Gadjah

Mada University) in Yogyakarta, of which I had been a team member during my study at UGM, to evacuate people from the area affected by the eruption to several refugee camps.

Mataharitimoer/MT

MT is an active blogger and netizen. Before conducting the interview, MT and I had contacted each other. I also made an appointment to meet him during my fieldwork. He agreed and provided me with his cellphone number. In December 2010, we met each other at the Pesantren Darul Ulum Bogor. The pesantren was easy to reach since it is located in Bantar-Kemang near the famous Terminal (bus-station) Baranangsiang in Bogor. MT, his wife and their children have been living in a house near the Pesantren.

The Pesantren Darul Ulum looked clean, as is usual for modern Pesantren. I found many Arabic and English instructions on several sides of the Pesantren. For example, the Arabic, *Rabithah al-Thalabah bi al-Ma'had al-Tarbiyyah al-Islamiyyah Darul Ulum* (Students Association of the Pesantren Darul Ulum), and the English big-banner "**Trust yourself in the way of success,**" etc.[151] It was around 16:00 when I arrived in the Pesantren and met MT. After I introduced myself, MT introduced his wife and children to me. He also introduced Iqbal, the son of the pesantren's kyai (leader) who was previously MT's fellow during his time in NII.

After I shared a brief explanation of my study about transformation of jihad through the life stories of former Muslim extremists, I asked each of the questions from my semi-structured questionnaire. MT gave his answers seriously. After a 2 hour

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[151] When I told a German friend who has mastery of English about this, he said it is not Standard English. However, it is common that the modern Pesantren in Indonesia have many slogans written both in English and Arabic on their walls.

interview, at 18:00, MT asked me to conduct Maghrib prayers and after that we continued the interview. At 21:00 the interview was almost finished when Iqbal came to join us. We further discussed NII and its jihad since Iqbal was also a previous member. At 23:00 I left the Pesantren and returned to Jakarta.

Visiting and Observing the Pesantren of Former Muslim extremists

During the fieldwork, besides interviews with primary and secondary informants, visiting and observing deradicalization programs held by the Indonesian police and the NGO, I also visited and observed the Pesantren of the primary informants, with the exception of Nasir Abas'Pesantren in Malaysia.

The Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah (MIS) Malaysia

According to Nasir Abas, the Ma'had Ittibaus Sunnah (MIS) is a mosque located near the road market in Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia. Nowadays it is widely known as Jalan Lama (the old road) to Seremban, which is the capital of Negeri Sembilan (federal) state. The MIS was a famous mosque used as a place for learning to translate and to interpret al-Qur'an and the Prophet Hadith. It was managed by Hashim Abdul Ghani, the teacher whom Abas recognizes as his guide for understanding the al-Qur'an. The MIS is also famous for its interpretation of the al-Qur'an in a precise and word-by-word method, which made it easy to learn and quickly gained the attention of Muslims. The majority of the MIS students were students from many universities such as UPM (University of Native Malaysia), UM (University of Malaya), UKM (National University of Malaysia) and other universities.

The MIS had about 80 students but was rather small in size. There were many rooms for students to stay but it was limited so that other students used the prayer-room for sleeping. Mrs Yami, a local donor, usually provided food for lunch and dinner. However, especially on Monday and Tuesday nights, when students had *iftar* (breaking of their fasting), they received food from various local people as their charity (*shadaqah*).

The MIS generally provided people of all ages the opportunity to participate. There was no obligation to wear certain uniforms or to stay in the MIS. Also there was no clear information about how long students should study at the MIS.

The principle method was word-by-word teaching (*harfiyyah*). Students are taught to interpret al-Qur'an with the help of a translation dictionary of al-Furqon written by staff at the MIS. Additionally, there are many subjects taught to the MIS students

such as *nahwu, sharaf* (both are basic grammar for Arabic language), the prophet hadith especially used the book of *bullughul maram* and *subulus salam* (the way to peace) and other books concerning *Hadith, fiqh, ushul fiqh, ulumul qur'an*, etc.

The class in the MIS could be categorized in three groups: senior, junior, and mixed classes. Every weekend there was a public sermon the MIS students could attend as well. After one year of studying at the MIS, Abas became a teacher there, and remained from 1986 until the end of 1987. In the following year, he taught junior class while at the same time becoming a student in the senior class. Abas was elected head of the senior class.

After two years studying at the MIS, Abas was appointed to teach the junior and senior class the word-by-word al-Qur'an interpretation method (*harfiyyah*) and Arabic grammar (*nahwu and sharaf*).

The Pesantren al-Islam Lamongan

Pesantren al-Islam is located in Tenggulun village, Solokuro, the northern part of Lamongan regency. The location is isolated, and it is not easy to reach as it is far away from public-transport. To reach the Pesantren, from the main street, I had to take an *ojek* (motorcycle-taxi). Since there is no way back, I asked the *ojek* to wait for me during the visit and the interview. The Pesantren is simple, if not poor. There is no fence to separate it from the nearby kampung (village) and no proper external lighting. Several parts of the Pesantren compound are made from plywood. There is no clear billboard announcing its existence, only a plain board, 30 centimeters (cm) by 40 cm affixed to the edge of one of the buildings.

The Pesantren al-Islam was established in 1992 on a land of 7, 500 m^2 but officially started in 1993 after it was registered by the Regional Department of Religious Affairs of East Java. The founders were Khozin and his brother Ja'far Shodiq with the assistance of Muslih. The initial process was funded by donations

from Tenggulun-migrant workers in Malaysia who collected money for almost 3 years.

The Pesantren was established after Khozin saw inadequate religious teaching in the public schools. Its *khithah* (struggle) is to create *ulama amilin fi sabilillah* (religious cleric who struggle in the God's path). The curriculum was designed by three sources: the Pesantren and the Departments of Education and Religious Affairs. For the elementary school (*madrasah),* the curriculum is similar to a public school but with a large portion of the curriculum dedicated to Islamic teachings. Atthe junior high school, the Pesantren is given a different name for boys (KMI/Kulliyatul Mu'alimin al-Islamiyah) and for girls is (KMA /Kulliyatul Mu'alimat al-Islamiyah). For the senior high school, the Pesantren named it *takhassus* (specific) differently for boys and girls. The Pesantren also had *madrasah diniyyah* (afternoon or evening school on Islamic teaching) as well as kindergarten.

The majority of Tenggulun residents are either Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah followers. The Pesantren al-Islam then developed the Salafiyah teaching method, which is not used by either of these organizations. Discipline was strongly inculcated into the minds of the students. Female students are encouraged to wear a *cadar* (veil), which is why among hundreds of its students, only 3 are locals.

In everyday life, all *santri* (students) KMI-KMA and *takhassus* are obliged to speak Arabic in the Pesantren area. If not, there would be educational punishment such as memorizing several surah/verses of the al-Qur'an or sometimes cleaning the toilet, bathroom, or the Pesantren area.

Study in the Pesantren starts at 08:00 and last until 12:00 pm after dhuhur prayer. After ashar prayer at 16:00, there is short public sermon about 10-15 minutes by a santri, which is followed another santri-led recitation of the al-Qur'an. After *Maghrib* prayer at 18:00, the santri from the kindergarten and elementary school as well as the *diniyah* learn to recite the al-Qur'an

mentored by a santri from KMI-KMA and takhassus. All santri of KMI-KMA and *takhassus* routinely fast each Monday and Tuesday and also perform prayer during the mid-night (*qiyamul lail*).

Martial arts were introduced to the curriculum as part of the education to strengthen students' spirituality. Such practice, however, was common in other Pesantren. In the Pesantren al-Islam, the martial arts training, meant for self-defense, often took place at night near the woods and cemeteries in the vicinity of the Pesantren.[152]

The Pesantren issued its own certificate but if the santri requires a government certificate, the Pesantren would facilitate them to get it by joining other public schools in the final exam. By doing this, the Pesantren is able to show that it provides equal quality education as students receive from public schools so those santri could continue easily their education at a higher level.

In 2003, the Pesantren had about 85 men and 65 women santri. The alumni comprise about 300 graduates. All santri mostly come from East Java especially Lamongan, Bojonegoro, Tuban, Surabaya and Mojokerto and even from Madura Island and the Borneo (Pontianak and Samarinda). The requirement to enroll as a santri is not difficult: students must be able to read the al-Qur'an and Roman alphabets and have a serious motivation to learn. The Pesantren has 12 *ustadz* (male-teacher) and 10 *ustadzah* (female-teacher).

To cover operational costs, the Pesantren collects fees from its santri of Rp. 125,000 per-month. This includes the tuition fee, dormitory and food costs. In October 2002, after BB1, the Pesantren became publicly-known and received funding from the Department of Education for about Rp. 30 million to renovate the Pesantren and madrasah buildings.

In relation with the Pesantren Ngruki of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the Pesantren structurally has no relationship, with the exception of Pesantren Ngruki initial helped for the Pesantren al-Islam to send about 10 ustadz for the first 4 years. Three clerics, Ja'far Shadiq, Mushlih and Khozin, founded the Pesantren in 1992 and started to enroll students in the following year. The three founding clerics as well as Ali Ghufron, all graduated from Pesantren Ngruki. This probably explains why the Pesantren Al Islam was linked to the detained cleric. When they were studying in Ngruki, Khozin visited them multiple times, meeting Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

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[152] It is common that Pesantren affiliated to extremist groups or figures have martial art programsfor extracurricular activities. The martial art is taught not onlyasan exercise for health reasons but also a part of what so called *I'dadiyah* (preparation) for physical jihad.

Ba'asyir himself visited the Pesantren al-Islam to preach twice but the connection stopped there because structurally and professionally there were never any links between Pesantren al-Islam and Pesantren Ngruki of Ba'asyir.

If we look at the above explanation, it seems there are signs of extremism in the Pesantren al-Islam, although it was the family Pesantren of the trio of Bali Bombers, Ali Imron, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi. Both Imron and Ghufron once taught there but only for a short amount of time. According to Endang Turmudzi et al. (2005), the Pesantren al-Islam respects and will support any figure and organization that struggles for the implementation of Islamic law (shari'ah) but the Pesantren itself prefers to use *majlis-ta'lim* (forum of religious sermon) as a medium for its struggle. Khozin, as the founder, also explains that there are at least three differences in vision between the Pesantren and the trio of Bali Bombers:(1) Ali Ghufron who is an expert on Islamic teaching and once became a teacher in the Pesantren saw no benefit from joining formal organization as Khozin had done as Khozin argues it is good to build a network for dakwah; (2) After BB1, the family blamed the trio of Bali Bombers but later they took the view of *tawakkal* (Muslim belief of giving the judge of the BB1 to the view of God); (3) Khozin questioned the perpetrator whether the trio of Bali Bombers were involved or not and it reflected his rejection of violent jihad in Indonesia.[153]

However when I asked local people about the Pesantren, their answer was a bit surprising. They said that the Pesantren appeared to have isolated itself from local residents. Their lives were exclusive and secluded. Generally, the Pesantren unites with nearby residents. The local people said that it looked as though the Pesantren al-Islam had put itself in a different category, and therefore avoid local people.

The Pesantren Ihyaussunnah Yogyakarta

The school, Ihya'us Sunnah Tadribud Du'at, established in 1994, is in Degolan village, about ninety minutes' drive north of Yogyakarta. It comprises about half a dozen buildings, including a small mosque, several houses and two cramped dormitories. Most of the buildings are rented and of simple construction. The main dormitory has dirt floors covered with mats and plastic, no ceiling or lining on the walls. There are about sixty students, many of whom are "day" students who have lodgings in nearby villages. If Laskar Jihad is receiving generous funding from the Suharto family and sections of the military, as is often alleged,

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[153] Endang Turmudzi et all (2005), *Radikalisme di Indonesia*, Jakarta: LIPI Press.

there is little sign of it at Degolan. The Pesantren became Thalib's private residence, and the hub of Salafi organization. From here, along with some others who later made up the central board of FKWAJ, it began to consolidate the community across Java and the archipelago.

The Pesantren Ihyaussunnah was established by Thalib and some other Salafi proponents in 1994 at Degolan Kaliurang, around 16 km to the north of Yogyakarta. The names of Pesantren have been associated with the slogan or doctrines popular among the Salafi. Ihya'ussunnah means the revival of the Prophetic tradition. When I visited this Pesantren for the first time in 2000, it appeared to be unadorned and poor. It was built on no more than 300 m^2 (square meters) rented for a period of 10 years and centered around a modest mosque initially named Jamil al-Rahman, later changed to Uthman bin Affan. Approximately a hundred meters from this mosque there were 2 cramped dormitories, each about a hundred meters-square, with walls made of bamboo and dirt floors covered with mats and plastic. The Pesantren had about 70 students who range in age from 7 to 17 years old. They were taught by 4 ustadz renting modest houses in the surrounding area. Some of them were day students who had lodgings in nearby villages. The students were divided into 3 groups according to their age. To run this Pesantren, Thalib recruited Umar as-Sewed a LIPIA graduate who had completed his studies in Islamic teaching center in Saudi Arabia associated with al-Uthaymin, a Salafi ulama.

The Pesantren Ihyaussunnah emerged as the pioneer institution of a dozen other Salafi Pesantren, which were established in the period between 1995-2005 in various regions in Indonesia including Solo, Magelang, Semarang, Cirebon, Bandung, Makassar, Sukoharjo, Magetan, Jember, Ngawi, Gresik, Cilacap, Pekanbaru, Yogyakarta and Balikpapan. These Pesantren had a special connection with the Pesantren Ihyaussunnah since they were generally established and run by Ihyaussunnah graduates who were sent by Thalib to study with Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadii in Yemen.[154] Like Ihyaussunnah, those other Pesantren were generally poor.

The system of instruction and curriculum in the Pesantren is conservative in nature. Every morning at around 8:00 ustadz

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[154] Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadii (1930-2001), a Salafi ulama from Yemen spent many years in Saudi Arabia. He was expelled in 1979 for his connection to the leader of radical group Jama'ah Salafiyah al-Muhtasiba namely Juhayman al-Utaybi but he returned to Yemen and set up a teaching institute where he took a quietist position, although he remained critical of Saudi activities for most of the rest of his life. See William Sheppard, 2013, Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Political-Religious Movement, in Clinton Bennet (Ed.), 2013, *The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies*, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing plc.

comes to the mosque and takes different positions. The most senior ustadz usually takes a position in the center of the mosque and the other ustadz in its wings. Students sit around them and look at the Arabic books in their hands while listening to their ustadz. The ustadz read the books and explain the meaning of every sentence while providing giving illustrations and examples. Sometimes they use a small blackboard to make their explanations clearer. Some students take notes on their books while others only listen (the so-called *bandongan,* a teaching method that is popular in traditional Pesantren affiliated to NU). When being taught Arabic, the students are drilled repeatedly so that they can learn to imitate the example sentences given by their ustadz as fluently as possible. Students have opportunities to pose their questions after the ustadz finish their lessons. This activity lasts until the noon prayer. Between the noon and afternoon prayers students have lunch and rest. Following afternoon prayer, they come back to undertake the same activity. This afternoon activity ends around one hour before the sunset prayer at 18:00. Between the sunset prayer and the evening prayer, at 19:00, the students read and memorize parts of al-Qur'an assigned by their ustadz.

Islamic theology (*aqidah*) or more precisely the Wahhabi doctrine is the main subject studied in the Pesantren. Students read such books as *al-qaul al-mufid fi adila al-tauhid* (useful opinion on the evidence of oneness God) which is the summary of the book *kitab al-tauhid* written by Muhammad Ibnu Abdul Wahhab. Having completed this book, students are obliged to study the *kitab al-tauhid* (book of oneness God) and its annotated commentaries. Students also study *al-ushul al-thalata* (three principles) by Wahhab before reading al-*aqida al-washatiyya* (middle faith) by Ibnu Taymiyya and its annotated commentaries. Having mastered these primary books, students are encouraged to read other books including *nubdha fi al-aqida* (fragmentation in faith) by al-Uthaymin and *minhaj al-firqa al-najiya* (method of saved sect) by Jamilu Zainu.

As all above books are in Arabic, Ihyaussunnah students are first required to study Arabic. Various aspects are taught separately including *nahwu* (basic grammar), *sharaf* (morphology), *muthala'a* (reading), *imla* (writing), *muhadathah* (conversation) and *balagha* (rethoric). For this last subject, they use books that are popular in traditional Pesantren such as *al-nahwu al-wadih* (distinct basic grammar), *al-amthila al-tasrifiyya* (Arabic morphological example), *qowa'id al-sharf* (principles of morphology) and *al-balaghah al-wadih* (distinct rhetoric). In addition to these, they make use of *al-Arabiyya li al-nashihin* (Arabic for beginners), a comprehensive book of Arabic distributed free of charge to various Islamic educational institutions by Saudi Arabian embassies.

The understanding of the Wahhabi doctrine provides the foundation for the students to study other subjects including Qur'anic exegesis, the prophetic tradition, Islamic legal theory, and Islamic jurisprudence and dakwah method. For example, for Qur'anic exegesis they study *ushul al-tafsir* (the principle of Qur'anic exegesis) by al-Uthaymin, for the prophetic tradition they study *al-arba'in al-nawawi* (al-nawawi 40 prophetic tradition collection) and *mudhakkarat al-hadith al-nabawi* (treatise on the prophetic tradition) by Sheikh Rabi al-Madkhali. For Islamic legal theory, they study *ushul fiqh* and *al-ushul min ilm al-ushul* by al-Uthaymin. For the dakwah method they study *dakwah al-du'at* (Islamic propagation guideline for Muslim preacher) by Ibnu Qayyim al-Jauziyah.

The authors mentioned above—Muhamad Ibnu Abdul Wahab, Ibn Taymiyya, al-Uthaymin and Jamilu Zainu—are widely known as Muslim scholars who follow the Hanbali school of thought (*madzhab*). They are also known as influential clerics among Salafi movements in the Muslim world. Therefore, books from such authors are not taught in the traditional Pesantren affiliated to NU although they recognize the four madzhab (Syafii, Hanbali, Maliki and Hanafi) but the biggest portion is given to madzhab Syafii.

The Pesantren also offer special programs for university students called *tadrib al-du'at* (training for preachers) and *tarbiyat al-nisa* (education for women). These programs last from 3 months to 1 year. Tadrib al-duat is designed to produce preachers ready to conduct dakwah activities. Subjects include Islamic theology, Qur'anic exegesis, prophet Tradition, Islamic history, Islamic law, Ethics and Arabic. The Tarbiyat al-Nisa is designed for women and aims at forming their personalities to suit Wahhabite doctrines. In this program, the participants study Islamic theology and jurisprudence besides receiving a number of instructions on behavior, fashion, gender relations, and methods for taking care

of husbands and children. The materials used are selected from the books required in the aforementioned regular programs.[155]

The Pesantren Darul Ulum Bogor

Pesantren Darul Ulum was established in 1960 in Bogor by Elon Syujai (1912-1990), a grandson of famous Jawara[156] from Bantar Kemang Sub-District named Empuh Uning. The embryo of the Pesantren is the *majlis taklim* of small mushola in 1960s led by Syujai. In the initial establishment, the Pesantren was named Suja'iyyah referring to the name of its kyai (leader). In 1971, after cooperating with several figures from IPB/Bogor Agricultural Institute, the Pesantren changed its name into YPIP/Pesantren Foundation for Agricultural Science, "Darul Ulum," for several reasons, but most importantly to avoid a personal cult since the Pesantren should belong to the Muslim community (*ummah*), not individuals. The name of "Darul ulum" (house of sciences) is seen as reflective of the vision and mission of the Pesantren.

Currently led by KH Nasrudin Latief, the first son of Elon, the Pesantren is now located in the two areas. First is in Bantar Kemang (head office) where there are Islamic junior and senior high schools, an Islamic kindergarten, a Pesantren clinic, Majelis Ta'lim, and the Sinar Kencana martial art group are located. The second is in Nagrek (branch office) where the junior and senior high schools, an Islamic kindergarten and a philanthropic

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[155] Noorhaidi Hassan, 2006, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New-Order Indonesia,* Ithaca NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program

[156] Jawara is a Bantenesse term for those who are clever in Silat (kind of fencing, taught also in Pesantren in Banten), but who also possess other definite skills. Jawara are not synonymous with robbers and thieves but it is the jawara who are able to guarantee safety and security in the desa (village) because people respect them. In general the jawara are also very obedient to the ulama. Their spirit finds guidance from ulama. Of course there are those who are negative in their conduct, but they usually can be overcome by other jawara. See; Michael Williams, 2010, *Sickle and Crescent: The Communist Revolt of 1926 in Banten*, USA: Cornell SEAP Publication.

institution for the poor are located. In both locations, there is also a Pesantren cooperation (koperasi Pesantren).[157]

The Pesantren Darul Ulum is a kind of modern Pesantren that adopts modern methods for its education system. It combines both the Salaf curriculum and the Department of Education's curriculum. Like other modern Pesantren such as Pesantren Gontor in Ponorogo and Pesantren Dar el-Qolam Tangerang, the Pesantren Darul Ulum also emphasizes language skill especially Arabic and English to the students at the junior and senior high schools. The Pesantren also focuses on the development of high morality (*al-akhlaq al-karimah*) among its students.

The Pesantren Darul Ulum is widely known for its training in learning al-Qur'an by a method called *al-Nashiri* (referring to the innovator Nashruddin Latif). Latif claims that by joining such training, the students are able to read al-Qur'an after finishing a 10 hour training program. Besides, it established ICDW in which Mataharitimoer is actively involved.

The negative stigma to Pesantren as a hub of Islamic extremism and even terrorism caused Kyai Nasruddin Latief and Mataharitimoer of Pesantren Darul Ulum to be concerned about

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[157] Sejarah Lembaga in: www.darululum.com

that important issue. They both later established ICDW (Indonesian Center for Deradicalization and Wisdom) to give Indonesian Muslims service and consultation regarding deradicalization and wisdom. It also aims to provide a medium for former radical Muslim activists prior to their departure to engage with plural society.[158] ICDW organizes a forum for former radical Muslims from NII, mostly from West Java, to gradually change their radical ideology to be more moderate and to prepare them before going back to plural society. The participants are mostly from former members of NII KW-9 Al-Zaytun. ICDW also provides training to children of former radical activists and gives them scholarships to study at schools owned by Pesantren Darul Ulum.[159] ICDW actively spreads the belief that terrorism contradicts Islamic teachings. They want to encourage terrorist and radical Muslims to denounce their ideology and activism.

Kyai Nasruddin Latief explains that ICDW does not recruit terrorist and radical Muslims to join their program. Normally, they come to ICDW of their own volition. They do, however, discuss the terrorists and radical Muslims' ideology. Furthermore, it is also possible that ICDW will give other kinds of support to them such as helping them to get a job, financing their children's school, etc. Principally, they always treat terrorist and radical Muslims as their fellows, apart from the difference regarding religious ideology. Kyai Nasruddin further explains that there are several terrorist and radical Muslims who joined deradicalization and rehabilitations program held by ICDW. They come from various cities such as Banten, Surabaya, Madura, West Java, and also Jakarta. Some of them have even successfully transitioned back to "normal" life, having various jobs such as trader, teacher, farmer, etc.[160]

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[158] Profile of ICDW, in: www.ICDWpeoject.darululum.com
[159] Booklet of ICDW
[160] Mataharitimoer, 2009, *Rehabilitasi Kaum Radikal*, see: http://polhukam.kompasiana.com/2009/12/10/rehabilitasi-kaum-radikal/. (Accessed on 14 Dec 2009)

CHAPTER 4
TRAJECTORIES OF JIHAD:
FROM THE INITIAL TO THE LIMINAL SITUATION OF JIHAD

Introduction

This chapter will present and discuss jihadist trajectories using the life stories of several former Muslim extremists who joined violent jihad groups but later disengaged from such groups and or renounced their radical ideologies. This chapter will focus on the initial jihad period to its subsequent period during which Muslim extremists find themselves at a crossroads: a dilemma vis-à-vis the jihadism and activism of their violent jihad groups.

Through the life-story narrative of jihadist trajectories, I will present my arguments to answer this chapter's primary questions; (1) Why and how did they join the extremist group? (2) What did they do for jihad during their period radicalization and engagement in the group? And, finally, (3) What brought them to the crossroad, leading them to a dilemma with their jihad groups, ideologies and activities, and then to a transition period that led them to disengagement and deradicalization?

I argue that the process and experience of jihad until the disengagement and deradicalization period is an individual but complex phenomenon. As such, the reasons for joining extremist group may be different from the factors that influence continuing involvement in the group, engagement in violent acts and disengagement from the group and or deradicalization their ideology. In this chapter, I apply John Horgan's process model theory (2005).[161] As I explained in Chapter 2, this theory involves a detailed look at the process of becoming a member of an organization, progressing toward and becoming engaged in violent activities and finally the process of disengagement and deradicalization. This theory, according to Horgan consists of three phases.[162] ***Phase 1 introduction,*** *is the process of becoming a member of an extremist group.* In this phase a person decides to join extremist group, often in the context of the presence of suitable preconditions, the occurrence of a catalyst, identification in addition to other positive features of involvement, and increased involvement subject to timing, opportunity, pacing and progression. ***Phase 2 radicalization-engagement*** *is being an extremist.* This theory defines simply an extremist as one of the perpetrators of terrorism of radicalism. Normally actors do not operate alone but in an extremist group, so this phase is a group process. The groups play a significant role not only in forming

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[161] John Horgan, 2005, *The Psychology of Terrorism*, London & New York; Routledge
[162] John Horgan, 2005, *op.cit.*

the behavioral process but more importantly also maintaining continued involvement and encouraging extremism. The process is defined as sustained, increased and focused involvement. This involvement mainly includes decision and search activity (targeting and pre-action), preparation or pre-actor activity, event execution, post-event-activity and strategic analysis. ***Phase 3 is disengaging and deradicalizing from extremism***. Horgan recognizes that this is the least researched phase of extremism activities, so the factors are still hypothetical. The factors are emergence of the seed of psychological disengagement and deradicalization, the presence of additional psychological influences, physical disengagement, and the presence of group issues and the implications of leaving.

I argue that the decision to disengage from the extremist group and deradicalize their extremist ideology during the transition period is the result of personal reasons, specific conditions, or repercussions or a combination of these. It begins, however, with three endogenous processes: strategic calculations, political learning, and *weltanschauung*(s) revision(s). **First,** the process is based on rational-choice calculations and cost-benefit analyses. **Second,** the process is a product of socialization and interaction with the "other." The leadership will update its beliefs and reassess its behavior due to the behavior of their interaction partners. **Third**, the process is based on perceptual and psychological factors. It is a process in which the leadership of extremist Muslim groups modifies its worldviews as a result of severe crises, frustration and dramatic changes in the environment.

As I explained in Chapter 2, I will also apply Tore Bjorgo's (2009) theory of push and pull factors of deradicalization.[163] **Push factors** are negative circumstances or social forces that make it unattractive to continue membership in a particular group. They include: (1) Criminal Prosecution; (2) Parental or Social Disapproval; (3) Counter-violence from the oppositional group; (4) Loss of faith in the ideology or politics of the group; (5) Discomfort with group's violence activities; (6) Disillusionment with the group's leadership; (7) Loss of confidence, status or position in group; (8) Ejection from group; (9) Exhaustion from tension and uncertainty as a member of a targeted group; and (10) Increased activity in a competing role,i.e. political activity that displaces the violent role, etc. **Pull factors** are opportunities or social forces that attract an individual to a more promising alternative. They include: (1) Desire for a normal life; (2) Desire to establish a family and take on parental

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[163] Tore Bjorgo, "Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right", in John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, 2009, *Leaving Terrorism Behind, Individual and Collective Disengagement*, New York: Routledge, pp. 36-43.

and spousal roles; (3) Other changing priorities; (4) New employment or educational opportunities that could be undermined if group membership were known; (5) New role models or social groups; (6) New andmore compelling ideology or belief structure, etc.

Regarding the transition period of jihad, I argue that such transition occurs in the so called a liminal-situation of Jihad. Therefore, the transformation is a means ofcultural-survival for former Muslim extremists. In the radically-disjointed groups of the Islamic movement, the nature of transition in the liminal situation becomes paramount to cultural survivor. Liminality marks a period of alteration for Muslim extremists: a process of becoming, being inscribed by a new identity and initiated into a new power.

I will apply the concept of liminality by Arnold van Gennep (1960)[164] and Victor Turner (1969)[165]. As I explained in Chapter 2, van Gennep describes 3 phases of life crises; separation (pre-liminal), transition (liminal) and incorporation (post-liminal). Separation symbolically detaches the individual from an existing point in the social structure. After separation, the former social status no longer applies to the individual. In transition, the individual is a symbolic outsider with no clearly defined status or role. The liminal persona resides at the margins of society while they prepare to adopt a new role. Finally, incorporation allows the individual to adopt a new social status & re-enter society. If this re-entry does not occur, liminality does not end, a status that is entirely possible in hypermodern society but not in small-scale society.[166] Since the transition period emphasizes ambiguity, fragmentation and the blurring of set boundaries, I will also apply two major ideas of liminal model proposed by Victor Turner (1969) who elaborates van Gennep's. *First*, Turner's model focuses mainly on ritual behavior, which according to him exhibits a counter logic to the everyday world. He refers to this counter logic as liminality. *Second*, Turner defines the marginal and the outsider as being liminal, as they oppose social structure, or resist social classification. Marginal individuals, like ritual liminal, are ambiguous, betwixt and between, as they exist on the social boundaries.[167]

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[164] Arnold van Gennep, 1960, *The Rites of Passage, A classic study of cultural celebration* (Translated by Monika Vizedom & Gabielle Caffee), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
[165] Victor Turner, 1969, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, Chicago: Aldine Press.
[166] Arnold van Gennep, 1960, *op.cit.*
[167] Victor Turner, 1969, *op.cit.*

Short Profiles of Former Muslim extremists

This chapter will present the life stories of four former Muslim extremists as the primary informants in this study. They include Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, Ja'far Thalib and Mataharitimoer. Abas and Imron first joined jihad abroad (in Afghanistan), later becoming part of the transnational extremist Muslim group the *Jama'ah Islamiyah*/JI. They both, particularly Imron, took part in several bombings in Indonesia that led them to receive prison sentences (Abas was released but Imron received a life-prison sentence). Thalib studied Islam abroad (in Pakistan) and then became an ustadz (teacher) in a Pesantren as well as in the established Salafi groups FKAWJ (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunah wal Jama'ah*) in which he was appointed as the commander of its paramilitary wing, *Laskar Jihad*/LJ. Thalib took part in the community conflict in Maluku and Poso, which led him to a prison sentence but he was later released. Mataharitimoer/MT first joined a *liqo* (small group discussion of Islamic studies) in a certain mosque in Jakarta that led him to join an underground extremist Muslim group, NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia*). He actively took part in recruiting new members for the organization. Although their jihadist trajectories are dissimilar, they share a similar experience: namely, the so called *liminal*-phase during their Jihad periods that later led them to either disengage from their groups or deradicalize their radical ideologies. I will explain them respectively later in this chapter.

Before exploring their trajectories as jihadists, I will present short profiles in order to make it easier to map extremist Muslim figures. It will also provide a chronological context to understand and to analyze the narratives of jihad that will be presented in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

Nasir Abas: TheFormer Captain Jihad[168]

Abas was born in 1969 in Singapore but was raised in Malaysia, and studies at the MIS (Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah) Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan. Between 1987 and1993, facilitated by Abdullah Sungkar & Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abas joined the Afghanistan Military Academy/AMA, completing his first 3 years as a student and in the remaining 3 years became an instructor for Indonesian jihadists mostly affiliated to the JI. In mid-1998, as a commander of *wakalah* (agency) in Sabah Malayisa, Abas managed the journey of JI members who would leave for military training and to engage in jihad with the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) in the Philippines. He arranged the entry and exit of JI members from Indonesia to the Southern Philippines, both legally and illegally. In 2000, Abas and

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[168] Interview with Nasir Abas, 2010.

Mustapha were involved in the establishment of *Uhud Project* (the JI subdivision) to send fighters to help Muslims in communal conflict in Ambon and Poso. In April 2001, Abas was appointed Leader of Mantiqi 3 (the regional division that encompassed Sabah/Malaysia, Mindanao/Philippines, Tarakan and Nunukan (East Kalimantan) and Palu (Central Sulawesi)/Indonesia. On April18, 2003, Abas was arrested in Bekasi by the Indonesian police during a crackdown in the wake of BB1. He was surprised by his arrest because he had nothing to do with the BB1, other than the fact that he was some of the perpetrators' boss. In November 2004, Abas was freed. He showed his remorse and expressed his commitment to help the Indonesian police run the deradicalization program. Abas is recently also waiting Indonesian citizenship for which he previously applied to the Indonesian government.

Ali Imron; A Former Field Operator of Jihad[169]

Imron was born in Lamongan in 1970. He is the younger brother of Ali Ghufron and Amrozi who were both sentence to death and executed for their involvements in BB1. Between1992 and 1995, facilitated by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir, Imron was in Afghanistan joining AMA. In August and Sept 2000, Imron was indirectly involved (helping to obtain explosive materials) in the Philippine Ambassador's Bombing & Atrium Senen Bombing. During theAmbassador bombing, together with Amrozi, Imron also helped find the car (Suzuki Carry). On December 24, 2000, he was directly involved in 3 church bombing in Mojokerto, together with Hambali (initiator), Amrozi, Mubarak, Sawad, Salman and Muhajir. Imron was tasked with choosing and surveying the target, purchasing the material and preparing the bombs, and placing a bomb in one the churches. On October12, 2002, Imron was involved in the BB1. He was tasked with surveying the target, purchasing the material and help DR. Azahari and Dulmatin prepared the bomb. He also picked up the suicide bombers (Jimmy and Arnasan). On January14, 2003, after several months on run, the Indonesian police in Kuala Berukang, Kalimantan, captured Imron as he tried to flee the country. On February11, 2003, Imron publicly admitted his role in the attacks, and demonstrated how they were carried out. He said he feels sorry for the families of the victims, but describes the US and its allies as "legitimate targets."On July21, 2003, Imron went on trial. On September3, 2003, prosecutors asked for a 20-year jail term for Imron saying they do not want the death sentence because the defendant had expressed remorse for what he had done. On September 18, Imron was convicted of planning an act of terrorism and sentenced to life in prison, after the court said it had taken into account his

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[169] Interview with Ali Imron, 2010.

expression of regret. Imron is still serving his life imprisonment after the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono rejected his application for his imprisonment to belimited to 20 years. Together with Abas and Mubarok, Imron has been helping the Indonesian police to run the deradicalization program.

Ja'far Thalib: A Former Troop Commander of Jihad[170]

Thalib was born in Malang in 1961 from a Yemeni-family and the family of al-Irshad activist (an Arab descendant Muslim Group in Indonesia). He has studied in the LIPIA, /Indonesian Islamic and Arabic Institute sponsored by Saudi Arabia (1986-1987), and then in the Maududi Islamic Institute, Lahore, Pakistan (1987-1989). During these times he joined the struggling groups for Afghanistan, Hikmatyar, Sayyaf and Rabbani, and then studied in Yemen (1991). In 1994, Thalib established Pesantren Ihyaussunnah in Yogyakarta in which he preached and spread Salafi teachings. He also established an Indonesian-Salafi network that refers to the same group in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In February 1998, Thalib held the *takbir-akbar* program in Solo, declaring the establishment of the FKAWJ and its military wing, the Laskar Jihad (LJ). In March 2000, the LJ held military training in Surabaya, Gresik, Malang, Madiun, Jombang, Solo and Yogya, and then held national training in Bogor from April 7-17, 2000. On April6, 2000, the LJ held demonstrations in front of the *Istana Negara* (state-palace) and demanded a dialogue with the President Gus Dur. At the end of April and in mid-May 2000, LJ sent about 3000 fighters to Ambon and Poso. In March 2001, LJ executed the *Hukuman Rajam* (stoning to death) in Ambon. On May 4, 2001, the Indonesian police at Juanda Airport, Surabaya East Java, captured Thalib. On May 17, 2001, Thalib was serving house arrest, but he requested to be freed. Soon after this, the Court freed Thalib from his imprisonment following the proposal of *Pra-Peradilan* by a group of lawyers named the *Tim Pembela Islam* (Islamic Defender Team). On August 9, 2001, Thalib expressed his disappointment at the inauguration of Megawati Soekarnoputri as the Indonesian President. On April 3, 2002, Thalib condemned the Malino-Agreement accusing it as an "*Omong Kosong*" (empty talk or non-sense) by the government. On 26 April 2002, Thalib delivered his speech in a *Tabligh Akbar* in Ambon. The police accused his speech of being provocative. On May 7, 2002, after returning from Ambon, Thalib was

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[170] See Noorhaidi Hassan, 2006, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New-Order Indonesia,* Ithaca NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program; Saiful Umam, 2006, "Radical Muslim in Indonesia: The Case of Ja'far Umar Thalib and the Laskar Jihad, in *Exploration in Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 6 Spring No. 1, 2006, see: http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/2255/Exp6n1-1%20Umam.pdf?sequence=1

captured in the Juanda airport Surabaya and sent to prison. On July 20, 2002: Ambon's State Court warned that his arrest had not been legal (*cacat hukum*). On July 25, 2002, with a guarantee from his lawyers, Thalib got a new status as a housing-prisoner. On August 1, 2002, Thalib went on trial due for his speech at *Tabligh Akbar* in Ambon that was alleged to be provoking Muslims to fight against Christians. In October 2002, Thalib suddenly declared the dissolution of LJ. Recently, he has occupied himself by running his Pesantren and is also a preacher who to some extent would love to cooperate with the Indonesian police. On January 30, 2003, the court decided that he was not guilty.

Mataharitimoer: A Former Underground Jihad Activist[171]

MT was born in Jakarta in 1971 from poor migrant-worker family. In 1990, after he dropped out from senior high school, he engaged in *pekerja-serabutan* (odd jobs). MT was first introduced to NII from a *halaqoh* underground held by a small-mosque in Jakarta. He then joined the movement. While serving as a head of *Remaja Masjid* (Youth of the Mosque), he was given rewards to spread NII's ideology and to recruit new members. He extended the recruitment to schools (mostly SMP and SMA) in Jakarta. He often attended discussion in al-A'raf mosque in Kwitang to enhance his knowledge ofIslamic teachings. In 1991, due to the fact that the police captured several NII leaders, he lost contact with NII activists' but continued to recruit new members. In 1992, after having separated formally from NII for a year, several elite figures from the group came to MT asking for his network in Jakarta to be linked with their network. However, to avoid the police, MT then moved from one place to another, from Sukabumi, Depok, Ciputat, to Cikarang and finally returning to East Jakarta. MT successfully entered the elite group of NII and served as a secretary of internal affairs. He was responsible for the recruitment and training of NII members in *Jabodetabek*, several areas of West Java, East Java, Central Java, Madura and even Aceh. Unfortunately, after being involved in the NII elite group, MT found so many deviant behaviors among the group that influenced his commitment to that movement. He initially questioned the NII's vision and mission. All new NII members are required to undergo "sin cleansing" rituals and pledge to help establish an Islamic state. They are obliged to pay monthly contributions to the group's leader. MT later realized that the group used him likely as cash-cow, to enrich the group's leaders, and pay for their luxurious lifestyle. In other words, he had become a victim of extortion. His conflict with several elites also strengthened his desire to leave. Since 1997, MT has gradually left the movement. In 2007, ten years after his escape, MT

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[171] Interview with Mataharitimoer, 2010.

reemerged to the public with his surprising autobiography, which recollected his horrifying experience in the NII underground movement and explained why he finally left. Besides being an active blogger and netizen, MT has been recently involved in running the ICDW/Indonesian Center for Deradicalization and Wisdom, a Pesantren Darul Ulum-based-NGO that primary object is to assist current NII members who want to leave the groups.

JIHAD TRAJECTORY OF NASIR ABAS

1. Being a *Mujahidin* and the Initial Motive for Jihad

Mujahidin is an Arabic word (plural of the word *Mujahid*, fighter) meaning a Muslimwho engages in *jihad*. The word is from the same Arabic trilateral root as *jihad* (fight in the path of God). It was first used by the British authority to describe the mountainous sect of Hillman in Afghanistan who fought against the British control (although initially to the British, they were known as *Sitana Fanatics*) beginning in 1829 when an Islamic cleric, Sayyid Ahmed Shah Brelwi came back to Sitana village Sitana from the *hajj* (a pilgrimage to Mecca) and began preaching war against the infidels (*kafir*) in the area defining the northwest border of British India. Although Brelwi died in the battle, the sect he had created survived and the *Mujahidin* gained increasing power and prominence. During the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the *Mujahidin* were said to accept any fleeing spots and recruit them into their ranks. As time went by, the sect grew larger until it was raiding and controlling larger areas in Afghanistan.[172]

In the late twentieth century, the term *Mujahidin* became popular in the media to describe various armed Muslim fighters who subscribe to violent jihadism. Significantly, the concept of *mujahidin* is a unifying ideal; a lifelong fraternity of fighters, when called upon by a charismatic religious leader such as Osama bin Laden or Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi will not only fight to the death but commit suicide for their ideals. In almost every statement made by various terrorist groups, they proudly identify themselves as the *mujahidin*. They are viewed as more than just ideal fighters; their actions are not only respected by family, community, and country but also more significantly, deemed sacred. Their religious devotion is what makes them such dangerous and committed enemies.[173]

The initial process of Nasir Abas becoming a *Mujahidin* was stimulated by news about Afghanistan in the Malaysian media in 1980s. He first heard about the country when he was still in the 2nd and 3rd class of middle school in Johor Bahru Malaysia around 1983/1984. Several news reports and articles about *jihad* in Afghanistan appeared in the tabloids and daily news. At that time, Abas's parents usually bought the *Berita Harian* daily news. Abas recognizes that there was real sense of apprehension from the almost daily reports about the situation of people in

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[172] Byron Farwell, 2009, *Queen Victoria's Little War*, Pen & Sword Military Books, pp. 150-151.

[173] Dawn Perlmutter, 2006, Mujahideen Blood Rituals: The Religious & Frensic Symbolism of Alqaeda Beheading, in *Anthropoetics (The Journal of Generative Anthropology)*, Vol. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006). See: http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1102/muja.htm.

Afghanistan and their war with the USSR's (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic) army, often referred to as the *Pasukan Beruang Merah* (Red Bear Troops).[174] He recalls that all media outlets at that time referred to the fighters in Afghanistan as the *Mujahidin*. Furthermore, Abas explains:

> *The appellation "Mujahidin of Afghanistan" was mentioned over and over again both in the electronic and written media. The title Mujahidin was definitely impressive for Muslims at that time. In this regard, the conflict in Afghanistan aroused sentimental feelings as the one Islamic ummah (community) against non-Islamic (USSR) governments. Pictures that appeared in the daily newspapers and TV evoked emotions and sympathy from all people in Malaysia. And I feel sure that non-Muslim communities were also sympathetic toward what was happening in Afghanistan.*[175]

To show solidarity with their fellow Muslims, Abas explains that in the 1980s various institutions and communal organizations in Malaysia also set aside donations from their various donors in order to help the *Muhajirin* (refugees/immigrants) and the *Mujahidin* of Afghanistan. Abas himself really wanted to go to Afghanistan, to be a *Mujahidin* and assist the people there in their fight against non-Islamic government. He was unable to do so because of his age. Abas recalls:

> *Opportunities and intentions arose within my heart to go to Afghanistan in order to support the people there. However, such intention was not realized (for me) since I was only 15 years old and was yet unaware of the procedure for going to Afghanistan, not to mention how much money (the cost) for doing so. Because of that I preferred to focus on my preparation for the middle school exams at SRP (Sijil Rendah Peperiksaan, equal to Junior High School) which took place in several months later.*[176]

At the end of 1984, after finishing middle school, with the desire of becoming a Mujahidin, Abas preferred to continue his study at the *Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah* (MIS), which was well-known for its Islamic center, rather than any other school. The MIS seemed to be the gate for his desire to be a *Mujahidin*. From the

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[174] Nasir Abas, 2005, *Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah; Pengakuan Mantan Ketua JI,* Jakarta: Penerbit Graffindo, p. 19.
[175] Nasir Abas, Interview.
[176] Idem

interview, in my opinion, it was marked with 3 things; (1) meeting with Ustadz Abdul Halim who later-on funded Abas' travel to Afghanistan; (2) learning deeply about jihad from an Islamic perspective; and (3) getting the opportunity to go to Afghanistan.

After 3 months striving for Islamic knowledge at the MIS, around 50 people from Indonesia arrived in Malaysia,[177] including Ustadz Abdul Halim (pseudonym of Abdullah Sungkar)[178] and Ustadz Abdus Somad (pseudonym of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir).[179]

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[177] They are members of DI/Darul Islam of Indonesia. They escaped to Malaysia avoiding apprehensionby Indonesian police who were accusing DI as a subversive-group.

[178] **Abdullah Sungkar** born in 1937 was associated from the late 1950s with the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII) - a group of Islamic scholars that fought Christian missionariesin Indonesia, which refers to missionary activity as a threat to Islam. From the middle of the 60s, Sungkar spent his time teaching Islam. Since 1972, he has run the Al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki, Central Java, which he co-founded with Abu Bakar Bashir. Sungkar was detained briefly in 1977 by Indonesian authorities for urging the people not to vote in national elections and was rearrested in 1978 on subversion charges for alleged involvement in "Komando Jihad" and "Darul Islam" following a crackdown on Muslim political activists in Indonesia by Suharto's regime. After his release from jail in 1985, Sungkar fled into exile in Malaysia. In 01/1993 in Kuala Lumpur, Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir, cofounded the Jama'ah Islamiyah/JI. He was the first leader of the organization. Sungkar died of natural causes in 11/1999 shortly after he returned to Indonesia in late 1998 after the fall of Suharto'sregime. Abu Bakar Bashir succeeded him as the leader of Indonesian JI. See: http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=533

[179] **Abu Bakar Baashir** was born in 1938 in East Java. From the middle of the 1960s he spent his time teaching Islam. He runs, from 1972, the Al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki, Central Java. Bashir became influential among radical Muslims in Southeast Asia. He preached for Islamic communities the necessary pre-condition for setting up an Islamic state. Bashir was arrested in 1978 on subversion charges for alleged involvement in "Komando Jihad" and "Darul Islam" following a crackdown on Muslim political activists in Indonesia by Suharto'sregime. In 1985, Bashir fled into exile in Malaysia. In 01/1993 together with Abdullah Sungkar, Bashir founded the JI. Bashir returned to Indonesia in 1998. In 2000, Baashir sat on the executive board of the MMI/*Indonesian Mujahideen Council*, which was formed in Yogyakarta, Java, with Abu Rusdan as his lieutenant, as an umbrella group for people wanting to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state. Until his arrest a week after the Bali '02 Bombings, Baashir was a teacher at an Islamic school in Solo, central Java. Bashir was arrested in 10/2002. He was accused in connection with a number of bomb attacks blamed on JI - the Bali '02 Bombings,aseries of church attacks in 2000 and of planning the assassination of Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's former president. Bashir was acquitted from most of the charges but sentenced to four years in jail for treason. Bashir was released on medical grounds on 03/04/2004. On 03/30/2004 Bashir was rearrested and charged for connections with the Marriott Hotel attack in 2003. On 03/03/2005 Baashir was sentenced to 30 months in jail for providing spiritual support to the Bali '02 Bombings and the Marriott Hotel attack in 2003. Baashir was released from Indonesian jail on 06/14/2006. On Monday 08/09/2010, the Indonesian police rearrested him for alleged involvement with a new armed group arrested few days earlier. Baashir has been charged, on Monday 02/14/2011, with planning to use weapons to commit acts of terror. On

MIS'principal explained to his students within an introductory session that those people came to learn the Islamic system of education applied in Malaysia; in other words, they were there for comparative-studies. Abas recalls his first meeting with Ustadz Abdul Halim and Ustadz Abdus Somad:

> *At the MIS, Ustadz Abdul Halim was generally greeted by members of Indonesian group as Abah (father). First time I heard it I assumed those who called him Abah were his children but that was not the case. I realized later that Abah was a title of respect given to older people. However, I did not call him Abah, but ustadz. Later on around 1998, I first found out that his original name of Ustadz Abdul Halim in Indonesia was Abdullah Sungkar.*

> *I also met with Ustadz Abdus Somad at MIS. He was usually greeted by the Indonesian group as Ustadz Abu. I wondered at that time why they called him that name (from Ustadz Abdus Somad to Ustadz Abu). It was only in 1997 that I understood why the Indonesians greeted him as Ustadz Abu. Before he fled to Malaysia at the beginning of 1985, he was known in Indonesia by the name of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.[180]*

Abas also recognizes that he started to learn deeply about Jihad at MIS. He began to understand the meaning of Jihad, based on the explanation of the exegesis (*tafsir*) as taught by Ustadz Hashim Ghani and by *ustadz* from the Indonesian group. Unfortunately, he got different exegesis about Jihad. Abas recalls:

> *Every night, together with 2 or 3 friends, I went to Ustadz Hashim's house carrying various books amongst which were books about of fiqh-Jihad. He gave us a clear explanation. However, when answering my question about the obligation to wage jihad in Afghanistan, Ustadz Hashim said that people from Afghanistan were already carrying out its obligation [...].At that time I only accepted Ustadz Hashim's answers as a personal opinion.*

> *I wanted to hear the explanation of various people including those from outside the MIS. Among the ustadz with whom I sometimes visited with books*

Thursday 06/16/2011 he was sentenced,forthe second time, to 15 years imprisonment. See: http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=533
[180] Nasir Abas, Interview.

> *at MIS, in order to study and ask for explanations to questions I had on various religious issues were Ustadz Abdul Halim, Ustadz Abdus Somad, Ustadz Afif, Ustadz Abu Jibril, and Ustadz Saiful. I asked them to explain and clarify various issues including jihad fi-sabilillah and I found sometimes received different answers compared to that I got from Ustadz Hashim.*[181]

Besides receiving verbal explanations from Ustadz Hashim and several Indonesian *ustadz* who were arriving at the MIS, Abas read many Indonesian and Malaysian related-books. Those books are mostly about the law of Jihad and the narratives of jihad undertaken personally by the prophet Muhammad and his companions (such as the book of *Hayatus Sohabah*). Abas also read books he borrowed or bought from the Indonesian *ustadz*, mainly about the narratives of jihad of *Mujahidin* in Afghanistan.[182]

Around September 1987, after finishing his Arabic course in the *Majidee* Arabic-school, Abas returned to the MIS where he met Pak Ristan (now a deceased member of the Indonesian group at MIS). He asked Abas whether Ustadz Hashim had delivered his message. Abas answered not yet and Pak Ristan suggested he immediately meet Ustadz Hashim. At Ustadz Hashim house, he asked Abas a question "*Do you want to go to Afghanistan or Perlis (one city in Malaysia where there is a large Islamic school)?*" Abas preferred to go to Afghanistan. He recalls:

> *I observed the countenance of Ustadz Hashim, which appeared to have hoped that I would help him teach at the MIS or leave for Perlis. However, I was unable to control my feeling of happiness because the word Afghanistan was already dominated my mind. From the depth of my heart, it urged me to leave for Afghanistan since I wanted to know and experience the atmosphere of jihad that until now I had only read in books and in daily newspapers. I had already imagined the ambience of fighting together with the Mujahidin of Afghanistan and holding a weapon. But at the same time I was feeling sad about the possibility I would not return to Malaysia because I would die in battle [...]. According to Ustadz Hashim, Ustadz Abdul Halim would cover all expenses. I only needed to prepare myself mentally for prolonged separation from my family. I requested*

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[181] Idem.
[182] Nasir Abas, 2005, *op.cit*.

Ustadz Hashim to ask for my parent's permission to leave for Afghanistan [...]. My parents, especially my father, gave me full moral support and prayed for my success in Afghanistan. My mother did not understand my purpose for going to Afghanistan. She only knew that I returned to the MIS. I had no bravery to inform him about this because I was really worried she would feel sad. Later on, she understood that I was studying in Pakistan.[183]

My Niyat (intention) was only to be together with the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, to protect and defend their land, which according to the news was in disarray at that time and under the authority of the USSR. To be honest, I realized that I am not a person who had much capability to help the Mujahidin. My age at that time had just reached 18 years old but I hoped with my presence there I would strengthen the rank of the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. No materials were carried from home except the provision of my father's prayers and blessings.[184]

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[183] Nasir Abas, interview---
[184]*Idem*

2. *Al-Sam'u Wa al-Tho'at* and the Loyality to (Leader of) Jihad Group

Al-Sam'u wa al-tho'at is an Arabic phrase meaning to hear (*al-sam'u*) and (wa) to obey (*al-tho'at).* The phrase comes from the prophet Muhammad Hadith as follows:

عَنِ الْعِرْبَاضِ بْنِ سَارِيَةَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ قَالَ : صَلَّىٰ بِنَا رَسُوْلُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ ذَاتَ يَوْمٍ ، ثُمَّ أَقْبَلَ عَلَيْنَا ، فَوَعَظَنَا مَوْعِظَةً بَلِيْغَةً ؛ ذَرَفَتْ مِنْهَا الْعُيُوْنُ ، وَوَجِلَتْ مِنْهَا الْقُلُوْبُ ، قَالَ قَائِلٌ : يَا رَسُوْلَ اللَّهِ ! كَأَنَّ هٰذِهِ مَوْعِظَةُ مُوَدِّعٍ ، فَمَاذَا تَعْهَدُ إِلَيْنَا ؟ فَقَالَ : «أُوْصِيْكُمْ بِتَقْوَى اللَّهِ ، وَالسَّمْعِ وَالطَّاعَةِ وَإِنْ عَبْدٌ حَبَشِيٌّ ، فَإِنَّهُ مَنْ يَعِشْ مِنْكُمْ بَعْدِيْ فَسَيَرَى اخْتِلَافًا كَثِيْرًا ، فَعَلَيْكُمْ بِسُنَّتِيْ وَسُنَّةِ الْخُلَفَاءِ الْمَهْدِيِّيْنَ الرَّاشِدِيْنَ ، تَمَسَّكُوْا بِهَا وَعَضُّوْا عَلَيْهَا بِالنَّوَاجِذِ ، وَإِيَّاكُمْ وَمُحْدَثَاتِ الْأُمُوْرِ ، فَإِنَّ كُلَّ مُحْدَثَةٍ بِدْعَةٌ ، وَكُلَّ بِدْعَةٍ ضَلَالَةٌ».

From al-Irbad ibn Sariyah (May Allaah be pleased with him) said: The Prophet (May the peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) led us in prayer one day and then he faced us and gave us an eloquent sermon, which caused the eyes to flow with tears and the hearts to be moved, so one of us said, "Oh Messenger of Allaah, it is as if this is a farewell sermon, so what do you advise us with?" He said (May the peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) "I advise you with the fear of Allaah and to hear and obey (your leaders) even if an Abyssinian slave were to rule over you for whomsoever lives amongst you after me then they will see many differences so upon you is to follow my sunnah and the sunnah of the Rightly Guided Caliphs after me. Stick to it and bite onto it with the molar teeth and he warned of the newly-invented matters for verily every newly-invented

matter is an innovation and every innovation is misguidance.[185]

The doctrine, "to hear and obey" (religious leaders) later became famous among Muslims since most preachers emphasize this doctrine in their sermons. In every religious meeting, the *dai* (preachers) will highlight that *jama'ah* (members) must always express their attitude and quality of *al-Sam'u wa al-Tho'at* (to hear and to obey) to their religious leaders. Forseveral groups such as Darul Islam (DI; also NII) this phrase is also expressed as part of an oath (*bai'at*) and at other rituals.

Abas also expressed the doctrine, "hear and obey" with making *bai'at* before traveling to Afghanistan. Around the middle of October 1987, in the evening before departing to Subang Kuala Lumpur, all 15 people who would depart for Afghanistan gathered together at Pak Ristan's house in Serting Negeri Sembilan. Later, Abas recognized that the purpose of the gathering was actually to make a *bai'at* (oath) before departing for Afghanistan. He recalls:

> *We all sat together with Pak Ristan in a circle, and after some time Ustadz Abdul Halim, Ustadz Abdus Somad and Ustdaz Hashim arrived. The meeting opened with a muqodimah (introduction) by Pak Ristan. After that, one by one, each member of the departing group moved in front of Ustadz Abdul Halim and whilst grasping his-right-hand) stated some words that I do not completely remember [...]. I did not know what had taken place with these Indonesians and what ritual this was [...]. Before my turn took place, I was thinking of Ustadz Hashim's order and teaching but I have never received. However, I thought that if I did not shake hands with Abdul Halim, it may be that I would not depart for Afghanistan. Based on this, at that time I held the opinion that shaking hands was a small issue, not something difficult. Furthermore, the whole process took no longer than 3 minutes. The words I stated at the time of shaking hands were "**Bayat'tuku 'ala al-Sam'I wa al-Tho'ati fi al-'Usri wa al-Yusri"**(I make an*

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[185] The status of this Hadith is valid (*shahih)*, as cited by several imam muhadith (expert of Hadith); They include: (1) Imam Ahmad in his *Musnad* [IV/126 - 127]. (2) Imam Abu Dawud [no. 4607] and his lafazh. (3) Imam At-Tirmidzi [no. 2676].Imam Ibnu Majah [no. 42]. Imam Ad-Darimi [I/44] Imam Ibnu Hibban in his *Shahiih* [no. 5, *at-Ta'liiqaatul Hisaan* and no. 102, *al-Mawaarid*]. Imam Al-Hakim [I/95-96]. Imam Ibnu Abi 'Ashim in *as-Sunnah* [no. 54 - 59]. Imam al-Baghawi in *Syarhus Sunnah* [I/205, no. 102]. Imam Al-Baihaqi in his *Sunan* [X/114]. Imam al-Laalika-i in *Syarah Ushuul I'tiqaad Ahlis Sunnah wal Jamaa'ah* [I/83, no. 81].

> *oath/bai'at to hear and obey in ease and hardship). After all participants finished shaking hands with Ustadz Abdul Halim, he gave a speech about jihad to fortify our hearts.*[186]

The airplane took off from Subang airport in Kuala Lumpur, heading for Pakistan to land in Karachi. Abas and his groups overnighted there and in the following days they left Karachi for Peshawar by bus, which took 2 nights. Later, they arrived in a refugee camp for the Afghan Mujahidin at Pabbi where they were located in an intermediate military school owned by the Tandzim Ittihad e-Islamiy or Harbiy Sohanjay. In that place, at the end of 1987, Abas first met Ali Ghufron (who later married Abas's younger sister. Ghufron is also the older brother of Ali Imron). At Harbi Sonjay, Abas and his groups were reminded that they should claim to be Filipinos if asked by the Afghanis or the Arabs; this would provide them with a cover story, and without answering back they all obeyed this rule.

From Harbiy Sonjay, Abas and other selected members of the group were moved to the Afghanistan Military Academy. Their departure was controlled by Indonesians such as Dzulkarnain, Saad and Utbah who did not reside at Harbiy Sohanjay but at a house located in Pabbi, the area for refugees (*Muhajirin*). In other words, Dzulkarnain and others were a number of people chosen for the task after completing their education at the Academy. The Afghanistan Mujahidin Military Academy was owned by the Tanzim Ittihad e-Islamy organization under the leadership of Syeikh Abdur Robbi Rosul Sayyaf. The academy comprised 6 faculties namely: infantry, engineering, artillery, logistics, communications and cavalry. Education in the academy took 3 years (1st, 2nd, and 3rd classes). At every level, there were Indonesian students. In addition to military study, students also completed Islamic studies like *tafsir* al-Qur'an (exegesis), *hadith* of the Prophet, *Fiqh* (Jurisprudence), Islamic leadership, etc., although it only made up a small amount of their studies.[187]

In 1990, the class of 1987 finished their three-year education. Several graduates were tasked with becoming an instructor, including Abas. He had already been involved as an educator since 1989 when he was tasked to teach and train people from Bangladesh. In 1990, Abas was tasked with being an assistant instructor to teach the 1st class of the Indonesian squad. He received several opportunities to depart to the battlefield in Afghanistan, especially during his holidays from teachings and trainings. In the middle of June, Abas returned to Malaysia in order to attend the marriage of his younger sister to Ali Ghufron,

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[186] Nasir Abas, interview---
[187] Nasir Abas, 2005, *op.cit.*

which took place on July 1, 1990. He stayed in Johor Bahru for 1 month after which he had to go back to the Afghanistan Mujahidin military academy in Sadda, working as an instructor until the academy was closed atthe end of 1992 and then relocated to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. However, the Indonesian student trainees together with Abas and other instructors did not move to Kabul. They were relocated to a camp in Towrkham, which later became well-known as the camp for NII/DI, which later turned into a JI camp from 1993 to1995 when the camp was closed during the Taliban's war against the Afghani Mujahidin and anyone else in Afghanistan who did not submit to and join together with the Taliban. At the end of 1993, Abas returned to Malaysia.[188]

3. *Amir Mantiqi* 3 of JI and Being Leader of *Tandzim Sirri* (Secret Group)

In the beginning of 1994, after arriving in Malaysia, Nasir Abas was not tasked with any specific assignment, except the occasional request to give sermons to JI members in Johor Bahru. However, around September 1994, Abas was assigned by Dzulkarnain to go to Mindanao (Moro) in the Southern Philippines together with four other JI members. The purpose was to train the military members of the Moro Nation Freedom-Fighters. In December 1994, Abas arrived in Mindanao and became the moderator and military instructor at the Hudaibiyah training camp until the end of 1996.[189]

In August 1997, Abas was appointed by Mustafa (Head/*amir* of *Mantiqi* 3) as a commander of JI's*wakalah* (agency) in Sabah Malaysia. The *wakalah* was responsible for arranging border crossing of militants between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Abas recalls why he was chosen:

> *We (I and Mustafa) both sat in the mosque of Madrasah Lukmanul Hakim where Mustapha told me about the promotion. He made the decision to choose me probably because I was married to a woman in Sandakan Sabah, sohe assumed it would not present difficulties for me if I were to live there. He also added that my experience of once passing through Tawi-Tawi, the Southern Philippines to arrive in Mindanao would really help him to carry out this duty.*

In mid-1998, Abas organized the JI members'journey; they left to complete military training and jihad together with the MILF. He

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[188] Idem

[189] Nasir Abas, interview,---

managed the entry and exit of the JI members from Indonesia to the Southern Philippines. Abas recalls his roles as follows:

> *All arrangements for the entry or exit of the JI members from Indonesia to the Southern Philippines were organized both legally and illegally. From that time on, JI members' entry and exit to (and or from) the Southern Philippines ran smoothly until the end of 2002. The order to arrange for the JI members to travel or cross to the Philippines came from Mustafa. He always took care of my standing in the JI structure, and I was always positioned below him.*[190]

In 2000, together with Mustafa, Abas initiated the establishment of the Uhud Project as part of JI to send fighters to Ambon and Poso. Mustafa also informed him that there was a possibility for Abas to replace Mustafa as leader of Mantiqi 3 as Mustafa held two posts as leader at that time, the leader of Mantiqi 3 and the leader of the Uhud Project (a program for territorial establishment in Poso which took shape in 2000. Abas recalls:

> *The busy nature of Mustafa activities, within his capacity of dispatching JI members to Poso, made for a less than optimal performance of the Mantiqi 3. According to Mustafa, the proposal for me to be appointed the leader of Mantiqi 3 was put before the central committee and the Amir which is Ustadz Abdus Somad (Abu Bakar Ba'asyir). Mustafa informed me that according to PUPJI/Pedoman Umum Perjuangan JI (General Guidelines for the struggle of JI), the one with power to install the leader of Mantiqi 3 was the Amir of JI and therefore I had a meeting with Ustadz Abdus Somad.*[191]

In April 2001, Abas was invited by Mustafa who informed that he had to meet Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and that he was expected to travel with him to Indonesia. In Solo, Abas was appointed Leader of the Mantiqi 3, the regional divisions that encompassed Sabah in Malaysia, Mindanao in Philippines, Tarakan and Nunukan (East Kalimantan) and Palu (Central Sulawesi) in Indonesia. Abas recognized that he accepted that position without objection because he knew that since Abdullah Sungkar had died atthe end of 1999. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had become JI's *amir*. He recalls:

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[190] Nasir Abas, interview.---
[191] *Idem*

> *When we (Mustafa and I) arrived in Solo at the Ma'had Ali, Ustadz Abu Bakar* Ba'asyir *was already there in one office of Ma'had Ali. Once the Ustadz finished with his agenda at the time, I was called in to meet him and invited to speak with him alone in one room without the presence of Mustafa oranyone else to witness what took place. Ustadz Abu Bakar* Ba'asyir *immediately informed me that I was now taking over the position held by Mustafa as leader of the Mantiqi 3. I accepted this without objection because as far as I knew, since the death of Ustadz Abdul Halim (Abdullah Sungkar) around the end of 1999, Abu Bakar* Ba'asyir *was the Amir of JI and therefore he was the highest-ranking leader of the group of which I was a member, the JI. I also knew that the person who possessed the authority to nominate leader of the Mantiqi was the Amir of JI. In the meantime, Mustafa was to occupy the post of military advisor of the central committee.*[192]

4. Nasir Abas at a Crossroad

In May 2001, Abas returned to Sabah Malaysia. When the JI ramped up its terrorist bombing campaign in 2000 and striking churches, Abas realized that he had become uneasy with the group's change in direction. He said the group has fallen under the spell of Osama bin Laden who had begun calling attacks against Western civilians, which Abas argues is a deviation from Islamic teaching. From the independent-minded Abas's perspective, the rot set in the day he received the fatwa from Abu Bakar Baasyir and Hambali that endorsed Osama bin Laden's 23 February 1998 ruling authorizing the killing of American and Western civilians.[193] Abas recalls:

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[192]*Idem*

[193] The 1998 fatwa (edict) reaches *al-Quds al-Arabi* by fax and was signed by 5 people, 4 of them represented specific Islamic groups. They include; Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Jihad Group of Egypt), Ahmed Refai Taha (Jama'ah Islamiyah of Egypt), Mir Hamzah (Jama'at Ulama of Pakistan) and Fazul Rahman (Harakat Jihadul Islam of Bangladesh). The signatories as a group were identified as the "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders". This fatwā complains of American military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, and American support for Israel. It purports to provide religious authorization for indiscriminate killing of Americans and Jews everywhere. The fatwa calls upon each individual member of the existing Ummah to, "*in accordance with the words of Almighty God, 'fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,' and 'fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God*.' "The fatwa is widely regarded by terrorism experts as the founding document of the World Islamic Front. See Bernard Lewis, License To Kill: Osama bin Laden's Declaration of Jihad, in *Foreign Affairs,* November 1998, Montasser al-

I heard there was a decree brought down by Hambali that was passed to him by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. The Decree was allegedly from Osama bin Laden, urging Muslims to defend themselves against the Americans. The Americans had persecuted Muslims all over the world and had even killed Muslims. The decree said that it was alright to kill Americans even though they were not armed. We were also told that we could kill women and children and other civilians. The decree was given to all the Mantiqis.[194]

This decree forced Abas into serious soul searching. He later admitted that he had personally read a photocopy of the decree and began to feel that something was not right. Abas consequently did not relay the decree to the members of Mantiqi 3, thinking to himself that if it was the American leadership that we are after then why should JI attack the innocent that could well include Muslim civilians?[195] The following year, a JI member previously-trained by Abas, Fathurrahman al-Ghozi, worked with his Canadian al-Qaeda accomplice Mohammed Jabarah in an attempt to blow up the American and Israeli embassies in Singapore, a plot that was stopped by the authorities. Abas's qualm grew stronger after Hambali masterminded the Christmas Eve bombings in 2000. Abas claimed he had already turned against JI because it was targeting civilians. "*What they had done was not in the battlefield, not in the conflict area,*" Abas argued.

After the Bali Bombing 1/BB1 attack on October 2002, the Indonesian police investigation led to the arrest of JI members. Uncovering JI's structure, Abas was identified as one of its leaders. By that time, Abas was captured by the police in Bekasi near East Jakarta on April18, 2003 and was sentenced to 10 months in prison (until February 2004).

During his arrest, Abas busted his best kung-fu moves to get the police to kill him since he suffered the indignity of being captured by the infidels (*kafir*). He broke the leg of one police officer and the arm of another, but the police still did not shoot. Abas was too valuable a source to kill. At first, Abas answered all integration questions with one phrase, God forgive me (*astaghfirullah*). Then Bekto Suprapto, now an-ex-head of Detachment 88, strode into his cell and delivered a rapid-fire

Zayyat, 1998, *The Road To AlQaeda: The Story of Bin Laden Right-Handman,* Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
[194] Kumar Ramakhrisna, 2009, *Radical Pathways, Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia*, Westport CT: Praeger Security International
[195] Kumar Ramakhrisna, 2009, *op.cit*

biography of the militant. Convinced he was going to be tortured and possibly killed, Abas was surprised to see how gently his interrogators treated him. They apparently learned from other arrested militants that he did not support the attacks. *"Look at my eyes, do I look hostile to Islam?"* the anti-terror squad Chief Bekto Suprapto, is quoted as saying. *"If you don't agree with the bombings, let us stop it together."* Abas was intrigued by this man who seemed to know everything about him, including his disagreement with JI's turn toward killing innocent civilians. He asked if Bekto would be willing to meet him one-on-one. The police chief agreed, even removing Abas's handcuffs while they talked for days. *"I thought I could kill this old man if I wanted but he trusted me, and I could not abuse that,"* Abas recalled. *"In Islam, if someone respects you, you must respect them back."*[196]

After his arrest, Abas recalls, he refused to answer any questions but was troubled by his own question in jail: why did God not let him to die? He had told the people he had trained that it was better to be killed than to be taken prisoner. His concluded that his arrest was God's will and that there was something that God wanted him to do. After the church Bombings in 2000, Abas, Zulkarnaen and two other militants (Mustafa and Ahmad Roichan) had warned Hambali not to carry out any more bombings, but they had done it again and everything was ruined. Abas really expected the worst from the police but his first interrogator as mentioned above, never used abusive language and treated him with respect. Abas then began to talk; he did so with a heavy heart because he was not ordinary JI member and had trained other people to keep the groups secret. He asked to speak with the police one-on-one and the police agreed. Abas told the police that he would cooperate with the police to stop JI's crimes so that they would no longer sin.[197]

His conversion, Abas said, came after his 2003 arrest. *"I always thought the police were my enemy."* But they called him Mr. Abas and, after beating him the day of his arrest, never touched him again. If they had tortured him further, he said, he would have been silent or given them false information. They said, Abas recalls:

> *We are Muslim like you. We are not against Islam. We just want to stop criminals. Even the Christian cops did not use bad words about Islam. I changed my mind about the police, and that was one turning point.*

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[196] Nasir Abas, interview
[197] Nasir Abas, interview

Abas explained that another event was when the Cipinang's commander came to see him in prison. Abas recalls:

> *Bekto Suprapto was a colonel and a Christian. He told the ten men guarding me to take off my handcuffs. Then he told them to leave. I am thinking, "what a brave man, because if I want to do something to him, I am sure I could carry it out."We talked about jihad, about Christians and Muslims. He gave me a Bible and I ended up reading it. I started wondering why God had not let me die or be killed. I answered my own question. He had not because there was something God wanted of me. It was to do what I am doing now.*

Abas' change of direction also had a practical benefit: it won his release from custody.

JIHAD TRAJECTORY OF ALI IMRON

1. Muslims are like one-body and assisting the oppressed-Muslims

The phrase "*Muslims are like one-body*" is derived from the Prophet Muhammad's hadith:"***The likeness of the believers, in their mutual love, mercy and compassion, are like one body: if one organ complained, the rest of the body develops a fever.***"[198] Through the hadith, the Prophet Muhammad means that the *ummah* (Muslim community) is one-body of Muslims; if one member becomes sick, the other members of this one body will take care of the sick one. Jihadist groups all over the world realize that media outlets and the internet have no shortage of news revealing the turmoil that Muslims are living in around the world: from occupation of the Muslim lands to the dire poverty of brothers and sisters. This is where a sense of brotherhood becomes the vital connection between Muslims around the globe. Those groups also highlight that it is an obligation to be politically and intellectually aware of all affairs impacting Muslims everywhere since God has described the believers as a brother to other believers, and therefore it should pain Muslims— just as it would if it were their own blood brother—when they read about the plight of fellow Muslims.[199]

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[198] Shahih Bukhari and Muslim, The Book of Virtue, Good Manners and Joining of the Ties of Relationship (*Kitab Al-Birr was-Salat-I-wal-Adab)*, Hadith No. 6261

[199] Anonym, 'Muslim are nothing except brothers', Pebruary 2010, see http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/concepts/islamic-culture/8869-muslims-are-nothing-except-brothers (Accessed on 23 January 2013).

In the case of Ali Imron, his initial step towards jihad began with his identity crisis following his failure to study in Pesantren Ngruki in 1988. Unlike his older brother Ali Ghufron, who graduated and eventually became an *ustadz* (teacher) at that Pesantren, Imron spent only one month there before deciding to return home. Continuing his study in a high school and Pesantren affiliated to Muhammadiyah in Karangasem Lamongan, Imron also admitted to not having a strong commitment to study. He said, "*I spent more time having fun than studying.*"[200]

Following his identity crisis, Imron then took part in an Islamic study circle held by his fellows in the Pesantren Karangasem in 1990. During the study circle sessions, some *ustadz* (teacher) taught about jihad, describing the misery of fellow Muslims persecuted by non-Muslims in other corners of the globe such as in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, and quoting the famous Prophet Hadith; *Muslims are like one body*. In addition to Islamic teachings on jihad, which resulted inacognitive-opening for Imron, there was also a video screening of the struggle of jihad carried out by several Muslim movements in countries such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. For Imron, these sessions ignited his "moral-shock" when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that he becomes inclined toward political actions (as Jasper argues). Responding to this, Imron expressed

> *Since then, I was moved to change my old bad habits [...]. I also wanted to take part in a struggle to defend my religion and my fellow Muslims from the atrocities committedby their enemies as happened in Palestine, Iraq and Afhganistan.*

> *This session triggered my mind to change my bad habits [...]. It also encouraged me to participate in the fight to defend Islam and Muslims against their enemies such as in Palestine, Iraq and Afhganistan.*[201]

Imron's initial introduction to violent jihad was made by way of watching the jihadist videos. Imron recalls: "*Having watched the video, I felt the need to defend Islam and my fellow Muslims from the evil acts committed by the enemies of Islam such as in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan.*"

It appears in the video that the speakers must have introduced the concept of jihad and emphasized the need for jihad (fight in the

[200] Ali Imron, 2007, *Ali Imron Sang Pengembom*, Jakarta: Republika, p. 4
[201]*Idem.*

name of God) to stop the occupation and the sufferings of fellow Muslims. Imron seems to have identified with the plight of the Muslims and the experience produced profound effects on his behavior; for example, he studied harder and conducted daily activities more seriously; he also intended to travel as a *muhajirin* (immigrant), in order to find a place to fight the enemy of Muslims. Imron said:

> *From the moment, I began to do things better than previously. I studied harder, change my patterns of thinking, improved my daily activities and even began to consider traveling to find a place to fight, conducting jihad.*[202]

Following that initial step toward jihad, Imron's next step was to contact his older brother, Ali Ghufron, who had joined the jihadist group, DI, and lived in Malaysia with the leaders of DI, Abdullah Sungkar andAbu Bakar Ba'asyir.

After he completed senior high school in 1991, Imron wrote a letter to Ali Ghufron who had already attended the *Mujahidin* military academy in Afghanistan and then lived and taught at a Pesantren in Johor Bahru, Malaysia. In his letter, Imron expressed his *niyat* (intention) to conduct jihad. As he received a positive response from Ghufron, he left Lamongan for Malaysia. Soon after his arrival, Ghufron arranged for his departure to Afghanistan and introduced him to Abdullah Sungkar, a leader of the DI who provided the funding for the travel. Before his departure, Imron had to attend a series of lectures from Sungkar and eventually made *bai'at* (oath) to join the group. Thus began his formal involvement in the extremist Muslim group.

However, Imron's motivation was not only to gain an opportunity to fight foreign forces, but also to study overseas like his brother had. Imron recalls what he said to Ghufron when he met him in Johor Bahru in 1992:

> *I was so happy meeting Mukhlas (also known as Ali Ghufron) because it was already 6 years since we separated, and he was the closest to me compared to my other brothers. I immediately stated my wish to study at the place where he used to study such as in Afghanistan. A week later he told me that, Alhamdulillah (God willing), my wish would be granted.*[203]

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[202]*Idem.*

[203]*Idem.* p. 5

2. *I'dad* and the preparation of Jihad

I'dad is an Arabic word meaning preparation. In terms of jihad, preparation according to extremist Muslim groups like al-Qaeda is obligatory. Anwar al-Awlaqi (1971-2011) a senior recruiter and motivator withal-Qaeda,[204] for example, explained that the preparation for jihad is obligatory since jihad today is obligatory and the *shari'a* rules states that "*Whatever is needed for an obligatory act becomes obligatory.*"Generally, preparation for jihad can take on any form of action, ranging from spiritual to material aspects. However, al-Awlaqi highlights that armed military training is an essential part in such preparation. He refers to al-Qur'an Surah al-Anfal (8: 60): *"and prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged."* Al-Awlaqi also refers to a Hadith recited by Imam Muslim saying that *"Power is marksmanship, power is marksmanship."* Furthermore, al-Awlaqi recognizes that the issue of armed military training is critical so that if such training is not possible in your country then it is worth the time and money to travel to another country to train, again, if it is possible.[205]

Similarly, in the case of Ali Imron, his initial step toward jihad was followed by *I'dad*/preparation in the form of armed military training. Thanks to his brother Ali Ghufron, Imron did not face too many difficulties progressing to the next step of jihad. He departed Malaysia for Afghanistan, accompanied by an emir and a guide named Ismail. Imron was taken to Peshawar and later to Pabbi in Afghanistan where Dzulqarnain managed fighters from Southeast Asian countries. At that time, Dzulqarnain gave Imron the *nom de guerre (*alias) Zaid. Imron was then taken to the *Mujahidin* military academy in Sadda Parachinar in Pakistan territory and began his training in early October 1991. Other trainees from Southeast Asia included 18 from Indonesia such as Imam Samudera, Umar Patek and Abu Ayub. Indonesians trained them with exception of Nasir Abas, a Malaysian and former head of Mantiqi 3 (The JI territorial unit including Johor Bahru and Borneo).[206]

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[204] Anwar al-Awlaqi (1971-2011) was a senior talent recruiter and motivator who was involved with planning operations for the Islamist extremist group al-Qaeda.

[205] Anwar al-Awlaqi, 2009, *44 Ways to Support Jihad (an Essay)*, January 2009 in www.anwar-alawlaki.com. According to US officials, this essay is considered a key text for al-Qaeda members.

[206] Ali Imron, 2007, *op.cit.*

Imron was taught military skills training including weapons training, military tactics and strategy, field engineering, map reading, bomb making, etc. He was also given religious lessons, especially at night. At this phase, his intention was not to commit terrorist activities because the purpose of the training was "I'dad" (the preparation) for a war. Imron's goal remained to join the fight against foreign forces occupying Muslim countries or local governments installed by foreign powers. He particularly wanted to join the fight in Afghanistan. Imron said:

> *About December 1991, we had reached the middle of our 1ˢᵗ year training and it was time for a holiday. Traditionally, during the holiday, senior students were sent to war. We also wished to be among those who were sent. Some of my classmates had left the academy to join the war. However, the Communist government led by Najibullah had been toppled by the Mujahidin, so some of the colleagues who had left had to return. The failure to join the war made us sad because we did not get the chance to fight.*[207]

However, Abdullah Sungkar's (Imron's sponsor) motivation may have been different. As mentioned earlier, before Imron's departure, Sungkar was a leader of DI, which aspires to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state. However in 1993, Sungkar exited DI and then established JI (Jama'ah Islamiyah), which had a broader aspiration, i.e. to establish an Islamic government in Southeast Asia, carving the region into 3 territorial units called *Mantiqi*. Imron chose to join JI as Sungkar had sponsored his study in Afghanistan. This juncture marked the beginning of Imron's involvement in the JI, although he did not have to make another *bai'at* (oath).[208]

The *Mujahidin* military academy was moved to Kabul, but Imron and other students and staff from the Southeast Asia joined another camp owned by the Southeast Asian group in Towrkham, Nangrahar province Afghanistan, commanded by Mustafa. There was also another Southeast Asian camp in this area. Both were owned by *Tandzim Ittihad Islami* Afhganistan and led by Abdur Robbi Rosul Sayyaf (it is not clear whether Rosul Sayyaf had any connection with Abu Sayyaf group from the Southern Philippines). Imron could not join the final exam at this camp, however, as he had to be transferred to another camp for weapon reloading training. After 1994, Imron moved to another camp, which had been vacated by a Libyan contingent, where he and his colleagues learned new skills from Abu Syaikh including poison

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[207]*Idem*, p. 16.
[208] Zilfirdaus Adnan, 2009, *op.cit*, p. 92

formulation and the construction of poison bombs. In 1995, Imron moved to Pabbi Peshawar, to join Abu Dujana, Saad al-Ghazali, and Sobih, who stayed at the Southeast Asian office. This marked the end of Imron's military training.[209]

Although it is not clear whether Imron received any training certificate (he recalled that he did not attend the final exam), it appears that he was now considered a graduate, ready to undertake tasks for JI. As a graduate, Imron had acquired specific military skills and religious knowledge to prepare (I"dad) for his future "jihad"assignments. As a yet unmarried man, he had no family commitment to worry about. In the context of community support, it is clear that Imron was respected by the Muslim community in his hometown in Tenggulun, East Java, having trained abroad and probably believed to have participated in "jihad"in Afghanistan. Imron faced no problem when he was assigned to teach at the (then) newly-established Pesantren Al-Islam and his students were very fond of his jihad teachings, wishing to join the fight in Chechnya. However, Imron had not acquired (or been subject to) other forms of terrorist knowledge such as previous experience of violence, being victimized by the enemy and/or having a good operational/knowledge of JI (Ali Imron, 2007: 28-29). The Indonesian context differed from Palestine and Northern Ireland which were occupied with religious and nationalist aspirations suppressed by foreign forces. Nevertheless, it was clear that as a member of the JI, whose training in Afghanistan had been sponsored by the JI, the leadership expected Imron to act according to their wishes.[210]

4. Against the Enemy of Muslims and the Bombings

About two months after his return from Afghanistan to Malaysia in 1996, Imron was sent to Sabah by Dzulqarnain, a senior member of JI and an Afghan graduate who was in charge of organizing all alumni from the *Mujahidin* military academy in Afghanistan. Imron was sent to Sabah in preparation for planned assignments in Mindanao, the Southern Philippines. He stayed at the same accommodation traditionally used by the JI members on route to the region. However, perhaps due to the security problems in Mindanao, Imron was allowed to return to his hometown in Tenggulun Lamongan. Two months later, Dzulqarnain re-assigned Imron to Pontianak Kalimantan to survey the border between Indonesia and Malaysian territories. Imron and his colleague were keen to go to Mindanao to fight for the Moro Muslims, but acquiesced to the reassignment. However, two months later, Imron was re-assigned again to teach at the Pesantren al-Islam in Tenggulun Lamongan (perhaps to educate

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[209] Ali Imron, 2007, *op.cit*.
[210] Zilfirdaus Adnan, 2009, *op.*cit, p.93

and train future figures). Imron was reluctant to take the teaching position as he had received previous military training. He did, however, follow the order.[211]

At the Pesantren al-Islam, Imron encouraged his students to exercise jihad, which was well received. A large number of his new graduates wanted to be sent to a war zone. In fact, Imron boosted the enthusiasm of some of his students to the extent that two of them asked to be sent to Chechnya using their own parents' funds. Imron was active not only in educating his students but also in the activities he and other JI members organized in East Java. Although his formal status was the teacher ata Pesantren, he was given other assignments by the JI's leadership. One of these tasks was to collect weapons, which he was instructed to do by Dzulqarnain in 1998. The following year, Imron was tasked with going to Ambon to assist Muslims in the war against Christian fighters. Imron claims that at this phase, he still did not know the details of JI's structure and leadership, and that he had no desire to know (Ali Imron, 2007: 33). Although Imron knew about the (natural) death of Abdullah Sungkar in 1999 in Bogor and his subsequent replacement by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Imron claims that he was not involved in disputes about Ba'asyir's appointment.[212]

Imron's first involvement in the bombing attacks was the bombing of the Philippines Ambassador residence on August1, 2000 and then the bombing of the Atrium Shopping Center in Jakarta in the same year. However, his involvement was indirect (at the pre-bombing stage); he only helped to obtain explosive materials. In the Ambassador bombing, Imron and his brother Amrozi also helped to find the car (Suzuki Carry) used in the bombing. Imron does not reveal much about these bombings since he was not directly involved in their execution. Imron was, however, involved in the Church bombings on December 24, 2000 in Mojokerto East Java and in the Bali Bombing 1/BB1 on October 12, 2002.

The Church bombings in 2000 started with Hambali's (a.k.a Riduan Isamuddin) visit to Surabaya, a senior figure of the JI and former head of the Mantiqi 3. Imron, Amrozi and Mubarok were invited by Hambali to meet him in the Hotel Mesir in Surabaya. Imron recalls:

> *On arrival, Hambali lectured us on the suffering*
> *and death of Muslims in many parts of the world*
> *at the hand of Christian Kafir (infidels) and he*
> *said it was the time to avenge their death and*

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[211] Ali Imron, 2007, *op.*cit. p. 31
[212] Zilfirdaus Adnan, 2009, *op.cit*. p. 93

sufferings. Because Muslims in Ambon had been killed during idul-fitri (celebration in the end of Ramadhan, fasting month), Hambali believed that we should kill Christians during their Christmas celebration by bombing churches.

Hambali also delegated Imron, Amrozi and Mubarok the responsibility to prepare and execute their plan. He gave them money to cover the cost of operation. But Hambali was still involved in the initial selection of the target. They discussed the target at length and made careful surveys of the sites. The potential targets included Churches in Surabaya, Mojokerto, Jombang, Bojonegoro, and Tuban, all in East Java. Surabaya was excluded from their plan due to difficulties involved in purchasing bomb materials such as fertilizer, detonators and sulfur locally. Mojokerto, on the other hand, was an ideal choice because it had a high density of Christian churches. Imron, Amrozi, Mubarok and Hambali surveyed the town before Hambali was taken to the Juanda airport (his next destination is not clear). The other 3 reconsidered targets, and in the process, surveyed churches in other towns, but eventually they decided to pursue the initial choice. Finally three targets were selected; the Bethani, Allah Baik and Ebenheizer churches. A total of six operatives include Imron, Amrozi, Mubarok, Sawad, Salman and Muhajir were to bomb each of the three targets, a pair being responsible for each. The target selection was politically symbolic as it reflected their desire to avenge the killing of Muslims, particularly those in Ambon.[213]

The Bali bombing 1/BB1 was a much bigger operation, and took a significantly larger team longer to prepare, from August to October 11, 2002. Imron mentions a meeting (he thought it was the first but Imam Samudera said it was the third meeting) at Idris' (a.k.a Johny Hendrawan) rented house in Solo in the middle of August 2002. The meeting was attended by nine JI members (Imron, Idris, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron, Amrozi, Dul Matin, Umar Patek, Sawad, and Abdul Ghoni). Ali Ghufron began the meeting by stressing the need for jihad against the USA and its allies and announced that Imam Samudra was the project leader. Samudra then explained that Bali was selected because many Westerners took their holidays there, especially from the USA and its allies. The purpose was to commemorate the WTC attack on September 11, 2001. No specific target was decided as survey operations needed to be undertaken in Bali. Nevertheless, the target was clearly political.

The BB1 was preceded by sophisticated preparation work. JI planned to explode a car bomb containing a ton of explosives, a

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[213] Ali Imron, 2007, *op.cit.*

motorbike bomb containing 50 kilograms, and suicide bombers armed with explosive vests. Ali Imron and his brother Amrozi were tasked with buying the explosive materials, detonation cords and switches and sent them to Bali in small quantities. Both Imron and Amrozi also had to find a vehicle to carry the explosive, modify it appropriately and remove its identity numbers. After the meeting, Imron and Amrozi returned to Tenggulun Lamongan and waited to receive money from Imam Samudra to purchase bomb materials and a vehicle. Upon receipt of funds, they purchased an L-300 Mitsubishi van and a ton of fertilizer in Surabaya. The car van was modified to increase its carrying capacity and a false registration number was affixed to avoid detection. The bomb materials were later sent to Bali in small quantities.

On 8 September 2002, Imron, Amrozi and Mubarok were visited by Imam Samudera, Dul Matin and Idris who asked them to travel together to Bali to start surveying possible targets. The latter traveled around Kuta and the Sari Club was the first potential target to attract their attentions. The next day they continued the survey at Kuta and Sanur beaches and streets. Samudra also ordered Imron to buy a motorbike to assist their surveillance activities. Imron recalls:

> *As you can read in my book, surveillance was undertaken in disguise (wearing Western style of clothes and sitting at the Kuta beach among foreign (Western) tourist, and around cafes, discos and nightclubs. I even colored my hair blond to avoid suspicion. We also played Western songs in our car and we rented a house while making bombs, although this tactic created a conflict between the members (especially Samudra) who opposed it (due to its un-Islamic nature) and those who supported it in an attempt to avoid suspicion from public or security officers.*[214]

In planning the bombings, Imron who was not initially involved in the project, had to play a key role in installing detonation cords and switches, teaching the suicide bombers how to operate bombs and eventually in driving the bomb cars close to the target because Jimmy, the selected bomber, was unable to drive well. Imron also had to place a bomb at the American consulate in Denpasar shortly before he drove Jimmy and another bomber Iqbal to Paddy's club. Azahari and his team include Umar Patek, Dul Matin; Abdul Ghoni would design and construct three bombs (car, bag and vest bombs). Regarding the bombers, Imron recalls:

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[214] Ali Imron, Interview

Out of the five people prepared to be suicide bombers, only 2 were finally selected by Imam Samudera; Iqbal a.k.a Isa a.k.a Feri and Jimmy a.k.a Acong a.k.a Arnasan. The rest of candidates and other members of the bomb making team were ordered to leave Bali before the bombing. Iqbal was selected because of his strong commitment to jihad as well as his experience fighting in Ambon. Jimmy was selected for his bravery; he had previously been a preman (criminal) at Malingping traditional market in his hometown in West Java and had proven successful in the robbery of a Chinese jewelry shop in Serang West Java. Iqbal was assigned to detonate a vest bomb and Jimmy was to detonate the car bomb.[215]

On October 11, 2002, Azhari and his team completed the bombs with the exception of the detonators, which were left to Ali Imron to install. Around 10:00 am, Imron installed three switches on the motorbike to be used as a decoy when dropping the bag bomb at the USA consulate and then at 13:00 pm he showed the two suicide bombers (Iqbal and Jimmy) how the firing devices worked and how to activate them, the plan for the bombing and reported to Imam Samudera. At 20:00 pm Imron managed to place the remotely controlled bag bomb on the footpath/pedestrian walkway outside the US consulate, despite the presence of police officers near the roundabout in front of the building. Imron then conducted a final surveillance at the Sari Club which he saw was crowded before returning to the rented house, where Idris and the two bombers were ready. Imron and the latter took the loaded L-300 van and drove to the Legian Street, not far from the Sari club; Idris followed on the motorbike at a distance, and later waited near Legian street. On the way to the target, Imron instructed the bombers to prepare their respective bombs. About 50 meters from the target, he asked Jimmy to drive closer to the target while Imron walked away to where Idris was waiting. From this position, Imron saw Jimmy enter Paddy's club to detonate his vest bomb among the crowd.[216]

Thus, the bombings were well-planned and successfully executed although Imron and Idris were not careful in discarding their motorbike. They left it in al-Ghuroba mosque in Bali where it was later found and provided a clue to their identity. The police traced the origins of the motorbike to a Yamaha showroom in Denpasar, from which they collected information about the team's physical appearances. The information was then used to develop a flyer that was widely publicized, and lead to the arrest of Amrozi (Imron's brother) at Tenggulun.

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[215]*Idem*

[216]*Idem*

4. Ali Imron at a Crossroad

According to the Indonesian police, the BB1 attack was claimed as the deadliest act of terrorism in the Indonesian history, killing 202 people (including 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 27 Britain, 9 Americans and 5 Swedish citizens. A further 240 people were injured. The final death toll was 202, mainly comprising Western tourists and holiday-makers in their 20s and 30s who were in or near the Paddy's Pub or the Sari Club, but also including many Balinese Indonesians working or living nearby, or simply passing by. Hundreds more people suffered horrific burns and other injuries. The largest groups among those killed were vacationers from Australia with 88 fatalities. On October14, 2002, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1438 condemning the attack as a threat to international peace and security. Two bodies were identified and were cremated at Bali in September 2003.[217]

Imron's seed of psychological disengagement began when he began to question the justification for bombing churches in 2000. He was confused and suffered from intense psychological pressure from outside his group when many people, including Muslims, renounced the bombings. Even, Imron himself renounced the bombings in his speeches in front ofMuslim audiences in Lamongan. He was also a bit shocked with the huge number of victims and damage caused by BB1.

Similarly, in the initial phase (the planning phase), Imron also questioned BB1. However, as he was just a junior member of the group, he did not make his qualms known to the leadership. The widespread outcry after BB1 led the Indonesian police to step up the hunt for the perpetrators, and following the arrest of Amrozi, the group was in disarray. Each of members, including Imron, had to escape to different parts of the country.

Imron went from being a respected teacher in the Pesantren al-Islam and surrounding communities to a fugitive who was eventually arrested in a hut at Kuala Bengkuang on the mouth of Mahakam River in Kalimantan. His psychological stress increased after he found out that everyone from his group and those who helped him during his escape had been detained. He recalls:

> *The arrest of Amrozi, Imam Samudra and Ali Ghufron as well as his (their) other friends incurred a heavy pressure on me. When I was also arrested the pressure became heavier especially after I found out that many of my friends were also*

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[217]*Idem*

> *arrested because they helped me during my escape attempt (Ali Imron, 2005:175).*

> *I found out that many people were arrested simply for helping me.... I had to see my two older brothers Amrozi and Ali Ghufron caged in the Bali Police Detention, led out while cuffed, and guarded by two policemen on the left and right. I was so hurting that I did not look at them passing in front of me because I could not stand seeing them in that situation (Ali Imron, 2005: 176).*

This intense stress eventually led him to change his mind. Imron called on his brethren to abandon terror attacks similar to BB1. He recalls:

Since then I wished to call on my comrades who were involved in BB1 to discourage other comrades from doing jihad by bombing as we did in Bali. The disaster that we experienced is enough as a sign and lesson that doing jihad like BB1 is not correct (Imron, 2005: 177).

JIHAD TRAJECTORY OF JA'FAR THALIB

1. The Impotent Ruler

Since fighting erupted in Ambon in January 1999, conservative hardliners have attempted to channel Indonesian Muslims' outrage at the government's failure to protect Muslims into action against their Christian Moluccas antagonists. Their campaign acquired a new impetus following the massacre by Christian militia of at least 500 Muslims in Halmahera, North Maluku, in December 1999, and culminated in a rally in Jakarta on January7, 2000, which attracted tens of thousands. This rally was addressed not only by conservative Muslim activists and members of Islamist parties such as the PBB (Star and Crescent Party) but also by the "cornered" Amien Rais and PPP (United Development Party) leader and the Indonesian Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, who endorsed calls for a jihad in Maluku.[218]

The conflict in 1999 reached a climax on December 26 when the Silo church and the an-Nur mosque, both located on the same road were burnt following an incident triggered by a traffic accident close to the Trikora monument. During this incident, a Muslim teenager namely Fauzan was crushed by a local transport and died but his body then disappeared. Muslims accused Christians of concealing his body in a cover-up. In the aftermath

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[218] Michael Davis, 2002, *Laskar Jihad and the political position of conservative Islam in Indonesia*, see:
http://www.angelfire.com/rock/hotburrito/laskar/iseas010402.html

of this clash, other conflicts soon broke out, both in Ambon as well as in the surrounding islands. The most ruthless results, however, were felt in the Tobelo sub-district, North Maluku, in the following days. The massacre of a hundred Muslims, including significant numbers of people hiding inside the al-Ikhlas mosque in Togaliwa village, occurred in Tobelo on December 28-29, 1999 during the fasting month of Ramadhan.

The news of the massacre quickly spread throughout the country via newspapers and magazines which soon provoked Muslims outside Maluku to be involved directly in the conflict. A video recorded by a medical emergency team of Mer-C who went to the area to take care of the causalities had further enflamed the emotions of Muslims living outside the area. Responding to this, several Muslim groups accused the impotence of the Indonesian government that could not control their people in Maluku and more importantly could not protect their Muslim fellows there.[219] The violent incident was then followed by a period of mobilization of a thousand non-local Muslim fighters to the conflict area from various Islamic group networks including those from the Laskar Jihad/LJ, a group led by Ja'far Umar Thalib. Thalib recalls:

> *We founded this movement (the LJ) in order to support Muslims in Eastern Indonesia. The thousands in Molluccas slaughtered them. The government did nothing to defend the Muslims. Subsequent governments did not defend them from the Christian attacks. In light of this situation we had no choice but to found the Laskar Jihad movement, to protect our Muslim brothers in the Eastern Indonesia.[220]*

2. *Kafir Harbi* and the Communal Conflict

Laskar Jihad (LJ) was formally established on January30, 2000 in Yogyakarta in response to what the FKAWJ saw as the deliberate persecution of Muslims in Maluku. According to Thalib, the decision to establish the LJ came after the FKAWJ dispatched a team of researchers to Maluku in late 1999 to gather data on the conflict. It found evidence that Protestant churches had plans to form a break away Christian state comprising Maluku, West Papua and North Sulawesi. Remnants of the former Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) based in the Netherlands were actively involved in this movement. A key part of their plan was to wage war on Muslims in those provinces in order to drive them to other areas. It was, Thalib said, a plan for "religious

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[219] Muhammad Najib Azca, 2009, *op.cit*.
[220] Zachary Abuza, 2003, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia; A Crucible of Terror*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc. p. 70

cleansing.“ When pressed on what evidence there was to support this, he referred to the testimony of the Christians who were “loyal to Indonesia“who had leaked documents detailing the Protestant churches’ plans. Based on these findings, the FKAWJ declared those Christians in Maluku who were attacking Muslims to be *kafir harbi* or “belligerent infidels.”*Kafir harbi* are seen as the most dangerous category of unbelievers and Islamic law obliges Muslims to wage war against them. In the case of the LJ, the labeling Christians as *kafir harbi* gave a powerful religious license to kill them. The FKAWJ subsequently declared the current Islamic year to be the “Year of Jihad“ (literally “religious struggle“ but also with the connotation of holy war) and claimed that any Muslim killed fighting Christian *kafir harbi* would die as a *syahid* (martyr). Thalib says:

> *Jihad does not just mean war. In the Qur’an, there are 13 types of jihad. Sometimes it means peaceful struggle. Sometimes it means doing good works. Sometimes it means a fight against Satan, and sometime it means against infidel.The jihad in the Moluccas was all 13 at once.*[221]

Thalib claimed that in mobilizing the LJ, he was merely doing his task as a Muslim, because the Indonesian government is clearly unable or unwilling to protect the Muslim community (*ummah*). Thalib argued that if the government cannot protect Muslim people, then Muslims must do it themselves. Thalib maintained that Abdurrahman’s government is anti-Islamic: *“It is positioned to oppress Muslim interests and protect those of the infidels.“* The FKAWJ is committed to bringing it down.[222]

Laskar Jihad’s/LJ membership and notoriety grew quickly in its early months. Many of its members were drawn from poorer, less-educated sections of the Islamic community, though a small number of tertiary graduates and professionals also joined. LJ first made national headlines in March when Thalib led an assault on the followers of a Muslim leader in Cirebon who had alleged that LJ was extorting funds from local non-Muslims and who had also condemned its plans to send fighters to Maluku (*Gatra*, March 25, 2000). The following month, LJ undertook a series of demonstrations and marches in Jakarta, including to the presidential palace and parliament, with many LJ members waving unsheathed swords and daggers. In late April, about 3000 members departed for Maluku. Press reports estimate there were about 6000 LJ fighters in Maluku, though Thalib claimed the figure was less than 4000. Total membership, according to the FKAWJ secretary-general, Ma’ruf Barhan, was at 10,000 and

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[221] Interview
[222] Greg Fealy, *Inside the Laskar Jihad*, see
http://www.insideindonesia.org/content/view/500/29/

plans were afoot to send units to new trouble spots such as Poso in Central Sulawesi, where several hundred Muslims were killed in religious violence earlier in 2000. Like many other extremist Muslim groups, LJ has proved to be adept at promoting its views via the media. It produced a magazine, *Salafy*, at an office and dormitory complex four kilometres from Degolan on the road to Yogyakarta and regularly updates a website run from the FKAWJ's Jakarta office (www.LaskarJihad.or.id). Thalib dismissed widespread speculation that LJ is backed by influential sections of TNI (Indonesian army), saying that the Islamic community has learned through bitter experience not to trust the military. In interviews earlier in the year, however, he and his lieutenants boasted about their relationship with TNI. In one interview, Thalib claimed to have a hotline to TNI commander Admiral Widodo (*Panji Masyarakat*, April 26, 2000). Another FKAWJ leader also admitted that the TNI officers have assisted in training of LJ (*Gatra*, March 25, 2000). He said that most of LJ's funds were raised through sources in the Muslim community.

In March 2001, Thalib declared the establishment of Islamic law in Moluccas. In all, around 9000 people died in the Moluccas communalconflict. Thalib publicly explained that he is against democracy as he considers it to be incompatible with Islam and he also did not endorse any political party.[223] Thalib argued:

> *Any state should be governed by shari'a, God's law rather than the law of individuals, and that democracy should be replaced by a council of Islamic scholars. This council would have the power to appoint the President and have control over government policy.*

3. Fatwa, a Letter to Invite Jihad

Fatwa (edict) is an Arabic word that literally means "opinion." Related words in Arabic are "a*fta,*"which means to give an opinion, and "*yastafti*," which means to ask for an opinion. In the religious context, the word "*fatwa*" carries more meaning. This is because when a Muslim has a question that they need answered from an Islamic point of view; they ask an Islamic scholar to provide an answer, a "fatwa." This "fatwa" carries more weight than just the random opinion of any person on the street. Muslim scholars are expected to give their "fatwa" based on religious evidence, not based on their personal opinions. Therefore, their "fatwa" is sometimes regarded as a religious ruling. It is interesting to note that in Islam, there are four sources from which Muslim scholars extract religious law or rulings, and upon

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[223]*Idem.*

which they base their "fatwa." The first is the Qu'ran, which is the holy book of Islam, and which is the direct and literal word of God, revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. The second source is the *Sunnah*, which incorporates anything that the Prophet said, did or approved of. The third source is the consensus of the scholars, meaning that if the scholars of a previous generation have all agreed on a certain issue, then this consensus is considered to represent Islam. Finally, if no evidence is found regarding a specific question from the three first sources, then an Islamic scholar performs what is known as "*ijtihad*." This means that they use their own logic and reasoning to come up with the best answer according to the best of their ability. It is also interesting to note that, regarding different methodologies, scholars frequently have different opinions regarding any given question. This is why there is usually more than one "fatwa" regarding any one question.[224]

As a Salafi ulama, Thalib did not forget to seek endorsement from both Yemeni and Arab Saudi Salafi scholars. 7 Salafi scholars issued fatwas that, according to Thalib, approved the plan to engage in jihad to assist fellow Muslims in Ambon. They were; (1) Syeikh Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad, a Medina mufti;(2) Syeikh Ahmad al-Najm, a member of the Saudi senior ulama committee;(3) Syeikh Muqbil Ibn Hadi al-Wadi'I, a Salafi Mufti in Yaman and Ja'far's teacher;(4) Syeikh Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, from Medina;(5) Syeikh Salih al-Suhaimi;(6) Syeikh Wahid al-Jabiri; and, (7) Syeikh Muhammad Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, the last three are Salafi muftis in Medina. [225]

When Thalib and Umar Sewed performed the Hajj in mid-1999, they made a point of consulting Saudi religious scholars about the conflict in Maluku. The consensus that waging jihad to defend Muslims against their attackers was *fardlu 'ain* (an individual obligation), but the nuances were interesting. Shaikh Abdul Muhsin al-'Abbad, a Hadith scholar from Medina said it was desirable for Muslims to help protect fellow Muslims but that a Maluku jihad should meet two conditions: (1) it should not endanger or hurt other Muslim; and (2) it should be defensive as Muslims should not be the first to attack.[226]

Shaikh Ahmad an-Najmi, a member of the ulama council, said it was obligatory to help oppressed Muslims but it was important not to rush into battle without adequate preparation and

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[224] Anonym, "What is Fatwa?". See:
http://www.questionsaboutislam.com/shariah-islamic-law/what-is-a-fatwa.php
(Accessed on December ,2012)

[225] Noorhaidi Hassan, 2006, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy and the Quest for Identity in Post New-Order Indonesia,* Ithaca NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia ProgramNoorhaidi Hassan, 2006, *Laskar Jihad*,

[226] ICG, 2007, *op.cit*.

consultation. The first step should be to choose someone to meet with those in authority and invite them to discuss the problem. If they agreed to defend the Muslims, they deserve obedience. If they refused, and if you had the necessary resources and strength, then it is permissible for you to rebel against them and form a separate Muslim government. But if you do not have the requisite strength, you should just be patient. He also said that if the Mujahidin did not have an *imama* (leader), they would have to appoint someone temporarily to lead the battle.[227]

Shaikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi, Ja'far's teacher in Yemen, said Indonesian Muslims had an individual obligation to defend fellow Muslims as Muslim outside Indonesia had a collective obligation to help, but he set six conditions: (1) that Muslims have the capacity to fight the *kafir* (infidel); (2) that the jihad not lead to conflict within the Muslim community; (3) that the mobilization for the Jihad be based purely on religion; (4) that the Jihad be based on Salafi principles and not be conducted under *hizbiyah*(party) flag; (5) that it not distract Muslims from studying true religion; and (6) that it not be used for personal gain or to obtain political positions. Shaikh Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali from Medina said the jihad was an obligation for all Muslims because their brothers were being attacked by Christians and jihad to help Muslims under attack for religious reasons was always obligatory; he also later stated that he had also set out a consultation process that should be followed and that Ja'far reportedly failed to heed his suggestion. Shaikh Salih al-Suhaimi from Medina said that the first priority should be to advise the Muslim community on the Salafi methodology, as it would only be possible to continue with jihad if this was contemplated. If Muslims did not have the capacity to wage Jihad, they should make peace with the *kafirs* as the Prophet did with idolaters.[228]

Shaikh Wahid al-Jabiri said it was permissible under Islamic law to defend Muslims under attack "but you know better than I about what is happening in your country." Finally, Shaikh Muhammad bin Hadi al-Madkhali in Medina also said: "If your government tries to prevent you from waging jihad to protect your brothers, then you must not obey."

After the receipt of these fatwas, Thalib made the decision to establish LJ out of the youth who were the security guards for the Forum during the mass rallies earlier in the year. He proclaimed the Muslim year 1421 the year of Jihad and, at a rally in Yogyakarta on January 30, 2000, the forum issued a resolution giving the government three months to settle the Maluku conflict. On February12, Thalib sent seven Forum members to Ambon to

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[227]*Idem*

[228]*Idem*

investigate the nature of the conflict and simultaneously establish posts for recruiting mujahidin/fighters. On April6, 2000, after the government had failed to meet his deadline, he announced establishment of LJ.[229]

The most important aspect of the ulama response, however, is the fact that their approval was conditional on a defensive jihad, intended to assist Muslims in the face of attacks by Christians. None of the Salafi ulama approved an attack where the LJ was the initiator. Moreover, some of them even laid down certain requirements without which the jihad would be illegitimate. Syeikh Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad, for instance, said that the jihad should not threaten other Muslims, while Syeikh Ahmad al-Najm and Syeikh Salih al-Suhaimi required the availability of power and strength before carrying out the jihad.[230]

Thalib argues that by providing the fatwa, the jihad was religiously justified. However, it is clear that the fatwa was not a starting point for Thalib to declare the jihad. In other words, he did not seek the fatwa before he decided to declare the jihad but did so, in fact, in reverse order. The fatwas themselves appeared after the mass rally in April 2000. Syeikh Muhammad Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, for instance, mentioned in his fatwa that Thalib's group, LJ, had already taken the proper steps, including the program of *tabligh Akbar* and meeting with President Abdurrahman Wahid, before carrying out the jihad.[231]

The appearance of fatwa after the establishment of the LJ provides grounds for explaining that Thalib's insistence on carrying out the jihad in Ambon was motivated more by his experience in Afghanistan than his status as Salafi ulama. Thalib was deeply distressed and angered by what had happened to Muslims in Ambon as he had been about the situation in Afghanistan. He had already made his decision before the fatwa was issued. However, since Thalib is a member of the Salafi network, he needed endorsement from the highest ranking Salafi scholars and his past history suggested that he would not have crossed the "border"without this endorsement. Had the Salafi ulama not issued the fatwa supporting the jihad, Thalib would have abrogated it.[232]

4. Ja'far Thalib at a Crossroad

LJ was dissolved, formally, on October 7, 2002. However, this was not public knowledge until October16, 2002, a few days after BB1. Ja'far Thalib argues that FKAWJ's legislative board

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[229]*Idem.*
[230] Saiful Umam, 2006, *op.cit.*
[231] Noorhaidi Hassan, 2006, *op.cit*
[232] Saiful Umam, 2006, *op.cit.*

decided to dissolve the LJ at a meeting in Yogyakarta from October 3-7, 2002. The main reason for dissolving LJ, according to Thalib, was LJ members' increasing involvement in political maneuvers. The second reason was the fatwa from Syeikh Rabi Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, one of the seven Salafi ulama who had previously issued the fatwa about Jihad in Ambon. The dissolution was very abrupt and many people were surprised because when it happened, thousands of the LJ *mujahidin* were still in Ambon. It resulted in an assumption that Thalib's decision was due to the Indonesian government's persuasion or suppression.[233] If we look-back to the beginning of LJ until its dissolution, it had clearly benefited from the domestic political situation and the contest of wills between President Wahid and the military. The military was angry at the President for stripping it of its political role and were certainly looking for ways to discredit his administration. That in itself is alarming. The fact that a growing greenfaction in the military might also have played a role is another reason for concern. However, it was not just the military that appeared indifferent or complicit. Many mainstream politicians not only failed to stop Thalib's force but endorsed them. Anti-secessionist and nationalist sentiments were very heart-felt by the political leaders, and Thalib was viewed as a hero by both co-religionists and nationalists alike. Thalib has therefore enjoyed considerable protection and impunity.[234]

After the 9/11 attack and the US government's launch of its war against terrorism, the Indonesian government was under pressure to join the anti-terrorism campaign as well as to take firm action in cracking down on suspected extremist Muslim groups. Thalib himself was reported by several mass-media as having a connection to Osama bin Laden and the LJ was suspected of providing a niche for the al-Qaeda in Indonesia.[235] However, Thalib clearly rejected the relationship between the LJ and al-Qaeda. According to Tempo Magazine, bin Laden who met Thalib in 1987, offered funding to LJ, but Thalib turned it down, though the JI's Laskar Mujahidin did not. Thalib explains that he turned it down because he questioned bin Laden's piety, asserting that bin Laden is very empty about the knowledge of religion. Thalib went to great pains to distance himself from bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network, though he had never previously done so. As I mentioned above, Thalib explains that most of LJ's fund were raised through sources in the Muslim community. Thalib says:

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[233] Saiful Umam, 2006, *op.cit*.

[234]*Idem*

[235] See for example; the report of Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez. "Qaeda Mobbing into Indonesia, Official Fear, "*The New York Times,* 23 January 2002. See also Andrew Marshall 'The Threat of Ja'far", in *The New York Times Magazine*, 20 March 2002.

> *LJ does not have ties with al-Qaeda or any organizations that are associated with Osama bin Laden or any form or part of his network. LJ distances itself from Osama bin Laden and his followers.*[236]

Although Thalib was briefly detained for ordering the stoning of an adulterer in mid-2001, he was released immediately. Following the March 2002 truce in the conflict area, there were a number of attacks and bombings attributed to the LJ, which alleged that it was trying to sabotage the agreement. In April 2002, Thalib was again arrested; this time for his allegation that President Megawati's regime[237] was cooperating with the RMS (Republic of South Moluccas) secessionist group. Thalib was charged with having insulted the president and as a provocateur of a religious and communal conflict. Even then, the country's Islamist vice-president, Hamzah Haz, visited Thalib in jail in an apparent display of solidarity. LJ's second in command, Ayip Syafruddin, continued to live and operate freely, and the LJ expanded its operations into Sulawesi, Irian Jaya and briefly (but unsuccessfully) in Aceh. It has more than 70 offices around the country. If anything, because of its jihad in the Moluccas, LJ grew in popularity and claimed to have roughly 10,000 members. On January 30, 2003, Thalib was acquitted of all charges that he incited violence in Moluccas after the court decided that he was not guilty.[238] In analyzing the possible connection between the detainment, the release and the dissolution of LJ as well as the court's verdict that Thalib was not guilty, some argue that there was a back-room deal between the Indonesian government and Thalib. In short, Thalib would be released if he dissolved LJ.[239]

Although this may have been the case, the evidence suggests that the dissolution of LJ was based more on Salafi principles, as Thalib argued, than on pressure from the Indonesian government. After Thalib became popular as its, he was invited to several religious gatherings where he met and socialized with non-Salafi Muslims. Additionally, Thalib was also often interviewed by mass media so that his face frequently appeared on television as well as in printed-newspapers and magazines. Thalib's increasing personal popularity was not acceptable to the majority of Salafi members. Umar Sewed who was previously Thalib's close ally in the early 1990s, for example, criticized all Thalib's activities. Another member from the Salafi network, Qumar Suaidi wrote a media piece, "Ja'far *Thalib has left us*"consisting an explanation that Thalib has deviated from the Salafi principles. Being

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[236]Saiful Umam, 2006, *op.cit.*
[237] Megawati (previously vice-president) becomes president after the impeachment of President Gus Dur on July 23,2001.
[238]Saiful Umam, 2006, *op.cit.*
[239]*Idem*

disappointed with an apparent change inThalib's actions, many members of the Salafi relayed their views to Syeikh Rabi Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. The Syeikh responded quickly to the report in a long statement recorded on a cassette. He expressed regret for Thalib's behavior and for recent developments in relation to jihad. Al-Madkhali once said: "*If you (Thalib) continue, it means you have joined the brotherhood [...]. And the real Salafis will shun you*."[240] After Thalib received the cassette, he and LJ committee members met with the FKAWJ in the early October 2002 to discuss the group's future. Thalib insisted on the dissolution of the LJ. Based on this, we can also say that if there had been no fatwa from the Syeikh, it is very likely that Thalib would have continued his jihad, though there might have been repression from the Indonesian government. As I noted earlier, when Thalib started the jihad, he continued to deploy LJ members despite the fact that President Abdurrahman Wahid had prohibited it.[241]

After its dissolution, LJ made a show of withdrawing 300 troops from Ambon Moluccas though a fraction remained in place there along with paramilitaries in Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. Moreover, LJ's umbrella organization, the FKWAJ, still operates with its offices in 70 cities around the country, and it runs businesses and several Islamic schools (*madrasah*). [242]

JIHAD TRAJECTORY OF MATAHARITIMOER

1. *Fir'aun* and the un-Islamic ruler

Historically in Islamic tradition, *Fir'aun* (Pharaoh) has become a personal name rather than a title, referring to the ruler of Egypt at the time of Moses. The depiction of Fir'aun in the Qur'an as the tyrant, who terrorized Moses and his people until God drowned him in the Red Sea in pursuit of the Israelites, made the Fir'aun a bad symbol. In several Islamic groups and among Muslim figures, Fir'aun continues to be used to describe political leaders whose behavior is deemed un-Islamic. Khalid al-Islambuly, for instance, most famous as the leader of a group that murdered Anwar al-Sadat, the President of Egypt, in 1991 called out after the killing "*My name is Khalid al-Islambuli. I have killed Fir'aun. And I am not afraid to die.*"[243]

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[240] Quoted from ICG, September 2004, p.18. The brotherhood here means the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*), an international organization based in Egypt and founded for its first time by Hassan al-Bana.
[241] Saiful Umam, 2006, *op.cit*.
[242]*Idem.*
[243] Petra M Sijpestein, "Building Egyptian Identity", in Asad Ahmed et al (eds), 2011, *The Islamic Scholarly Tradition*, The Netherlands: Brill.

After he finished his junior high school, Mataharitimoer lived on the street and left his poorparents. He enjoyed staying in a mosque that would later change his life as he became involved in an Islamic underground-movement, NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia*). The movement's goal was to fight against Fir'aun, Suharto's authoritarian regime, and to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state. Its real vision is a country based on Islam where the highest law is the Qur'an and prophet'sHadith. In 1949, Indonesia had no government as a result of the Renville Agreement (a Dutch-Indonesian accord which aimed at resolving unsettled disputes from a previous settlement). The vision and mission of the NII seemed ideal to Imam Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (1905-1962) at that time. The Medina Chapter, inaugurated by Prophet Muhammas, inspired his vision of an Islamic state. During the time of the Prophet, Medina was a just state for Muslims, Jews, Christians and anyone else who lived there.[244]

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[244]*Idem.*

2. Hijrah, a Gateway to the Path of Jihad

Hijrah is an Arabic word literally meaning emigration, moving from one place to another and moving from any condition that is against God's rules to a condition that obeys God's rules in every aspect of life. In the history of Islam, in the time of Prophet Muhammad, the term *Hijrah* carried a special meaning as it referred to the migration of Muslims from the city of Mecca to Medina. In that time, many hijrahs were performed. It began with the hijrah of the Muslims from Mecca to Habsyah (nowadays Ethiopia). The Hijrah was their only way of escaping the cruelty of the Quraisy who were infidels. Another hijrah was performed from Mecca to Medina with Prophet Muhammad. This hijrah was necessary as the Muslims were oppressed. Their *da'wah* (preaching) movements were restricted. They were also treated cruelly in Mecca.[245] However, in the extremist Muslim group, the word *Hijrah* has a narrow meaning. They interpret *Hijrah* merely as the migration of an individual Muslim into an extremist group through particularly rituals (preaching, oaths, praying, etc.).

NII also encourages participation in what it calls *musyahadah hijrah*, whereby a member exchanges his Indonesian citizenship for citizenship in NII/Indonesian Islamic state. MT joined the *musyahadah hijrah* ritual for about two days. The ritual consists of NI's senior members at each level ranging from village, regional and central level preaching to the group and ends with the bai'at (declaring allegiance to NII's leader). After Hijrah, as MT recalls, he felt strongly about his involvement in NII as he felt he had found the medium by which he could carry out his previous desire to be involved in jihad. He tirelessly served as a head of *Remaja Masjid* (Young members of the Mosque) and benefitted from this position by preaching NII's ideology and recruiting new members. MT extended his network to schools (mostly SMP and SMA) surrounding his mosque. After losing contact with several young preachers from NII, he alone tried to extent his network by using religious books that had been mushrooming between 1991 and 1992 and attending discussions in al-A'raf mosque in Kwitang Jakarta to enhance his knowledge of Islamic teachings.[246]

Having separated formally from NII for a year due to security reasons (after several NII members were captured by Indonesian police), many of NII's elites came to MT asking that his network in Jakarta (Cengkareng, Tanjung Priok, Matraman, Klender and Cikarang) come under their organization. The police initially suspected this hidden and underground movement that uses

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[245] Foead BS, 2008, *Al-Hijra (Immigration)*, in http://www.icgc.info/Lectures/Al-Hijra.html
[246] Mataharitimoer, interview

mosques for their base-camp. It started when an Ustadz, who taught MT, after feeling hurt to MT and his network returned to his Pesantren in Bangil East Java and spread any information that MT's movement (NII) was religiously mislead. This led people in MT's surrounding Mosque became aware of NII and its penetration in the mosques. MT and his colleagues were subject to a 3 days interrogation by the police investigating the suspected movement.

MT then decided to run-away from the mosque one night. He previously instructed to his 2 right-hand men to coordinate his network. MT tried to look for another area where he would be more freely able to spread his network. He moved from one place to another ranging from Sukabumi, Depok, Ciputat, and Cikarang. Finally, he returned to East Jakarta. MT successfully reached an elite NII group and served as a secretary of internal affairs. He was responsible for recruiting and educating the movement's members in Jabodetabek, several areas of West Java, East Java, Central Java, Madura and even Aceh.

3. Mataharitimoer at Crossroad

Unfortunately, after being involved in its elite group, MT found so many ironies that influenced his commitment to that movement. He initially doubted NII's vision and mission. All new NII members are required to undergo "sin cleansing" rituals and pledge their commitment to establishing an Islamic state. They are obliged to pay monthly contributions to the group's leader. MT later realized that he was used by the group as cash cow, to enrich the group's leaders, and pay for their luxurious lifestyle. In other words, he had become a victim of extortion. His conflict with several elites also strengthened his desire to leave the movement. MT says:

> *The most principle deviation is that they do many things to harm the image of Islam. They think that only their group is representative of the truth and Islam. They hardly accept criticism and rely more on violence than dialogue to spread their message. This runs contrary to Islam as a religion that aims to spread love to the world or widely-known among Muslims as blessing for all over the world or rahmatan lil 'alamin).*[247]

However, after realizing his *niyat* (intention), MT and his colleagues who shared the same criticism of the group published

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[247] Ayu Arman, 2007, *Leaving the NII: an Interview with Mataharitimoer*, 15 September 2007. See:
http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=21670&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0. (Accessed on 14 Dec 2009)

a journal on culture that was distributed internally to NII members. The journal also circulated critiques of NII' elite's beliefs, which led the group to suspect that MT and his colleague's activities, were subversive and dangerous to the existence of the movement. Several elite figures from NII tried to encourage all members not to read the journal as well as not to follow what MT and his colleagues had done. The journal was then banned but MT continued to publish it only by changing the name.

His journal's ban marked the end of MT's activism in NII. It did not, however, lead him to directly leave the movement. There were so many activists who came to him asking his advice about their current status. They mostly wanted to leave but were not brave enough to do so. MT recalls that this could be attributed to the fact that according to NII, if one member leaves the organization, he has become an apostate (*murtad*), although he might still consider himself a practicing Muslim. MT promised them to give his support.

To protect himself and other members who followed him in leaving the NII, MT asked for support from one Pesantren that he had visited when he was still an active NII member. Together with kyai and students from this Pesantren, MT has been active in helping active NII members if they want to leave NII as well as helping former members regarding what they will do in the post-activism period. This has been done under an organization namely the ICDW, Indonesian Center for Deradicalization and Wisdom.

After almost ten years in hiding, he has re-emerged with his surprising autobiography, which discusses his horrifying experience in a 365 page novel.[248] In an interview with Ayu Arman, a freelance journalist in Jakarta, September 11, 2007 (exposed by Common Ground News Service - CGNews), MT said that he was still traumatized by the movement's violent methods. He had been terrorized, slandered, beaten, caged and even bribed by the NII in order to prevent him from leaving.[249] MT recalls:

> *If I still felt vengeful, I would do a lot more than just write a novel. I would reveal their secrets and divulge the whereabouts of NII leaders. But I haven't done that. As for dealing with the trauma,*

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[248] Mataharitimoer, 2007, *Jihad Terlarang: Cerita Dari Bawah Tanah*, Jakarta: Pustaka Kayla.

[249249] Ayu Arman, 2007, *Leaving the NII: an Interview with Mataharitimoer*, 15 September 2007. See: http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=21670&lan=en&sid=1&sp=0. (Accessed on 14 Dec 2009)

frankly speaking, I am still traumatized today by the movement's violent methods. I have been terrorized, slandered, beaten, caged and even bribed by the NII in order to prevent me from leaving.[250]

DISCUSSION

Three Routes in the Jihad Trajectory

I have presented transformation of jihad through the life-story narratives of several former extremist Muslims. Such transformation is a complex phenomenon that involves multiple factors. The process model proposed by Horgan (2005) helps us to capture three routes as important aspects of the transformation of Jihad, i.e., introduction (how and why they got interested in jihad and joined extremist groups), radicalization and engagement (how and why they progressed in the groups), deradicalization and disengagement (how and why they later decided to renounce extremism). Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, Ja'far Thalib and Mataharitimoer's personal trajectories in extremist activities demonstrates three routes by which "ordinary" individuals can come to commit terrible and extraordinary acts of extremism, violence and even terror. These routes are introduction, engagement and disengagement.

(1) Nasir Abas's initial introduction to violent jihad was made by way of reading newspaper articles aboutthewar in Afghanistan and the mujahidin. This introduction was made largely thanks to the MIS (Ma'had Ittibaus Sunnah), where Abas later met Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Sungkar sent Abas to join the JI's three-year military training program in Afghanistan in 1988. **(2)** Abas's engagement in extremism began after his Afghani connections asked him to establish the Hudaibiyah Training camp in Moro, Southern Philippines in 1994 where Abas became a training instructor for the Moro Nation Freedom Fighter until the end of 1996. After his success there, Abas was appointed *Wakalah* (regency commander of JI) in 1997. In 2000, together with his Afhgani connection, Abas initiated the establishment of the Uhud Project from the JI subdivision, sending fighters to Ambon and Poso where there was communal conflict between Muslims and Christians. In 2001, Abas was appointed the leader of JI's Mantiqi 3 (regional divisions, which encompassed Sabah in Malaysia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Tarakan and Nunukan (East Kalimantan) and Palu (Central Sulawesi) in Indonesia. **(3)** Abas's disengagement from terrorism involved him leaving behind the shared values, attitudes and

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[250] Mataharitimoer, interview

aspirations that had been carefully forged while he was a JI member. During the initial planning of the JI's bombings, Abas began to share his rejection but could do nothing, as it required a group decision. He was also not directly involved in the bombings. When the Indonesian police caught Abas, he first refused to cooperate with the police whom he accused of being *kafir* (infidels). Later, Abas was morally shocked when the police showed moral and religious piety during the investigation. After this, Abas began to feel guilty and became more open to the police especially about uncovering his group that was very helpful to catch other suspect terrorists. In addition, incentives promised by the police (i.e. reducing his prison time, etc.) also influenced Abas'decision.

(1) Ali Imron's initial introduction to violent jihad was made by way of watching jihadi videos. He recalls: "*Having watched the video, I felt the need to defend Islam and my fellow Muslims from the evil acts committed by the enemies of Islam such as in Palestine and Afghanistan.*" This introduction was made largely thanks to Imron's elder brother Ali Ghufron, who was then in exile in Malaysia together with one of the founders, Abdullah Sungkar. Ghufron sent Imron to join the JI's three-year military training program in Afghanistan in 1991. **(2)** Imron's engagement in terrorism began after his Afghani connections asked him to join a series of deadly missions in Indonesia's Ambon in 1999, then fraught with intermittent communal violence in 1999, including blowing up the ambassadors to the Philippines residence, Imam Bonjol in August 2000, the bombing attacks against churches on Christmas Eve in December 2000 and finally BB1 in 2002 that killed more than 200 people, mostly foreigners. **(3)** Imron's disengagement from terrorism involved him leaving behind the shared values, attitudes and aspirations that had been carefully forged while he was a member of the JI. During his time on the run from the Indonesian police, Imron started to realize that terrorist violence per-se, including the Bali bombing, rarely, if ever, managed to achieve its aims. In this regard, he recalls: "*Jihad, by blowing up Bali, is very debatable among Muslims. Some Muslims agree with it and some do not. I was wrong and I now regret it.*" Imron goes on to say that he wishes to apologize to the victims, their families, the people of Bali, the government of Indonesia and the Muslim community. In addition, incentives promised by the police (i.e. reducing his prison time etc.) also influenced Imron's decision.

(1) Ja'far Thalib's initial introduction to violent jihad was made by way of studying in LIPIA, the Indonesian Islamic Institute sponsored by Saudi Arabia (1986-1987), which is a well-known radically-prone institution (wahabi-ideology campus), and then in the Maududi Islamic Institute, Lahore, Pakistan (1987-1989) and during the times Thalib joined the struggling groups for

Afghanistan; Hikmatyar, Sayyaf and Rabbani, and then studied in Yemen (1991).**(2)** Thalib's engagement in extremism began after his Yemeni connections asked him to establish an Indonesian-Salafi network that refers to the same group in Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 1994. Thalib also established a Pesantren in Yogyakarta where he preached and spread Salafi's thought. In February 1998, Thalib held *takbir akbar* in Solo, declaring the establishment of FKAWJ and its military wing, the Laskar Jihad (LJ). In March 2000, the LJ held military training in Surabaya, Gresik, Malang, Madiun, Jombang, Solo and Yogya, and then held national training in Bogor on April 7-17, 2000. On April 6, 2000, the LJ held a demonstration in front of Istana Negara and demanded a dialogue with President Gus Dur. At the end of April and middle May 2000, the LJ sent about 3000 fighters to Ambon and Poso. In March 2001, the LJ executed *Hukuman Rajam* (Stoning to death) in Ambon after LJ implemented *shari'ah* among Muslim communities there. **(3)** Thalib's disengagement from extremism involved him leaving behind the shared values, attitudes and aspirations that had been carefully forged, through the dissolution of LJ based not only on religious but also political reasons. Thalib argues that the main reason for the dissolution was an increasing trend of involvement in political maneuvers among the LJ members. The second reason was the fatwa from Syeikh Rabi Ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, one of the seven Salafi ulama who previously issued the fatwa about Jihad in Ambon. However, there was also strong assumption that that Thalib's decision was due to the Indonesian government's persuasion or suppression. In analyzing possible connections between the detainment of Thalib, the release and the dissolution of the LJ and FKAWJ as well as the court's verdict that Thalib was not guilty, some argued that there was a back-room deal between the Indonesian government and Thalib. In short, Thalib would be released if he dissolved LJ.

(1) Mataharitimoer's (MT) initial introduction to violent jihad was made by way of feeling disappointed with the Suharto's authoritarian regime and joining a limited Islamic group discussion (*liqo'*) in a mosque where he met several NII activists. **(2)** MT's engagement in extremism began after having separated formally from NII's *liqo* for a year in 1992, several elite NII figures came to MT asking about his network in Jakarta to be linked with their network. However, to avoid the Indonesian police who tried to capture the NII activists, MT then moved from one place to another, ranging from Sukabumi, Depok, Ciputat, and Cikarang and finally he returned to East Jakarta. MT successfully entered the elite NII group and served as a secretary of internal affairs. He was tasked with recruiting and training NII members in Jabodetabek, several areas in West Java, East Java, Central Java, Madura and even Aceh. **(3)** MT's disengagement from extremism involved him leaving the shared values, attitudes

and aspirations that had been carefully forged while he was still an NII activist. After being involved in its elite group, MT found so many deviant behaviors among the elite group that influenced his commitment to NII. MT initially questioned NII's activism. All new NII members are required to undergo "sin cleansing" rituals and pledge to help establish an Islamic state. They are obliged to pay monthly contributions to the group's leader. MT later realized that he was used by the group as cash cow, to enrich the elite group's leaders, and pay for their luxurious lifestyle. In other words, MT had become a victim of extortion. His conflict with several elites also strengthened his desire to leave. Since 1997, MT has gradually left NII. However, for security reasons, it was not until 2007 when MT publicly declared his departure from NII.

Based on these three routes in jihad trajectories, **it supports the process model's assumption that motivation in each route (introduction, radicalization-engagement and deradicalization/disengagement) are different and even motivation in several activities in sub-routes are somehow different**. For example, Ali Imron's motivation in joining extremist groups was different from the motivation for participating in extremist and violent acts. Imron's motivation for conducting terrorist acts in Mojokerto (the church bombings) and his involvement in BB1 were also different. In Mojokerto, it was to avenge the killing of Muslims in Ambon. In Bali, however, Imron was to some extent coerced into participating by his brother and the operational-group. Initially, Imron wanted to conduct jihad through a fight against Soviet Union troops in Afghanistan (which has a clear justification in Qur'an) and gain opportunity to study abroad, not bomb civilian targets in Indonesia. Imron obviously did not know that he would join JI when he first left Lamongan as JI did not yet exist then; it seems that he did not even know that there was an oath (*bai"at*) to join the DI (Imron only realized this after he arrived in Afghanistan). Even following the establishment of the JI, Imron did not know that he would eventually be involved in the bombing of civilian targets as JI's central leadership was not fully involved in BB1. It was masterminded by a small younger group within the JI, particularly Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi.[251] PUPJI, the ideology if the JI itself does not condone terrorist acts like bombing civilian targets although it justifies the use of military force to form an Islamic state.

The above three routes of the Jihad trajectories also share the common account that extremism is essentially done in a group context and that individual behavior is subordinated to

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[251] Those three master-minds were already given the death penalty in 2006. Zachary ABuza, 2006, *op.cit.*

the group. Nasir Abas, for example, was disagreeing with the content of bin Laden's fatwa to kill American targets although they were not armed. This fatwa then became likely a letter of invitation for JI to conduct the bombings. Other JI members such as Abu Rusdan and Musthafa also share a similar opinion about the fatwa. Abas explains that the group had broken and fallen under the spell of bin Laden. However, since more dominant figures in JI (Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Hambali) endorsed the fatwa, JI decided to accept the fatwa's direction to kill American civilian target in Indonesia.

Imron's routes also share similar accounts. Although Imron ultimately was involved in the attacks on civilian targets, his involvement seems to have been motivated by group solidarity rather than his own initiative. Imron says: "*The bombing of churches was not my idea although I was one of the perpetrators*." Imron recognizes that prior to BB1 he once told Ali Ghufron that bombing civilian targets would harm JI's development. Ghufron agreed but he later changed his mind and proceeded with plans to bomb the civilian targets in Bali. Imron recalls:

> *Maybe Ali Ghufron had learned from what happened to our brethren in Malaysia (arrest) and to Pesantren Lukman Hakim in Johor Bahru (being closed down), as when he came to Lamongan he called us to meeting and decided that Mubarok and I had to concentrate on the Pesantren al-Islam, and he would not include us in future terroracts such as church bombings. But not long after the decision was made; Ghufron involved us in BB1.*[252]

Despite Imron's reluctance to attack the civilian target, Imron joined the BB1 operation as he felt that he "had to follow the group's decision based on group solidarity."[253]

In the case of Ja'far Thalib, his involvement in extremism was brought about through the establishment of LJ, which was motivated by, one among many, the fatwa from ulama of Salafi group in the Middle East. In short, Thalib conducted his violent jihad under the banner of the Salafi group in a broader context in which he positioned himself as well as LJ as the subordinate of several Salafi scholars and Salafi groups abroad. Fatwa, either as the cause or to justify the violent-jihad, can be seen as symbolic catalysts of religious subordination.

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[252] Ali Imron, interview, 2010
[253] *Idem*

For the case of the ideologically-driven group, the articulation by credible-religious authorities such as through *fatwa* (edict), of theologically grounded-imperatives for renouncing radicalism could be an important factor in catalyzing the decision to leave the religiously-radical group.

Liminal-Situation and the Transformation of Jihad

I argued at the beginning of this chapter that the Jihad trajectories signified a "liminal situation" that brought about a center meaning structure for the Muslim extremists that organized the other activities in their life. The liminal-situation was a pivotal period for the actors, I argue, because it consisted of two key aspects: ***first,*** the nature of highrisk violent jihad activism, which involves high-levels of "cost" and "risk" in its involvement that brings strong significance to the actor's decision through engaging high level emotions and reasons; and ***second***, through the use of religious symbols and meaning in the involvement, as reflected in the use of the term *new-form-of-jihad*, that impacts actors powerfully. The combination of both aspects resulted in the creation of a pivotal meaning structure as reflected in the use of a marker referring to a belief that those who transformed their jihad into new-form-of-jihad are still also seen as jihad actor/activist or *mujahid*. It also marked the key life phase of the jihad actor by symbolically distinguishing between their life before and after liminal situation of jihad.

The above informants decided to involve in the violent-jihad atdifferent times and situations and in response to different causes or motives. Instead of summarizing the life story narratives of the individual informants, which have already been presented in this chapter, I will discuss the different ways of transformation of Jihad as narrated by the different actors in this section. I will also apply the theory of pull and push factors proposed by Bjorgo (2009).

The liminal situation in Nasir Abas' jihad period began to transform into a new jihad after the appointment of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as a new leader of the JI following the death of Abdullah Sungkar in 1993. Abas says:

> *To be honest, I highly respected ustadz Abu. He has deep knowledge about Islamic teaching. He is also a wise figure. However, I thought he was not the right person to lead JI. In my opinion, he is likely to be a thinker not a leader. He lacks the capacity to make any important decisions about*

> *the group and seems to be highly influenced by his*
> *right-hand figures.*[254]

His disillusionment with the JI leadership arose again after he had different opinion about Osama bin Laden's fatwa in 1998 and saw that Abu Bakar Ba'ashir and his right-hand figure Hambali continued to endorse the fatwa and bomb civilian targets, thereby ignoring objections from Abas and other JI members such as Abu Rusdan, Mushthafa, etc. Abas himself was not directly involved in the bombings from planning to execution. He was captured by the police due to his position as the Head of JI's Mantiqi 3 and was accused of having knowledge about the bombing from its initial process.

Abas also shared his disagreement with the JI Leadership when in 2000 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir established the MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia)[255] and became its leader. Abas said that Ba'asyir's right-hand figure Ustadz Abu Jibril played a dominant role in the process of establishing MMI and the appointment of Ba'asyir as its leader. Abas says:

> *At that time we already had a Jihad group, JI. It*
> *covers Southeast Asia through Mantiqi 1, 2, 3.*
> *Therefore, I did not think that we needed a new*
> *group that only covers Indonesia.*[256]

Abas's disillusionment with JI's leadership, his mental pressure during and after he was captured by the police and also any promising incentives from the Indonesian police if he cooperated with police (i.e. reduction his sentence and other kind of incentives) led to his decision to renounce violent Jihad and help the Indonesian police. Following this decision, Abas was released after several months in jail. The assumption about material incentives was also proven. Additionally, Abas' activities to help police during the capture and investigation into who was involved in the bombings and uncover JI's network, makes money for him from the police. It was also evidently known through information from the wiki-leaks that in 2006 the Indonesian police asked the US government to remove Abas from the US and UN (United Nations) list of terrorists.[257]The proposal mentioned several reasons:

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[254] Nasir Abas, interview, 2010.

[255]The Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI), or Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, established in Yogyakarta in 2000 is an umbrella organization of IndonesianIslamist groups. MMI is headed by Abu Bakar Bashir, the former leader of JI. Known and influential figure of MMI includes Muhammad Iqbal also known as Ustadz Abu Jibril who has called for people to "*Destroy America and its allies! Kill those who desecrate Islam*!" at a public rally in May 2005.

[256] Nasir Abas, Interview, Jakarta, 2010.

[257] See http://cables.mrkva.eu/cable.php?id=67575

While he was in prison and especially after finishinghissentence, Mr. Nasir Abbas realized themistakes he had made so far and has been intensely assisting Indonesian Law Enforcement especially the Indonesian National Police in revealing Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah Organization, especiallyin destroying terrorism acts in bombing cases, including being directly involved in planning and executing the raid of Dr. Azahari by INP Bomb Task Force/Special Detachment 88/AT.

c. Mr. Nasir Abbas is presently very active in:

-Testifying in courts thatreveal all information related to the terrorist networks that had been unknown to Law Enforcements/Governments in the Southeast Asia.

-Conducting re-education program both forthose convicted of terrorist activities and to other members of Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah Organization.

-Giving enlightenment seminars and actively participating in scientific discussions to reduce radicalism and militant ideologies that develop in the society in various Pesantren (Islamic Boarding Schools) and universities in Indonesia as well as in various electronic and printed media.

-Being a speaker or guest lecturer atvarious counter-terrorism trainings and courses for members of INP, the Republic of Indonesia's law enforcement agency as well as of countries in the world held by JCLEC (Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation) in Semarang and Terror Eradication Coordination Desk of the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security of the Republic Indonesia.

d. Also, Mr. Nasir Abbas has written various articles thatspeak against terrorism. Moreover, he has written a book, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, (translation: Exposing Jamaah Islamiyah), which has been translated into English with the title, Unveiling Jamaah Islamiyah: Confession of an ex - JI Member.

> *In relation to the above matters and due to various requests for enlightenment seminars from various law enforcement agencies around the world, in order to utilize the ability and commitment of Mr. Nasir Abbas to eradicate terrorism in the world, it is hereby suggested that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia propose the de-listing of Mr. Nasir Abbas from the Terrorist List stipulated in the 1267 (Al-Qaida/Taliban) Committee and Terrorist List of United States Treasury (Liste Bush 39).*

Ali Imron's story shared several aspects. Despite Ali Ghufron's high-level of influence on his previous decision to be involved in violent jihadism and activities, Imron's questioning of the need to bomb Bali, the mental stress that he suffered while on the run, and after he was captured upon seeing his innocent friends also captured because they had helped him either directly or indirectly, and seeing his brothers being handcuffed and otherwise humiliated, led to his decision to cooperate with the police, and suggests that he was not overwhelmingly influenced by Imam Samudra's interpretation of jihad (which allows indiscriminate killings of civilians in Indonesian). For these reasons, it was, perhaps, easier for Imron to disengage and renounce Samudra's interpretation of jihad than other BB1 perpetrators.

In the luminal situation of violent jihad groups like JI, Imron's transformation of violent jihad was also marked by physical disengagement. Imron moved from one place to another during his escape while hiding. Imron might have suffered from financial problems during his escape but mental pressure appears to have been more affected by the dramatic change in the Indonesian police force's attitude to terrorism in response to intense international political pressure. On the run, listening to radio reports on how serious the Indonesian police were about capturing all the perpetrators, Imron thoughthe could no longer stay on run. He says:

The arrest of Amrozi placed heavy pressure on me. I thought that I would be captured by the police sooner or later."

In the case of Ja'far Umar Thalib, the liminal situation of LJ's violent jihad led to more complicated situation. After the religious pressure from Salafi ulama's fatwa following the disappointment of Salafi members concerning the media darling behavior of Thalib and the non-religious pressure that took place in the form of the Indonesian government, LJ was pressured into ceasing their violent jihad activism in the conflict area.

The religious pressure that led the Salafi ulama to issue the fatwa was initiated when Ja'far's personal popularity was growing; this was not acceptable for Salafi members. Umar Sewed, for instance, wrote that "Ja'far *telah meninggalkan kita*/Ja'farThalib has left us," meaning that he had deviated from Salafi principles. Disappointed with an apparent change in Thalib's actions, the Salafi members relayed their views to Sheikh ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, who responded to the report in a long statement recorded on a cassette, expressing regret for Thalib's behavior and for recent developments in relation to jihad. The Shaikh said "*if you continue it means you have joined the Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) [...] and thereal Salafi will shun you.*"[258] After receiving that cassette, Thalib and LJ and FKAWJ committee members met in early October 2002 and discussed the future of the group. Thalib insisted on dissolving the LJ as well as FKAWJ. Therefore, if there had been no fatwa from the Sheikh, it was very likely that Thalib would continue his jihad, though there might have been repression from the government. As previously mentioned, when Thalib started his jihad, he continued deploying LJ members despite the fact that President Gus Dur had prohibited it. However, at the same time there was also another pressure from the government. It came from a political deal between Thalib and the government. On May 4, 2002, Thalib was detained. He was charged with having insulted the president and with provoking a religious conflict. But after several days in jail, Thalib was released and on January 30, 2003, the court decided that he was not guilty. In analyzing possible connection between his detainment, release, dissolution of LJ and FKAWJ, and the court verdict that Thalib was not guilty, some argued that there was a deal between the government and Thalib. In other words, Thalib would be released if he dissolved LJ.[259]

In the case of Mataharitimoer/MT, the liminal situation of the NII jihad, three things marked MT's transformation of jihad, namely disillusionment with group hypocrisy, objection to group direction and a change in circumstance. In 1995 about 6 years after joining the NII undergrounded movement; he started to reach the elite groups. Unfortunately, MT also started to find many ironies that influenced his commitment to that movement. He initially criticized NII's vision and mission and saw the hypocrisy among NII several leaders. All new NII members are required to undergo "sin cleansing" rituals and pledge to help establish an Islamic state. They are also obliged to pay monthly contributions to the group's leader, including bystealing from the infidels (those who are not part of their group). MT later realized that he was being used by the group as cash cow, to enrich the group's leaders, and pay for their luxurious lifestyle. In other

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[258] ICG, 2004, *op.cit.* p. 18
[259] Saiful Umam, 2006, *op.cit.* p. 20

words, he had become a victim of extortion. His conflict with several elites also strengthened his desire to leave the movement. Regarding his findings, he commented:

> *The most principle deviation is that they do many things to harm the image of Islam. They think that only their group is representative of the truth and Islam. They hardly accept criticism and rely more on violence than dialogue to spread their message. This runs contrary to Islam as a religion that aims to spread love to the world (rahmatan lil'alamin).*[260]

MT also explained that NII's struggle to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and to fight against the authoritarian regime that marginalized Islamic group had less appeal. In fact, since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia has become more democratic, and this has provided Islamic groups ample room to express their aspirations.

Problem of Recidivism: The case of Urwah

After exploring the jihad trajectory of several Muslim extremists in which the luminal situation of violent jihad led finally to the transformation of jihad from violent to less-violent, in this section I will present the exceptional case. It is about the liminal-situation of violent jihad that led the jihadist to retain extremist beliefs and sometimes even become more extreme than before. This problem of recidivism confirms Turner's explanation as described in Chapter 2 that all liminal-situations must be solved, for it is a state of great intensity that cannot exist very long without some sort of structure to stabilize it. Either the individual returns to the surrounding social structure, such as in the case of Abas, Imron, Thalib and MT, or else liminal individual develop their own structure a condition Turner calls "normative communitas."The case of Urwah provides a strong example of normative communitas after the liminal jihad situation of jihad.

Urwah was a JI member who served 3 years in prison for his involvement in the 2004 Australian embassy bombing and took part in the JW Marriot hotel bombing. During his time in prison, he was involved in the government's deradicalization program. After his release from prison, however, Urwah has again become involved in violent jihad with his former JI network.

Born in Kudus on November 2, 1978, Urwah attended the JI-affiliated boarding school (*Pesantren*) called Al-Muttaqien in Jepara, Central Java from 1990 to 1996, drawing him into the

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[260] Ayu Arman, 2007, *op.cit.*

heart of the JI organization in Central Java. He went on to teach, probably as part of a practice teaching program, in the Purwokerto-Cilacap area of southern Central Java. There, in 1999, he was part of the same JI division as Baharudin Latif, who later became Noordin's father-in-law. From 2000 to 2003, Urwah attended and then taught at the JI School Mahad Aly in Solo, where some of the most hardline members of JI were based. It was here that he met one of the leaders of Ring Banten, the West Java-based radical faction of Darul Islam (DI) whose members became the field operatives for the 2004 Australian embassy bombing. He also became best friends with a man named Lutfi Hudaeroh alias Ubeid, from Magetan, East Java. Sometime during 2000-2003, he underwent a week of military training in Poso, Central Sulawesi but the exact dates are unclear. In 2004, together with Ubeid and Ubeid's brother, Umar Burhanuddin, Urwah helped coordinate the training for the embassy bombing team in West Java and provided other logistical assistance.[261] For his involvement, Urwah was sentenced to three years in prison. During his time in prison in Jakarta, he joined the deradicalization program but refused to cooperate with police.

Shortly before his release, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir arranged a marriage for him with a young woman from a JI-linked school for girls in Bekasi.[262] Urwah went back to Solo and immediately started a home-based company called *Muqowama* Publication, producing cheaply packaged jihad documentaries of al-Qaeda videos with Indonesian subtitles. By August 2007, these videos were being advertised in the JI magazine *an-Najah* and by November, agents were getting them to book vendors in Poso, Palu, Bandung, Banten, Batam, Medan, Solo, Lampung and Lombok. According to Noor Huda Ismail (2009), Urwah also produced in-house jihad documentaries in Indonesian, including titles such as *Para Peminang Bidadari* (The Fairy Proposals), *Daulah Islamiyah Iraq* (The Islamic State of Iraq) and The United States of Losers. Urwah also actively gave lectures around Surakarta and Yogyakarta. A good part of his audience was made up of youths and young adults, as well as housewives.[263]

Urwah also re-established contact with JI members in Cilacap after his release and became an important mentor for them. In 2008, Urwah was rumored to be training a small force of some twelve to fifteen people as a new Special Forces unit variously

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[261] ICG, 2009, 'Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base', in *Update Briefing*, Asia Briefing, No. 95, Jakarta/Brussels, 27 Agustus 2009.

[262] The school is Pesantren Maratus Sholeh in Bekasi. Rina, Urwah's wife, also attended Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's pesantren in Ngruki, Solo; her father was involved in the 1980s with a radical group linked to Darul Islam known as Komando Jihad.

[263] Noor Huda Ismail, 2009, "My Encounters with Terrorist Urwah Budi Pranoto", in *The Jakarta Post*, 18 September 2009.

referred to Laskar Ababil or Laskar Arofah.[264] It was never clear who this group reported to, or if it in fact existed. In April 2008, police arrested an Arabic linguist and former classmate of Urwah's named Parmin alias Aslam because they found a letter Noordin had sent him via Urwah asking him to translate some jihadi texts. Urwah dropped out of sight temporarily after Parmin's arrest, although he soon resurfaced in the Solo area. By early 2009, he was said to have closed down his *Muqowama* operations but to suddenly have come into some money.[265] In July 2009 Urwah took part in the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings. In September 2009, the Indonesian police killed Urwah along with his fellow terrorist suspects, Noordin M Top, Aryo Sudarsono alias Aji and Adit Susilo, during a 16-hour siege on a house in Mojosongo, Surakarta in Central Java.[266]

The case of Urwah is being treated as evidence that terrorists who have served their sentences and been released are a major security threat. This is an exaggeration, since most of the more than 200 men who have been released have not returned to violence (and many of them played peripheral roles from the outset). But the hardcore ideologues were always going to be a problem, and Urwah is a prime example. The important lesson to draw is not so much that released prisoners are dangerous—although in Urwah's case, it is true—butrather that one well-connected person joining Noordin's network can significantly boost its size and scope.[267] The case of Urwah also shows that the war of terrorism is the war of ideology. It can only be won by changing extremists' belief in the use of violence. However, the bond of friendship and peer pressure must be considered highly as, in the case of Urwah, it becomes likely "a gate" to rejoin the former terrorist network.

After their release from prison, an ex-terrorist like Urwah will always have a decision to make: to stay radical (or become even more radical than he used to be), or to become more moderate and try to reorganize his views on and understanding of jihad. However, based on the bonds between the terrorists while they were in prison, an ex-terrorist is more likely to stay radical than to become moderate or to reform. This was the teaching they received inside prison, and is again repeated when they rejoin their religious groups outside prison. It has proven very difficult

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[264] This Laskar Ababil should not be confused with an organization of the same name that is a youth wing of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), a Muslim political party.

[265] ICG, 2009, *op.cit.*

[266] The Jakarta Post, Urwah's Dead Body Buried in Kudus, October 2,2009, see: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/02/urwah039s-dead-body-buried-kudus.html

[267] ICG, 2009, *op.cit*.

for a convicted terrorist to let go of his old values and become a moderate Muslim.[268]

When being asked about his time in jail, Urwah explained that there were three types of JI members behind bars. First, there were those he referred to as "*JI hitam*" (Black JI), who became turn coats and collaborated with the police by leaking the group's secrets. Second, there were those in the gray zone called *JI abu-abu*. The third category is made up of individuals who remained committed to the radical cause, theso-called *JI putih* (White JI). Urwah recognized that they need to visit those in the third category so they do not forget the cause. He regularly visited these JI inmates, at least once a month. Urwah understood that a strong bond between the jihadists (terrorists), often established inside prison, made them even more prominent, both as individuals and groups. The interaction between them in groups is continuous, thus (ideologically) strengthening each other. An addition to this is the response and appreciation from fellow Muslims around them who consider convicted terrorists as defenders of Islam, i.e. heroes, and as a result place them in a higher social hierarchy in their group. This distinction causes many of their friends, relatives and admirers to visit them in prison as a form of solidarity among Muslims, or jihadists, to be exact. This kind of support enables ex-terrorists, like Urwah, to maintain their spirit of violent jihad on the same level, because they are still living within jihadist groups even when they are in prison. Furthermore, as jihadists, they always have to protect their image and their principles on their views on jihad. Once, Urwah said in a very chilling message that he was convinced it was extremely important for Muslims to support any Islamist group still committed to jihad. When he was invited by a group of JI members to speak at a mosque, he reiterated that jihad was *fardhu a'in* (a personal obligation), and therefore legitimate for any group or individual to carry out jihad based on their own initiatives and methods. He argued that there was no need to ask permission from the group's imam (leaders).[269]

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[268] Noor Huda Ismail, 2009, *op.cit.*
[269] *Idem.*

CHAPTER 5
POST-LIMINAL (VIOLENT) JIHAD:
NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF JIHAD AND NEW JIHADIST IDENTITIES

Introduction

In this chapter, I will present and discuss post-liminal (violent) jihad. As described in Chapter 2, according to Victor Turner (1969), all liminality must eventually dissolve, for it is a state of great intensity that cannot exist very long without some sort of structure to stabilize it. Either the individual returns to the surrounding social structure or else liminal communities develop their own internal social structure, a condition Turner calls "*normative communitas.*" Post-liminal is a phase that marks the end (or at least the breaking) of the liminal phase and the re-integration (or being incorporated) of the people involved to their new social role and identity.[270]

Generally, post-liminal violent-jihad in Indonesia end up in prison, either for a life-sentence or temporary sentence, during which extremist Muslims join the deradicalization program run by the Indonesian police. However, individual deradicalization and disengagement of Jihadist are not always related to such programs. Apart from this, in the Indonesian context, most cases of post-liminal violent jihadists bring about a new interpretation of jihad and new jihadist identity.

Jihad in Islam, as described in Chapter 2, is clearly a subject to interpretation and in Muslim history it has a mixed record. Theoretically, there are at least 13 types of jihad that are divided into 4 categories: *jihad al-nafs* (jihad against oneself)*, jihad al-syaithan* (jihad against Satan)*, jiha al-munafiq wal kufr* (jihad against the hypocrite and disbeliever)*,* and *jihad al-taghut* (jihad against the oppressive leader). However, in practice, jihad has also been subject to manipulation, essentially for political reasons or in order to achieve certain political goals. It is also the subject of different interpretations in the four traditional Sunni *madzhabs*/schools (Syafii, Hambali, Maliki and Hanafi) as well as in the different Shi'ite doctrines. Contemporary approaches to jihad have multiple explanations of jihad ranging from radical, conservative, moderate and even liberal approaches. Like many other aspects of Islamic teachings, jihad has its theoretical and practical aspects, both being frequently apart from one another. In fact, both dimensions of jihad are fragmented as they reflect a

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[270] Victor Turner, 1969, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, Chicago: Aldin Publishing House.

much greater diversity in Islam than its opponents tend to reflect in their words and activities.

Identity, as described in Chapter 2, is the way in which people construct who they are and how they see themselves within the community and the social structure in which they live. In the post-liminal violent jihad, according to Najib Azca (2011), jihadists take on a new identity in about 3 possible forms. Those include:(a) identity enhancement, meaning that jihadists' attachment and commitment to violent jihadism and their group is increased; (b) identity-shift, meaning that the attachment and commitment of Jihadists to violent jihadism and their groups is altered; and (3) identity-confusion, meaning that the attachment and commitment of Jihadists to violent jihadism and their groups is confused.[271]

Furthermore, the degree of personal-identity change, according to Guobin Yang (2000), may vary depending on the depth of the liminal experience, as social movements like extremist Muslim groups are not liminal to the same degree. The relative liminality of extremist groups implies that they do not transform identities equally. As a hypothesis, we may assume that the degree of personal transformation depends on the extent to which jihadists are freed from previous structural conditions and on the depth and intensity of the new experience of jihadists. The stronger the contrast between pre-participation structural embeddings and the leveling effects unleashed by the groups, the greater the liminal effect and the more profound the transformative power of jihadists. Most biographical studies on the impact of post-participation in jihad group fall into 2 categories: immediate and long-term impacts. Guobin Yang explains that studies about the immediate impact on post-participation in social movements show that the experience of involvement means they still tend to become more committed social activists. They strongly hold on to the group's ideology but with different activities from what they had previously done in the social movement. However, research about the long-term impact shows their attachment to the group's ideology becomes weaker and they tend to incorporate and reintegrate into society.[272]

In this chapter, I will examine why and how the new interpretation of jihad and a new jihadist identity emerges in the life trajectory of post-liminal violent jihad. I will begin this chapter by presenting the life story narratives of Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, Ja'far Thalib and Mataharitimoer in their post-liminal-

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[271] Najib Azca, 2011, *op.cit.*

[272] Guobin Yang, 2000, "The Liminal Effects of Social Movements: Red Guards and the Transformation of Identity", in *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 15 No. 3, 2000.

jihad before further discussing the form their new interpretation took and how their new jihadist identity emerged.

NASIR ABAS' POST-LIMINAL JIHAD

Following the Prophet Jihad:
BB1, Mujahidin in Afghanistan & Moro Yes

From the explanation of Nasir Abas in our interview, I conclude that there are at least three events that marked the division among members of the Jema'ah Islamiyah/JI.

First is the appointment of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as the leader (*amir*) of JI after the death of Abdullah Sungkar in 1999. Abas found that several senior JI members such as Mushtafa, Abu Rusdan, and Abu Fatih, etc., criticized Ba'asyir as lacking leadership skill, although they recognized him as a knowledgeable Muslim scholar (*ulama*). However, under the banner of group solidarity, they did not continue their criticism and instead chose to accept his appointment.

Second is the establishment of MMI (Indonesian Mujahidin Council)[273] in August 2000 when Ba'asyir again was appointed the leader (*amir*). Several members argued that MMI is just a similar group like the JI but focuses specifically on Indonesian territory, which makes the group unnecessary. They also argue that Ba'asyir would find it difficult to lead two groups at the same time. However, again, due to group solidarity and after seeing that Ba'asyir himself was eager to lead MMI, they decided not to continue criticizing MMI and Ba'asyir as its leader (*amir*). Responding to critiques, Ba'asyir then appointed Abu Rusdan as the executor of *amir* JI atthe *Markaziyah* meeting in Bogor in 2002 and Ba'asyir remained an *amir* of JI until the appointment of the new-leader. Abas recognizes that the appointment of Ba'asyir as the *amir* of MMI had a large negative influence on members' loyalty. Several senior members then withdrew from the group due to their disappointment. Abas recalls:

> *After the establishment of MMI, there was division and distrust among JI members. They were divided into three; (a) those who remained as members of only JI; (b) those who maintained dual membership in JI and MMI at the same time;and (c) those who wanted to leave, as they*

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[273] MMI is a group that tries to implement sharia. It is an overt group headquartered in Yogyakarta that serves as umbrella organization and coordinating body for many conservative and extremist Muslim groups and others that are committed to the establishment of an Islamic state. See: Zachary Abuza, 2003, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror,* London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, p. 141.

did not want to join either the JI and the MMI due to their disappointment. Some of the disappointed members argued that to some extent it is not necessary to join Jama'ah (a group) to conduct jihad. Others said that they could also conduct Jihad with members of other existing Jihad groups such as NII, Wahdah Islamiyah, Jundullah, Kompak, etc., although it is not based on inter-group but personal relationships.

Third is the bombing, both the Christmas Eve Bombings in 2000 and BB1 in 2001. Abas recognized that in 2000 he began to have a different opinion about jihad through bombing than other JI members had. In that year when he was promoted as head of Mantiqi 3, he was shocked by the al-Qaeda attack in New York and Washington, because those attacks were directed at civilians. Abas recalls:

> *If this is called a war, what kind of a war is this? If this is a battle, what kind of a battle is this? I do not understand. If this is carried out by Muslims and they believe it is jihad, I disagree.*

According to Abas, the attacks symbolized all that he believed jihad should not be. He was unequivocal on the issue. When he was instructed to read Osama bin Laden's edict (*fatwa*) of 1998 against Crusaders and Jews, which authorized the killing of Civilians, to his members, Abas clearly rejected. In October 2002, when over 200 civilians were killed in BB1, he was incandescent about the direction some elements of JI were going, elements that had presumably heard and accepted bin Laden's fatwa. According to Abas, among those involved in both the Christmas Eve Bombing and the BB1 were members of JI who were influenced and allured by Hambali, the head of Mantiqi 1.[274]

Abas explains Hambali was the JI lieutenant most attuned to Osama bin Laden's vision of global jihad against "the far enemy" (Jews and Crusaders) and closely associated with al-Qaeda operation chief and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Hambali was apparently eager to make Southeast Asia part of the "terrorist" movement frontlines and began to send jihadists to fight Christians on Maluku Island in 1999. Encouraged by his success in heating up the Maluku crisis, Hambali decided to

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[274]Hambali was leader of Mantiqi 1 (covered Malaysia and Singapore) of the JI. He was often described as "the Osama bin Laden of Southeast Asia". Some media reports describe him as Bin Laden's lieutenant for Southeast Asian operations. Other reports describe him as an independent peer. He was highly trusted by Al Qaeda and was the main link between the JI and the al-Qaeda.

extend his brand of jihad to all of Indonesia and then to globalize the jihad by enlisting suicide bombers to hit Western targets and interests (including BB1).[275]

Abas recalls that he was on a ferry when he learned about the BB1 attacks. His immediate response was that JI had to be behind the attack, as only they had the skill and expertise to carry out such an operation.

> *In my heart I predicted that Hambali and his members had done this (BB1). But I was not sure until 5 days later when I visited my sister and had a private talk with my brother-in-law, Ali Ghufron. He told me that he and his brothers were involved in BB1 and that he and other JI members were under command of Hambali. I felt my previous prediction was correct.*
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> *I saw Ali Ghufron was proud that the operation had been success. I was shocked when I learned that several of my students from my times as a trainer in Afghanistan, including Ali Imron and Imam Samudra, were involved in BB1. I felt sorry. I felt sin because they used their knowledge to kill innocent civilians.*

During our interview, Abas also emphasized several times that he feels very disappointed about the JI's jihad through those bombings. I could see that he looked angry and that from his expression he meant it. The seeds, as Abas says, had been planted for his increasing disillusionment with the direction of JI was taking. Abas criticizes Imam Samudra and friends who conducted the BB1 attack mainly on two important aspects. ***First,*** Samudra prefers to choose offensive rather than defensive jihad. Consequently, he allows killing the enemy, robbing their material goods, the so called *fa'i*[276], telling lies to others and during the

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[275] Scott Attran, 2005, *To Jihad and Back*, see: www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/11/09/to_jihad_and_back

[276]*Fai* literally means restore or collect. It means things which are taken from the infidels (kafir) through a war such as treasure that is left behind by the infidels because of fear, includingtheproperty of dzimma (the infidels who submit to the government and pay tax/jizyah) who have no heirs. Among argument of fa'I are al-Qur'an surah al-hasyr: 6-7 (6) What Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken away) from them – for this ye made no expedition with either cavalry or camelry: but Allah gives power to His apostles over any He pleases: and Allah has power over all things. (7) What Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken away) from the people of the townships,belongs to Allah, to His Messenger and to kindred and orphans, the needy and the wayfarer; In order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you. So take what the Messenger assigns to you, and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you. And fear Allah for Allah is strict in Punishment.

investigation with the police and in a court, having confidence with their violent jihad and making public opinion to attract attention. **Second,** war and killing are only allowed when two military armies meet. It is unfair to attack innocent civilians (mostly tourists) and even women and children such as in the BB1 attackes. Accordingly, Abas concludes that Samudra was wrong in determining the status of war and to whom the attack should address and therefore BB1 cannot be categorized as a practice of *istisyhada* (being a martyr) as Samudra had claimed.[277]

While being critical of the BB1 attacks conducted by JI, Abas defends his participation in jihad with the Mujahidin in Afghanistan and Moro. He recalls:

> *The atmosphere in a battle that I imagined was like a documentary movie about the 1st and the 2nd World War, both sets of fully armed troops shooting at each other. When it is compared with the Mujahidin in Afghanistan there are many differences, one among many, the troops of Mujahidin do not wear uniforms. The first time I saw Mujahidin was in their picture (not the Taliban figures) in a magazine taken during a battle where they were shooting and being shot at. They were wearingeveryday clothing of their regions. Likewise, it was the case with pictures of Mujahidin in Moro. I saw them only wearing sandals, jeans, singlet while they also carried weapons to fight the troops of the Philippines government.*

> *What I imagined was also a comparison with the battle narratives of the Prophet Muhammad and his companion which I read in a book entitled Sirah Nabawiyah (life of the Prophet)[278] and Hayatus Sahabah (life of the Prophet's companions)[279]. There are at least two reasons why I came to the conclusion that the*

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[277] Nasir Abas, *Interview*, in Jakarta, October 2010.

[278] There are several Muslim scholars who wrote the book of Sirah Nabawiyah. However, the most notable books were written by Muslimhistorians Muhammad bin Yasar Ibn Ishaq (704-767) and by Ibnu Hisyam (died in 828) who was the student of Ibn Ishaq. Yasar Ibn Ishaq was an Arab Muslim historian. He collected oral traditions that formed the basis of an important biography of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Ibn Hisyam was said to have mastered Arabic philology and edited the biography of Muhammad written by Ibn Ishaq.

[279] Hayatus Sahabah is a 2000+ page collection about the Prophet's companion written by a famous Muslims Scholars, Muhammad Yusuf al-Khandlawi (1917-1965), the second leader (*amir*) of the Jama'at Tabligh from India.

implementation of jihad carried out by the Mujahidin in Afghanistan as well as in Moro were similar to the jihad in the era of the Prophet Muhammad. **First***, I refer to al-Qur'an Surah Anfal (8:15)"O you who believe, when you meet those who disbelieve in a battlefield, never turn your back to them.* **Second***, both the Mujahidins in Afghanistan and Moro had the same goals as the Prophet's jihad, that is, the maintenance of rights.*

For the **first reason**, regarding the Surah al-Anfal (8:15), Abas explains that the words "those who disbelieve (*Kafir*)" refers to the enemy troops (the *Quraish*) and not to Muslims who were engaged in the battle with the Muslims troops. The condition of *Kafir* troops in Surah was such that they were in a position of attack and so it was prohibited for the Mujahidin in combat to turn away or retreat when facing the enemy (the *Kafir* troops that fights against Muslim). Furthermore, Abas explains:

It was more convincing for me regarding the Mujahidin's jihad in Afghanistan when I had opportunity to join such jihad around 1987. I saw a real war when seeing the enemy troops; the Russian army and the Afghanistan communists. Likewise, after the Russian army retreated back to Russia, I saw the Mujahidin troops fought against the Communist government troops of Afghanistan under the command of President Najibullah.

The same thing happened to my experience together with the Mujahidin in Moro of the Southern Philippines from 1994 to 1996 and on my return there in 2000. When I was in Moro, my opinion that the right way to implement a jihad is when two armies/troops meet, which are ready and fully armed for engagement, became stronger. The Mujahidin troops in Moro faced the Filipino army troops who came and attacked the Mujahidin after their occupation ofthe region on behalf of their protest to separate Moro where majority of people are Muslim. The Mujahidins argued that, based on the history of Moro nations, they deserve the right to separate from the Philippines government.

Furthermore, Abas also explains that around 1972 when the Philippines were under President Marcos, the government brought into being the scorched earth policy for the MILF by means of martial law. It was the starting point for the Mujahidin in Moro to begin their self-defense against the Philippine army that was attacking the Moro regions. Therefore, the enemy of Mujahidin was tangibly visible and they knew the areas where enemy was located and were able to use shellfire or rockets to hit back at a precise target. Despite the environs of the combat being placed in the locale of non-Muslim villages, yet the Mujahidin of

Moro did not violate those villagers. Based on this, especially the meeting of two armies, Abas claimed that such actions constituted a jihad similar to that carried out by the Prophet Muhammad.

For the second-reason about why Jihad conducted by the Mujahidin of Afghanistan and Moro were similar to those carried out by the Prophet Muhammad, according to Abas, is the issue of maintenance of rights. Abas recalls that the leader of Mujahidin of Afghanistan from *Tanzim Ittihad e-Islamiy*, Abdurrabi Rasul Sayyaf, once explained that conflict first occurred when the people realized that the Afghanistan government program was showing interest in the application of the communist ideology (as a societal framework) through education and cultural programs. The people then carried out demonstrations and protested against the programs. However, the government responded in a repressive way and they invited the assistance from the Russian Army. The Afghanistan people then felt that it was Russia's real desire to take over the Afghanistan government. Therefore, the struggle they would undertake was to expel the Russian army along with their communist ideology. For Abas, it can be affirmed to be the maintenance of the right, the nation and the religion (as well as culture). The Afghanistan people basically were also not the side that initiated the hostility and war, but they adopted the essential method that allowed them to uphold the maintenance of their rights. The aggressive actions carried out by the Mujahidin of Afghanistan, therefore, were defensive within the strategy of warfare.

Uncovering JI's Misleading Understanding of ViolentJihad

Nasir Abas explains that his exit from JI was driven by his desire to salvage the Islamic community (*ummah*) especially considering that they do not follow JI's misleading opinion about violent Jihad and that there will be hopefully no more bomber-jihadists and bombing victims. He recalls:

> *Normally the process of a member who wants to leave the JI was initiated by being no longer active in joining the meeting agenda or the JI's other social activities. Before I did this, I have known there were already a large number of members who decided to leave theJI.*
>
> *More severe, I found that amongst elite members of the JI there is the opinion that to leave the JI is equal to leave Islam and it is based on one*

> *Prophet Hadith.*[280] *Such Hadith is used to warn all JI members so that they will always maintain their obedience and loyalty to JI. Whereas, I have different opinion because originally the Hadith is meant to address the highest leader of the Islamic community (ummah) such as the Prophet and the Caliph and not the leader of a group like JI.*

According to Abas, the above opinion (that to leave JI is equal to leaving Islam based on the certain Prophet Hadith) can be used, despite the fact that it is basically misleading, can be effectively used to recruit young Muslims to join jihadist groups like the JI and to maintain the existing members. By warning about the life of Muslims in the world and hereafter based on the above Hadith, the JI wants to warn their members to be worried about being considered an infidel (*Kafir*) or that they will die in the *Kafir* state (*Jahiliyah*).

Abas finds that the struggle among several JI members are no longer purely for Islamic community (*ummah)* but is instead conducted using lies as well as without the bravery to declare what was really the truth. The principles of their clandestine groups (*Tandzim Sirri*) have made the members of JI fearful of being honest and have allowed millions of Muslims in Southeast Asia to be bewildered by the behavior of JI members. According to Abas, the struggle of JI members, whose understanding of Jihad is misleading, will also lead to increased temptation (*fitnah*) within Muslim countries.

During the interview, I also asked Abas why he had not attempted to catalyze change while he was one of the leaders. He explained that when JI was established in the mid-1990s, Abas was asked to swear an oath of loyalty (*bai'at*) to the group, and also to obey its 44-page manual and constitution called the PUJPI (General Guidelines for the JI Struggle). Abas says it allows JI to conduct itself as a secret organization (*Tandzim Sirri*) by concealing its doctrine, membership and operations from public view. However, it does not sanction lying to the Muslim public. When Ba'asyir, Hambali, Imam Samudra and others began to misguide the Muslim community, twisting Islamic teachings to feed on public fear, Abas says he began to leave JI. He argues that no one verse (*surah*) in the al-Qur'an consists of an instruction for Muslims to create war with people of other religions. The contrary belief has only created discord in the

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[280] The hadith says: "*Whoever takes off his hand from allegiance (obedience) will meet Alloh on the Last day for no reason (in a state of sin), and whoever dies without a pledge of allegiance or bai'at on his neck then he dies the death of a (in a state of) jahiliyah (ignorance person)*", narrated by Muslim from Abdullah bin "umar, Sahih Muslim in Kitabul Imarah: 3433.

Muslim community and has led non-Muslims to regard Islam as a sadistic and cruel religion. Abas concluded, therefore, that for suicide bombers who believe that what they are doing is sacred, perhaps the best way to turn them from violence is to religiously promote competing sacred values.[281]

Additionally, as the former JI leader, Abas thinks that it is his task to clarify the mission of true Islamic *da'wah* (preaching) and jihad and to uncover the misleading understanding of jihad among JI members such as perpetrators of the BB1. Abas recognizes that other people maybe doubt his explanation since he previously was part of JI. He says:

> *To be honest, I am not the most suitable person to cast light upon JI because I was part of it before albeit not among the elite leadership who understand all aspects of the activities of JI. But there is none from within the JI leaders who try to explain the facts about the JI but rather there are those willing to distort them. Thus I feel that I am compelled to take on the role of explainer especially to the Islamic community (ummah) and generally to all people about what JI is according to my own experience. I hope that Islamic community (ummah) is no more confused after having seen the behavior of bombers such as Imam Saudra, etc. Believe it or not, it is up to others to value this. More importantly, I intentionally want to narrate my experience and spread it to others. It also can be compared to other information available about the JI.*

> *Other people should also see that only few JI members are involved in and/or associated with the bombings. I believe that the majority of those who graduated from the Afghanistan Mujahidin and from military training in Moro-Mindanao in the Southern Philippines, have no desire whatsoever and disapprove of bombing civilian areas as well as attacking civilians, except those who are influenced by misleading understanding of Jihad from Osama bin Laden and Imam Samudra about killing non-civilians Muslims as acts of revenge.*

Abas continues to argue that he finds many members within the JI who also reject the program of al-Qaeda's global jihad. They

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[281]   Scott   Attran,   2005,   *To   Jihad   and   Back*,   see: www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/11/09/to_jihad_and_back

also condemn the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and pose a question why Ba'asyir did not stop Hambali from planning suicide bombing attacks and killing civilians, including innocent Muslims. For those members, Abas claims, it is a bit easy to disengage from JI through the deradicalization program.

Abas recognizes that his decision to assist the Indonesian-police in the deradicalization program has been potentially life threatening. However, he believes that his decision is in line with Islamic teachings about defending Muslims from those who want to use Islam to legitimize their bad behaviors. He says:

> *Do I feel like a traitor after serving so many years asaJI leader? No. I feel I am doing the right thing. I never feel I am a traitor. I am only trying to bring people back to the right paths of Islamic teaching. I want to defend Islam from those who seek to use it to legitimizetheir bad actions. If people say I am a traitor because I join the Indonesianpolice, I do not care about that.*

> *The police had not paid any money for my decision to changes sides. But they helped look after my family and assisted with my children's education.*

When I asked Abas whether he is now living in fear of his life, given the fact that he is possibly one of the JI prime targets after deciding to leave and uncovering the structure, ideology and strategy of JI, he answered:

> *Yes, as a normal human being I do feel worried about that and feel I am in danger. But because of my faith, I believe that God will always be with me and covering me.*

In 2005, when Abas was interviewed by Scott Atran (2005), he said that he still dreamed of a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia as the best way to bring lasting justice and peace to the region. He had for sworn violence except on the battle field and followed the jihad principles of the Prophet Muhammad. He also agreed that the Iraq war and the relentless US and Australian pressure on the Indonesian government to crackdown on JI would play into violent hands.[282]

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[282]   Scott   Attran,   2005,   *To   Jihad   and   Back*,   see: www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/11/09/to_jihad_and_back

I tried to confirm Abas about his dream. However, he kept silent for a while and then answered, "*I am now not focusing on that dream. I have other more important tasks to do*."

From "Captain-Jihad"to Comic Hero:
Former Extremist Muslim Preaches Religious Tolerance

In the end of 2011, the real life of Nasir Abas had become a comic book titled "*Ku Temukan Makna Jihad* (I found the meaning of jihad)" depicting him as an extremist Muslim who transforms into an invaluable ally in the fight against violent-Jihad. Non-profit publisher Lazuardi Biru published the colorful 137-page comic. So far, more than 10,000 copies have been printed. Launched on September 8, 2011 in Jakarta when the movie titled "*Captain America*"was playing in the local cinemas, it inspired the Associated Press to nickname Abas as "Captain Jihad."[283]

Abas says he felt compelled to chronicle his life-story in a comic book because he wants to reach out to teenagers and young adults as they are most vulnerable target to being recruited by extremist groups like the JI. He explains:

> *I know this [that young people are targeted by extremist groups] from my own experience as I my self was recruited at the age of 15. And 3 years after when I was 18, I was sent to Afghanistan.*

When I asked Abas about the purpose of his comic-book publication, He answered:

> *I want all children to learn from my experience; how I was involved with extremist group and disengaged from it as well as found the new meaning of Jihad. I do not want them to make the same mistakes. And more importantly, this is also part of my newjihad now.[284]*

Abas explains that his need to warn the young people took on a greater urgency after on July 17, 2009 when Jakarta was hit by two bomb blasts. Dani Dwi Permana (18 years old) detonated a suitcase of explosive at the JW Marriot Hotel, killing himself and five others. Permana is known to be the country's youngest suicide bomber.[285]

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[283] Amy Chew, 2011, *Fighting Extremism Via Comic,* see: www.thestar.com.my/story.aspx/?file=/2011/10/2/nation/9617872
[284] Nasir Abas, *Interview,* Jakarta, October 2010
[285]*Idem.*

Abas argues it is also a creative way to battle hateful ideologies of violent jihadism spread by extremist Muslim groups. It can be part of a comprehensive counter-radicalism strategy in Indonesia. Furthermore, Abas explains that extremist groups often target young people in the recruitment program, so reaching out in creative ways such as through comic books will hopefully be effective. He says:

> *I do not want to have another Dani Dwi Permana. I hope this comic book will equip young people with the skills to take care of themselves so that they do not end up being recruited by extremist groups.*

Nowadays, Abas is a well-known figure in Indonesia for his regular appearances on media and at seminars where he speaks out against religious extremism and the twisted interpretation of jihad as espoused by the late Osama bin Laden of al-Qaeda that is followed by JI members. Being quiet and contemplative, Abas plays a critical role in helping the Indonesian police to unravel and arrest Muslim extremists involved in BB1 and other bombings by providing insider information. After becoming an ally for the police, the Indonesian government asked the United Nations/UN to remove Abas from the list of terrorist and it has already been accepted.

Abas transition from a Muslim extremist to a police-ally came about when he was arrested by the Indonesia police in 2003. He recalls:

> *AfterI was arrested, I refused to answer any questions but was in trouble with my own question:"Why did God not let me die?" I had always told the people I had trained that it was better to be killed than to be taken a prisoner. I concluded that the arrest was God's will and that there was something that God wanted me to do. After the church bombings, I, Zulkarnain and two others extremists (Mustafa and Ahmad Roichan) had warned Hambali not to carry out any more bombings. I expected the worst from the police but my first integrator, a Christian policeman, never used abusive language and treated me with respect. I responded by starting to talk but with a heavy heart, because I was not the ordinary JI member since I had trained other people to keep the group's secret. I then asked to speak with the task force commander one-on-one, and the commander agreed. He removed my handcuffs and the two were left in the cells. This surprised*

> *me and I decided to return the commander's trust.*
> *I told him that I would cooperate with the police to*
> *stop JI bombings so that they will sin no more.*

After that, facilitated by the police, Abas began to speak with the JI detainees to encourage them to cooperate with the police. Abas describes his methods as follows:

> A*t the beginning of the meeting with JI detainees,*
> *I tell them that they have a good spirit and a good*
> *intention to defend Islam but that Muslims are not*
> *afraid to speak. "Why don't you all talk to the*
> *police? Are you ashamed of what you have done*
> *(their engagement) with JI? I tell them, a Muslim*
> *has to recognize his responsibility whether others*
> *think he is right or wrong. I recalled sometimes*
> *they ask whether the members of the police force*
> *are infidels (kafir) and whether it is sinful to speak*
> *to the police. I ask them "how can policemen who*
> *pray and fast be an infidel (kafir)?" I also remind*
> *them that the Prophet Muhammad SAW*
> *encouraged that Muslims should not call their*
> *brothers infidels (kafir) or the accusation will fall*
> *back upon them. When talking to a policeman, I*
> *tell them, talk to him as apoliceman, a man doing*
> *his job and not as an enemy or as an infidel*
> *(kafir).*[286]

Abas's message is about means rather than ends. He claims that he does not seek to change the JI members' goal of an Islamic state, but based on the life and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his own experience in Afghanistan, he explains to them that an Islamic state should not be their priority. Abas recalls:

> *In 1992 the Afghanistan Mujahidin established an*
> *Islamic state but the following year the Taliban*
> *rose up and attacked the government of*
> *Mujahidin. This shows that an Islamic state is not*
> *the solution of any country's problem.*

Abas and Imron would approach new JI prisoners and try to challenge their beliefs. Abas focused on two key issues that he wanted to deradicalize in the jihadist mindset; the killing of civilians, and the aspiration for an Islamic state.With respect to the killing of civilians, Abas asserts that JI's struggle has been corrupted by the bombings against civilians. On the question of an Islamic state, Abas is trying to show the militants that true ulama do not want an Islamic state: *"The Islamic state is not*

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[286]*Idem.*

connected toreligion. The Prophet Muhammad never established a state. He struggled to make the people better persons. So why are we now struggling for an Islamic state?" He draws upon his own experience in Afghanistan and points to the collapse into fitna (temptation) following the war between Soviet-Union and the Mujahidin: *"Afghanistan became an Islamic state in 1992 under the mujahidin and what happened was civil war. The Taliban fought an Islamic state in order to set up their own Islamic government. I saw this."* Abas concludes that the struggle for an Islamic state is driven by politics and power, not by religion, and that *"true ulama donot want an Islamic state. Government historically has used the ulama, so they should stay away from worldly affairs."*[287]

Regarding his role in the deradicalization program, Abas explains that he has met with between 300 and 400 extremists, including those who are outside the prison. Some are persuaded and agree to cooperate with the police. Some are ambivalent. Others refuse and call Abas as a traitor, an apostate (*murtad*). A number of extremists also joined Abas in trying to persuade others to renounce violent jihadism, most prefer to remain anonymous.[288]

Due to his previous position in JI (as the head of Mantiqi 3), Abas's high profile plays an important role in the deradicalization program. The program seeks to turn the extremist's respect for seniority and hierarchy into a means of deradicalization and dis-engagement. The interrogators seek to gain the trust of JI insiders and then rely on the insiders to influence the rank and file.[289] Abas's unique insight into and knowledge of the inner working of the JI network were responsible, according to some reports, for almost half of the arrests that took place after BB1. He also participates in talks aimed at debunking the JI storyline on university campuses, at selected Pesantrens, and in prison.[290] He even wrote a book titled *Membongkar Jama'ah Islamiyah/ Uncovering JI* (2005) in which he also rejects Imam Samudra's view that the BB1 attack was a legitimate jihad.[291]

Sarlito Wirawan Sartono, an Indonesian psychologist who is involved in the deradicalization program recognizes that the program gains a great deal of benefit from Abas' involvement. Generally, within most extremist Muslim groups, a hierarchy of

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[287] Kirsten E Schulze, 2008, "Indonesia's Approach to Jihadist De-radicalization", in *Combating Terrorism Center*, 15 July 2008, see: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/indonesia%E2%80%99s-approach-to-jihadist-deradicalization

[288] Nasir Abas, Interview

[289] *Idem*

[290] Kumar Ramakrishna, 2009, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia*, Westport CT: Praeger Security International

[291] Nasir Abas, 2005, *Membongkar Jama'ah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Ketua JI*, Jakarta: Grazindo Khasanah Ilmu.

sorts exists. Those seniors who seem to have a good understanding of Arabic and Islamic teachings and knowledge as well as experience in military training, tend to be listened to and respected, something very much reinforced by the large power-distance orientation. The involvement of former elite figures of extremist Muslim groups like Abas is beneficial, as he has also been active in the network and knows what they are talking about. More importantly they will be seen to know what they are talking about and are very useful in warning young people about the potential future, perhaps of the dangers of blindly treading down JI path.[292]

However, according to Kumar Ramakhrisna (2009) there are limitations. Abas is unlikely to make much head way with hardcore JI members, both within and outside the prison. For example, Abas' attempts to persuade the incarcerated Ali Ghufron (his brother in-law and Ali Imron's older brother), that killing unarmed civilians is a shameful thing that is not considered jihad in Islam, were rebutted by the latter, who countered that the US killed civilians in Chechnya and Afghanistan and JI is taking revenge on them. Both men ended up shouting at each other. In addition, other hardcore JI members still at large tend to label Abas as a traitor and infidel (*kafir*), not the least because Abas is seen as being too close to the government and a co-opted person. Rather than being effective in winning them over he is likely to be harmed by them, if they are given half the chance. In fact, Abas has to move around under the police protection precisely for fear of such reprisals. The police also do not wish for Abas to speak at Pesantren al-Mukmin Ngruki, which is seen as JI's base, and, more dangerously, because Noordin M Top is apparently out to eliminate Abas. The Indonesian policetryto encourage Abas to work harder in attracting more extremists away from JI, thereby dividing and further weakening the network has shrewdly used this fact of being seen as a traitor. Moreover, Abas's efforts at creating a deradicalization program are effective to the extent that they are also accompanied as Sidney Jones of ICG points out, by police economic assistance to the detainee families.[293]

For all of his recent activities, in the end of our interview, Abas emphasized his new goal: *"This is my Jihad now. I hope that what I am doing will pay for my sins. I do not feel good having trained people who carried out bombings attacks."*

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[292] Sarlito Wirawan Sartono, *Interview*, Jakarta, September 2010

[293] Kumar Ramakhrisna, 2009, *op-cit*, p. 176

ALI IMRON'S POST-LIMINAL JIHAD

Why I Changed My Jihad?

When I asked Ali Imron during our interview about the initial process that led him to change his mind about violent jihadism, he answered:

> *Around 2001, I heard from one of my fellows who placed blame on our bombings. He said that if we were only just launching bombing attacks in many placed, many other people could do that. I know that my fellow is one of the second wave (1998) of Afghan Mujahidin alumni. I think he said that because he does not like to hear that we, the Afghan alumni, are involved in bombings such as bombings of the Philippines Embassy, Christmas Eve and the Atrium Senen. When I heard that for the first time, I felt angry.*[294]

After he had heard that interpretation of the bombings, he began to rethink and question what he haddone. Deep in his heart, he recognized that his fellows were disillusioned with the bombings, particularly in terms of how bombings could be acceptable. After that, Imron began to look for responses about the bomb attacks from other alumni, and he was disappointed to see only a few alumni supported the bombings; a majority disagreed with them. Imron was confused by the fact that if the bombings were part JI's program, why did so many of his fellows, supposed JI members, disagree and express unhappiness with the bombing attacks?

Unfortunately, Imron says that he had no opportunity to express his further curiosity about other Afghan alumni who disagreed with the bombings attack. During the BB1 meeting, he was not the decision-maker, and he felt that he did not have a chance to voice his opinion during that meeting. His participation in BB1 was only an expression of loyalty to the JI as well as respect towards senior JI members, especially his older brother, Ali Ghufron. At that time, Imron claims that as a member of the JI, he had to follow its approved programs. It was also Hambali who succeed in convincing him about the BB1 plan. Imron recalls:

> *After Hambali came to meet with us and discuss the bombing plan, and explained that it was a true jihad, I became more confident with being involved with BB1, as I respectedHambali as a senior JI member. He is an alumnus of Afghan*

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[294] Ali Imron, *Interview,* Jakarta. November 2010.

> *Mujahidin and a fellow of my older brother, Ali Ghufron. Based on this, I assumed that although only few JI members agreed with the bombings, it is the JI programs that have been previously considered and discussed in order to follow the process of a true-jihad. Of course I was still thinking about what benefit and what damage the bombings would cause, but I was only able to keep those opinions in my mind.[295]*

After the BB1 attack, Imron became a lone fugitive and experienced socio-psychological pressure on the run. It was also the time when he tried to rethink and reconsider the bombings. Among the BB1 perpetrators, Imron was caught later than others such as Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, Imam Samudra, etc., so he had more time not only to see the damage caused by BB1, but also to witness what was happening to the other BB1 perpetrators.

> *It was after I became a fugitive that I snapped, my thoughts and beliefs changed. I realized that I was wrong. It was not supposed to be the way it turned and I realized there was not any other kind of jihad […].So when I was caught by the police I did not resist because I felt guilty, I realized that what I did [the bombings]was wrong.[296]*

In his memoir, *Ali Sang Pengebom/Ali the Bomber* (2007), Imron writes a long-list of innocent people who had become unintentionally involved in BB1 and were then arrested by the police. He also describes how sad and humiliated he felt following the arrest of two brothers, Ali Ghufron and Amrozi. Imron was also terrified by his arrest and detention. Furthermore, there was very strong pressure from public and from the state to punish JI as the core network for his violent jihad activism and his involvement in JI. On the other hand, the police also used "a humane approach" when they interrogated the JI prisoners in order to win their hearts and to "deradicalize" them as well as to weaken the JI network.

Therefore, soon after his arrest in 2003, Imron made a public apology and admitted that he had made mistake. While taking responsibility for his involvement in BB1, he rejected his JI fellows' argument that the bombing had been part of a jihad, as he felt that the attack had broken at least four rules of jihad. He recalls:

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[295]*Idem*

[296]*Idem*

> *In the history of Muslim predecessors, I never found them to do jihad like BB1. It breaks the rule of jihad. First, the target was not clear. In jihad it must be clear, meaning that we should have authentic evidence that the targets really hate Islam. Second, there was no warning before the attack, but in jihad it is necessary to give a warning or proselytize before conducting the attack. Third is killing women. In jihad, we are not allowed to kill women except those who join the war against Islam. Fourth, the manner of killing was improper. In jihad, Islam orders that people are killed as humanely as possible.*

> *As a normal human being who has many weakness and made mistakes, I also wanted the prosecutor to give me the lightest punishment. But on the other side, my heart is not strong when I remember the tragedy is very tragic and my mistake is very big.*

Imron also shares his moral feelings about his change of heart vis-à-via jihad as well as its consequence and his family's response to the issue. He recalls:

> *Of course it is difficult to have such different opinion about this issue, but I believe that I have done the right thing. I think this is the true meaning of jihad according to al-Qur'an and the Prophet's Hadith […], not their interpretation of jihad. Although we never know what is right according to Allah until He himself tells us?[297]*

> *It is also very difficult situation […]. I know my mother sometimes feels sad about the issue […] that her children quarrel with each other, but I am confident that people will finally know that what I have done is basically for the sake of religion and for the sake of my family as well […].[298]*

Old Jihad, New Jihad

After reflecting on the issue, Imron recognizes that he made a mistake when he agreed to become involved in BB1. He has also publicly asked forgiveness from all BB1 victims for his involvement in the bombings. Moreover, if ever he gets out of

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[297] Najib Azca, 2011, *op.cit.*
[298] *Idem*

prison, he wants to go to Australia to offer his apologies to the victims' families in their homeland. He says:

> *I will continue to ask for forgiveness from the victims and their families, from anyone affected by violence (bombings) in which I was involved. I will never stop asking for forgiveness.*

In addition, Imron also wants to warn young Muslims that violent jihadism should only be waged in a war zone or an area where Muslims are attacked or killed. That would rule out Indonesia. In 2011, when a local TV interviewed him in jail, he confidently urged Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to give up and renounce violent jihad. He said:

> *I want to suggest that Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir should call on his followers to abandon violent-jihad. I know exactly that he is an icon for many and his comments would carry substantial weight.*

Nowadays, facilitated by the Indonesian police, Imron also sometimes appeals to other Muslim extremists both within and outside prisons to think long and hard about the damage caused by the bombings and how such attacks hinder rather than help their cause. However, he also has come to realize that there are many pros and cons pertaining to his decision to leave and later on criticizes JI. To those who doubt his remorse, Imron says:

> *How can they say I am faking? I was called a traitor and some of my old friends declared my blood halal (or permissible in Islam) and they declare it would be legitimate to kill me?[299]*

Imron also recently criticized Imam Samudra's understanding of violent jihad. In his book, *Aku Melawan Terrorist/I Fight the Terrorist*s (2004), Samudra writes that since the main target of BB1 was the Americans and their allies that were involved in attacking the Muslim community (*ummah*) in Afghanistan in 2001, and they deserved to be attacked as an act of jihad. Samudra alluded to the colonial powers who are involved in attacking helpless and innocent babies with those who are referred to in the al-Qur'an as the Arab polytheist (*musyrikin*) as indicated in Surah at-Taubah 36.[300] Samudra explains that war must be waged against those enemies in retaliation for what they

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[299] See The Jakarta Globe, 7 October 2012, *Bali Bomber: "I Want To Offer My Apologies to Australian"*.
[300] Al-Qur'an Surah at-Taubah 36 saying that "*...And fight against those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God, all together—just as they fight against you, (O believers), all together—and know that God is with those who are conscious Him*".

have done. In this regard, al-Qur'an Surah Taubah 36 acts as guidance and justification for his bombings.[301]

In his book, *Ali Imron Sang Pengebom/Ali Imron the Bomber* (2007), Imron formulated several points of criticism to challenge Samudra's justification for BB1. First, Imron refers to the absence of Islamic leadership/state as the condition for jihad as well as the leaders' lack of support from the majority of group members. Imron, for example, refers to the tensions and conflict between Dul Matin and Imam Samudra, between those who favored playing western songs in their car and those objected to it. Imron also refers to the following: (2) The erroneous motives and objectives; (3) violations of the ethics of Jihad (attack without waring); (4) misplaced revenge (not in war zone or area where Muslims are attacked); (5) creating enemies and causing trouble for themselves (people become angry and the police will capture the perpetrators); (6) violating justice and truth; (7) simplifying the use of suicide terrorism; (8) lack of carefulness in choosing targets of action; (9) self-imposed Jihad; and (10) lack of support from the Muslim community.[302]

Imron goes on to question Samudra'sassumption that he and other BB1 perpetrators are among the *Thaifah Manshurah/TM* (literally means the victorious group)*,* the group that according to several Prophet Hadith will be saved on Judgment Day (*yaum al-qiyamah*). According to several Hadiths, the TM is a group of Muslims who follow the Prophet, involved in as well as assisting the Muslim community (*ummah*). Imron explains that if we look deeply at the personal background of all those perpetrators, they cannot be categorized as the TM since they do not fulfill the detailed requirements formulated by several Muslim scholars (*ulama*). Imron also warns that we must be careful when they claim the religious high road like the *Tha'ifah Manshurah*.

It appears that Imron intends to disengage from Samudra's version of Jihad, but not necessarily from JI (of which he is not critical). He renounces Samudra's version of jihad because it allows indiscriminate attacks against any enemy targets including civilians, women, and children. Imron explains:

> *In my opinion, conducting Jihad such as the Bali Bombing [BB1] must be stopped and prevented because such activities attract more mudharat [negative effects]than mafsadat [positive effects],which according to the sunni legal*

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[301] Noor Huda Ismail, 2008, *Ali Imron's Book: What Does It Tell Us?* See: www.thejakartapost.com. For more complete Samudra's opinion about jihad, see Imam Samudra, 2004, *Aku Melawan Teroris/I Fight the Terrorist*, Solo: Jazera.

[302] Ali Imron, 2007, *op.cit,* pp. 212-213.

philosophy [ushul fiqih]as proposed by sunni-jurist Imam al-Mawardi should be avoided.

Imron emphasizes the legitimacy of jihad and the individual obligation to wage it when Muslims are under attack. He also adds his opinion about jihad that Muslims who are too weak to confront or not in a war zone or area where they are under attack should focus on the preparation of jihad (*I'dadiyah)*. He says:

> *In my opinion, Muslims who are too weak to confront a much stronger enemy and not in a war zone or area where they are under attack should focus on preparation (I'dadiyah) and building up their strength. If we think deeply about the Indonesian context, viewed from a cost benefit-analysis (between the manfangat-mashlahat and the madharat-mafsadat), bombing attacks areacounter-productive strategy. In Indonesia, it is clear that such attacks have a lack of support from the Muslim community (ummah) and to some extent the attack has only caused them to weaken and divide the ummah.*

Regarding how he changed his mind about jihad, Imron argues that it is justifiable in Islam to have an old opinion and new opinion on certain religious issue. During the interview, he once mentioned Imam Syafii's, a knowledgeable Islamic jurisprudence scholar (*ulama fiqh),* explanations about old opinions (*qaul qadim)* and new opinions (*qaul jaded*) about certain religious issue.[303] Furthermore, Imron says:

> *Conducting jihad using bombings like the one in Bali is disputable among the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Some say it is correct while some say it is wrong. Whereas I previously had followed that opinion from those who justified the bombing, I then changed my side to follow those who refused the justification of bombings. This is justifiable and there is nothing to forbid it.*

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[303] Abu Abdillah al-Syafi'ie (767-820) is a Muslim jurist from Gaza Palestine. He was active in juridical matters and his teaching eventually led to the Syafi'i school of *fiqh* (Madzhab) named after him.

From Terrorism Operator to the Police Assistant

Imron once looked for a presidential pardon and hoped to see his life-sentence in prison commuted to 20 years. However, in 2009 the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono/SBY has refused to pardon Imron. Apart from this, Imron promised to assist the Indonesian police efforts to de-radicalize Muslim extremists. Since 2004, he has been providing information to the police about the JI network and speaking out against terrorism. Imron says:

> *I help the police because I know what the terrorists think. I know how they will try to get their weapons and explosives. I know what kind of place they will target, for what kind of action and I know how they would carry it out. I know how they will hide from the police on the run and how the terrorists recruit new members and who is most vulnerable to the extremist message. I am giving all this information to the Indonesian police so that I can help to stop violence and terrorism.*

Together with Nasir Abas and Mubarok (the latter is also former extremist who is serving his life sentence for his role in BB1), Imron has either visited or invited JI prisoners, ex-prisoners and potential JI recruits, particularly those trained in Afghanistan and Mindanao in order to sway their violent jihadism. For example, facilitated by the police, a meeting was held outside Jakarta in which Imron, Mubarok and Abas invited 40 JI members for a debate on their jihad struggle. A very encouraging 38 of the 40 invitees turned up, and in addition to providing the police with the valuable opportunity to gain insight into these JI members, it also importantly provided thelatter the chance to see that the police officers were not quite the disembodied, abstract evil troops of the non-Islamic but Pancasila state, as their ideology had taught them to believe.[304]

Furthermore, the invitees engaged with Imron, Mubarok and Abas on how JI's worldview contradicted the basic tenets of al-Qur'an and the Prophet's Hadith and how the 2003 JW Marriot and the 2004 Australian Embassy bombings had killed Muslims apparently in a potent line of bombing attacks. The upshot of the meeting was that at the very least, the JI invitees, while still committed to pursuing Islamic law (*shariah*)-based state in Indonesia, appeared to be persuaded that non-violent jihad means were superior to violent approaches. Imron explains that the Indonesian police pay all invitees for their travel and

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[304] Kumar Ramakrishna, 2009, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia*, Westport CT: Praeger Security International

accommodation costs and give them financial assistance especially for their children's education. The police also help them to find new jobs based on their respective skills. Imron says the strategy is mostly working.

Professor Sarlito Wirawan Sartono, a psychologist who is involved in the deradicalization program, explains that since 2010 the program has applied 3 strategies: culture (using traditional wayang/puppet shows, either *wayang-orang*, *wayang-golek* or *wayang-kulit* and all stories contain religious ethic messages), business (trying to establish an economic base for extremists, both in prison and outside), and ideology (countering the radical brainwashing, in cooperation with the Faculty of Psychology at the University of Indonesia and the PSQ/Center for al-Qur'an Studies led by venerable moderate Muslim Prof. Quraish Shihab).[305]If the business method through financial incentives was accepted from the beginning, regarding the culture (watching the wayang/puppets) initially it was rejected by several members of the deradicalization program as they suspect it was based on un-Islamic culture. However, after the team convinced the member that the wayang story consists of several parts of Islamic history and values, they agreed to join the program and watch the wayang. The ideology method through sermons and discussions forum was also initially in high-tension and emotional with several members being very angry and even walking out of the forum during the debate, but they gradually follow and always stay in the forum and can control their tension and emotion.[306]

Ali Imron says he also has tried to influence people outside prison to help combat violent jihad ideology. He is using media to steer others away from the violent jihadismhe had chosen. Imron confidently claims that students (*santri)* at his family's Islamic boarding school (*Pesantren*) in Lamongan, East Java would become suicide bombers if he asked him to. Instead, he sends them the opposite message. From prison, he preached a non-violent jihad as a spiritual struggle in the name of God, recorded it on audio-cassette and he sent it to his family's *Pesantren*. He recalls:

> *I have been writing a book since I was in prison and other material about my new opinion on jihad. Also, every time when my family or friends visit me or I send a message to other people outside prison, I always say it was a mistake to carry out the bombing attacks. In short, bombing in Indonesia was the wrong kind of jihad.*

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[305] Sarlito Wirawan Sartono,*Interview,* Jakarta. September 2010.
[306]*Idem*.

However, Imron's old brother Ali Ghufron (also involved in BB1 and executed for his crime) at the same time was hard at work making a cassette for the students of the same *Pesantren* but urging them to follow his ways and become a terrorist. Imron says it is a battle for influence because he and Ali Ghufron both sent letters and cassettes to the same audience. Imron recalls:

> *It is a tough thing to deal with personally and tough for teachers there because I ask the santri (students) to follow my explanation, while Ali Ghufron calls on them to carry out violent jihad. We have to wait and see who would win the battle for influence.*

Regarding this battle, Imron claims he has had some success in dissuading other people from violent jihad. He recalls:

> *Yes, there have been some success stories, Alhamdulillah (Thank God). Until now, you see none of my santri (students) or former students is involved in terrorism and none of my close friends are involved. However, there are more things to do and I will keep working to stop terrorism.*

Like Abas, the story of Ali Imron has also been a part of a 130-pages comic book, *Ketika Nurani Bicara/When the Conscience Speaks* (2010). The comic attempts to explain BB1 and teach young people about the evils of terrorism. It was published by Lazuardi Biru, an Indonesian NGO that concerns itself with counter-religious extremism. The comic tells the story of BB1 from three perspectives: Haji Agus Bambang (a man who helped the rescue team after BB1), Hayati Eka Laksmi (whose husband was killed during BB1), and Ali Imron (one of the perpetrators of BB1). In this comic, Bambang shares his experience of helping evacuate the BB1 victims, Laksmi tells about her struggle to support her children without her husband and Imron reveals his involvement in BB1 and his subsequent remorse.[307] Throughout the comic, Imron also give readers tips and tricks to help them avoid being recruited by extremist groups.

When the comic was launched on September 27, 2010, Imron appeared in a video played at the beginning of the program. In that video, Imron said that he did not want to see young Indonesians people following his path. He also said: *I hope young people are not easily influenced by jihads that have incomplete meanings.*

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[307] Ni Komang Erviani, 2010, *Comic Book About Bali Bombing Released,* see: www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/10/12/comic-book-about-bali-bombing-released.html

JA'FAR THALIB'S POST-LIMINAL JIHAD

The Laskar Jihad Is Not Linked to Terrorism

While the establishment of LJ in 2000 was based on consultation with and the edict (*fatwa*) from several Salafi Muslim scholars (*ulama)* in the Middle East, the dissolution of LJ two years later was also based on many of the same reason. However, it was also allegedly linked to international as well as Indonesian developments following the September 11 Attacks in the US.

There is no question that after the 9/11 attack, Salafi leaders became increasingly concerned about repeated (and false) accusations in the media that the LJ was linked to al-Qaeda. If Thalib was consistent about anything, it was his disdain for Osama bin Laden as a *khawarij*, a deviant whose blood could be shed (*halal darahnya*) under the Islamic law (*shariah).* However, there were concerns from members of the Salafi group that if LJ was accused (unfairly) of links to al-Qaeda, the whole Salafi movement could suffer.[308]

There has also been the question of external support for LJ, allegedly from al-Qaeda. According to *Tempo Magazine*, bin Laden, the former leader of al-Qaeda, met Thalib in 1987 and offered funding for the organization but Thalib turned it down, although the JI's Laskar Mujahidin did not. Thalib argued that bin Laden is very empty in terms of his knowledge of Islamic teachings and therefore Thalib went to great pains to distance LJ and himself from bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network, though he had never previously done so. Thalib says:

> *LJ is not linked to al-Qaeda or any other groups associated with Osama bin Laden or any form or part of his network in the world. I declared that the LJ distances itself from Osama bin Laden and his followers.*[309]

However, far more important than this concern was the conviction from several members of the Salafi group that Thalib, through his activities with LJ, had deeply violated several Salafi principles. They suspected that the LJ was increasingly taking on the characteristic of a political group, that Thalib was consorting too far and too often with politicians, and that by becoming a high-profile media personality and beloved face for television

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[308] ICG, 2004, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism & Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, Brussels: Asia Report No. 83 Southeast Asia, 13 September 2004, pp. 16-18.

[309] Zachary Abusa, 2003, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror,* London: Lynne Riener Publisher, pp. 70-71.

cameras, Thalib was will fully transgressing Salafi structures against the representation, in art or in photograph, of living beings. [310]

Several members of Salafi group then wrote a letter to Sheikh Rabi' in Medina outlining concerns about the change in Thalib's behavior. To follow up, they sent two of Thalib's most vocal critics to Medina in September 2002 to directly consult Sheikh Rabi'. The Sheikh refused to receive them but was reportedly angry with Thalib. The Sheikh sent two cassettes back containing his discussion with two other Salafi Muslims scholars (*ulama)*; Sheikh Ibrahim al-Rokhani and Sheikh Abdul Malil Ramadanu al-Jaziri, about the impropriety of Thalib's behavior. Additionally, the delegates were entrusted with a third cassette, to be delivered directly to Thalib that instructed him to immediately disband LJ.[311]

Several parts of the Sheikh Rabi' speech that was addressed to Thalib is as follows:

> *We had previously issued a fatwa (edict) permitting jihad but we had set forth conditions for that jihad [...] then they went ahead and rushed into a jihad that violated my conditions. There was criticism from all fronts, but we defended Thalib and his friends [...] in the context of a greater good, which they achieved by opposing the enemies of Allah in Ambon [...]. We regarded it as a Salafi jihad, until I received a letter outlining instances of deviation, into which Thalib and his friends have fallen. I examined these deviations and felt disappointed because the Salafi jihad can change to become an ikhwani jihad and become no different than the jihad of the Muslim Brotherhood (ikhwanul muslimin) [...].*
>
> *I am not happy with the way Thalib and his friends behave like the ikhwani Jihad because they are all being taught according to the Salafi manhaj [...]. I hope you understand this that you realize the political games being played and not get taken in by them, because the fruits will all go to the Muslim Brotherhood and not to the Salafimovement [...], if you continue, it means you have joined the Muslim Brotherhood [...].[312]*

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[310] ICG, 2004, *op.cit*.

[311]*Idem*

[312] The rejection among the Salafi group of the struggle of ikhwanul Muslimin is to some extent paradoxical with the slogan of all Muslims are like one body as I previously described. However, such rejection between one and another Islamic movement is common. See, for example, ICG, 2004, "Indonesia

Thalib held two meetings with the leaders of the Salafi group after receiving Sheikh Rabis' cassette and on October 3, 2002, more than a week before the BB1 attack—Thalib, the LJ leader, decided to disband not only the LJ but also the forum. While Thalib accepted the decision, he reportedly continued to maintain that regardless of what happened to the group, it was still incumbent on all Muslims to wage jihad in the Moluccas. Two Salafi leaders, Lukman Baabduh and Umar Sewed, considered this willful disregard of orders from a leading Salafi Sheikh and they began to treat Thalib like an outcast. Thalib's participation in several public events attended by non-Salafi further increased the anger among the Salafi members, who considered those events exchanging greeting with *bid'ah* (religious innovation) that according to the Salafi ideology is considered forbidden under the Islamic law (*shariah*).[313]

The Salafi members asked Ustadz Mahri again to report these heretical undertakings to Sheikh Rabi' who promptly issued an edict (*fatwa*) effectively declaring Thalib as a non-Salafi. A detailed account of Mahri's conversation with Sheikh Rabi' was posted on the Salafi website under the title, "*Ja'farUmar Thalib Telah Meninggalkan Kita"/"*Ja'far Umar Thalib Has Left Us." Thalib then immediately wrote a bitter rebuttal attacking his former protégés whom he claimed to have helped by getting scholarships to Medina and introducing them to the famous Salafi sheikhs. These "pubescent youths" were now using the latter as rubber stamps to justify whatever they wanted to do including being hostile to him. After the dissolution of the Salafi Forum and his falling out with some of the Salafi figures, who were once part of it, especially Umar Sewed, Thalib lost much of his followers, to the point that when violence broke out in Ambon again in April 2004 and Thalib threatened to revive LJ, few thought that he could mobilize any of the old rank and file.[314]

After the dissolution of the LJ, Thalib defended the existence of its group's umbrella FKAWJ. It still operates and politically remains an important group. Thalib explains that nowadays it has offices in 70 cities around the country. It operates several large Islamic schools (*madrasah*) and other organizations that espouse a brand of Salafi. It owns businesses, fundraises, and publishes a weekly Salafi magazine. Regarding his political views, Thalib himself declares that he is against democracy, which he considers incompatible with Islam. He also does not endorse any political party but in contrast, as he claims, several political parties always ask him to endorse and even join them. Thalib argues that any

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Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix", in *Asia Report No. 83*, 13 September 2004.
[313]

[314]*Idem*

state should be governed by the Islamic law (*shariah*) as the law of God, rather than the law of individuals and that democracy should be replaced by a council of Muslim scholars (*ulama*), usually referred to as the *ahlu al-halli wa al-aqdi* (literally meaning those who bind and loosen).[315] This council, in Thalib's opinion, would have the power to appoint the president and have control over the government policies.[316]

Since mid-2003, Thalib has focused largely on his Pesantren Ihyaussunnah in Yogyakarta. He has been busy with teaching his students, supervising the regularly-scheduled religious study groups with a particular focus on the Salafism, and publishing a Salafi magazine. He also preaches Islam to Muslim audiences in Indonesia in discussions and seminars in various cities and sometimes he appears on the media.

Terrorism Is Not Jihad:
Ja'far **Thalib Criticizes JI & Its Members**

In 2010, a TV station in Indonesia held a dialogue program with Ja'far Thalib and other 2 terrorism analyst under the topic "Ba'asyir *in the whirlpool of terrorism.*" In that TV program (Metro TV, Tuesday August 10, 2010), Ja'far Thalib explains that JI and its members' understanding of jihad. Thalib argues that by adopting terrorism as a means of achieving their goals, the JI and its members have practiced *bid'ah* (religious innovation), something that according to Salafi opinions like Thalib's, is not recognized in Islamic teaching. He asserts that he could not accept the principle of and the way in which the JI operates. Therefore, Thalib claims that he will support any government efforts to clamp down on the global al-Qaeda linked group in Indonesia, the JI.

Furthermore, according to Thalib, the JI follows the principle of certain groups in Islamic history called *khawarij*.[317] The group is well known for their justification of terrorism as a means of achieving its goals. The JI also follows *khawarij* about the ideology of *takfiri,* meaning that people outside their circle can be quickly considered infidels (*kafir*). Thalib says:

> *We, of course, do not like that. We are obliged to conduct a scientific evaluation before considering someone or other groups as infidel (kafir). We*

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[315] *Ahl al-Halli wa al-Aqdi* is a council of Muslim scholars (ulama) and other intellectuals and community leaders who would govern according to the letter of Shariah (Islamic law).
[316] Zachary Abusa, 2003, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror,* London: Lynne Riener Publisher, pp. 772-73.
[317] *Khwarij* literally means exiter, derived from the Arabic word kharaja (exit).

> *definitely do not consider other Muslims outside our group as infidel (kafir) as the whole.*[318]

Furthermore, Thalib explains that *Khawarij* in the Islamic history arose when there was political tension between Ali bin Abi Thalib (the Prophet's companion) and Mu'awiyah bin Abi Sufyan. In this tension, *Khawarij* was a supporter of bin Abi Thalib. However, after bin Abi Thalib agreed to a *tahkim* (peace agreement) with bin Abi Sufyan, *Khawarij* rejected it and immediately decided to withdrawal their support from bin Abi Thalib. *Khawarij* literally comes from the word *khoroja*, meaning out. They accused bin Abi Thalib and his followers of violating God's law and caught as well as killed some of them who were hiding in the Sahara. *Khawarij* also killed Muslims who have different beliefs and opinions from them.[319]

Thalib accuses JI as *khawarij* followers because they both always claim that their opinion is the only representative voice of Islam. They both also consider Muslims with different beliefs and opinions as *sesat* or religiously misleadingand even labels them infidels (*kafir*). They also aspired to havetheir opinion that based on certain interpretations; Islam allows violent ways to be a common-morality. *Khawarij* have the opinion that although they see other Muslims have a good moral in life, they will not be saved in the hereafter until they follow the *khawarij* way. The Khawarif opinion is the result of interpretation on the fatalistic theology, the so-called *aqidah jabariyah* (theology of determination) saying that all Muslims must believe in God not based on their reason (*aqal*) but on Holy Scripture (*Nash*).[320]

Besides, in Thalib's opinion JI holds public interest and public order in high esteem. He agrees with JI's opinion to condemn the US government but disagrees since JI is also against the American people. Thalib says:

> *It is simply not right. Muslims are not allowed to display hatred against a particular ethnic group. What we are allowed to do is to express our rejection of a government's political policy.*

When asked about his former group, LJ, which sent thousands of fighters (*jihadist*) to Poso, Ambon, etc., Thalib answered that it was totally different from JI's terrorism. What he and LJ had done was only to defend Muslims who were being attacked by the Christians and the government seemed to be impotent. Thalib says:

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[318] Sri Wahyuni, 2002, *Laskar Jihad Differs With al-Qaeda*, see: www.thejakartapost.com, 24 January 2002.
[319]*Idem*
[320]*Idem*

We established the LJ and then sent the jihadists (fighters) only in order to support Muslims in Eastern Indonesia. The thousandChristians in Mollucas, Poso, etc., slaughtered them. Unfortunately, the government did nothing to defend the Muslims. Subsequent governments also did not defend them from the Christian attacks. In light of that situation, we had no choice but to established the LJ and then sent the fighters to those areas in order to protect our Muslim fellows in the Eastern Indonesia.

Unlike JI's bombings, which broke the rules of jihad, Thalib claims that what LJ's actions in Poso, Mollucas, etc., always follows the rule of jihad. Thalib says:

Jihad does not just mean war. In al-Qur'an there are 13 types of Jihad. Sometimes it means a peaceful struggle. Sometimes it means doing good work. Sometimes it means a fight against Satan, and sometimes it means against the infidel. But all types of jihad must follow the rules revealed by al-Qur'an and the Prophet's Hadith.

When asked which type of jihad LJ had conducted in Poso, Mollucas, etc., Thalib immediately answered: *"In my opinion, I would say, all 13 types of jihad at once."*

Back To (Salafy) Pesantren

Since LJ's dissolution on October 7, 2002, Thalib's words and political maneuverings have rarely gained attention by the media. While previously holding the same function as the commander of LJ, after its dissolution, Thalib, the father of 10 children and the husband of 4 wives, was back to his Pesantren Ihyaussunnah. He says: *"I have recently returned to my original struggle, my original jihad, which is dakwah (preaching) and education."*

The Pesantren is located in Degolan, Ngemplak, Sleman, Yogyakarta, about 200 meters from the Kaliurang Street Km 15 in the cold area at the foot of the Merapi Mountain. Established in 1990, the Pesantren now has an official website (www.alghuroba.com) on which Thalib routinely answers any questions about religious issues posted by the visitors to the website. As a Salafi *ulama* (Muslim scholars), Thalib also suggests his student practice several Salafi-life styles such as wearing a long beard, a shaved moustache, trousers above the ankles, a white turban and white Arabian clothes, etc. Another

instance is also the *Kembulan*, eating together by putting food on a big-size tray.

However, unlike other Salafi Pesantren, it is also includes a swimming-pool (35 x 25 meters), located in the western part of the Pesantren. The pool is open every day in the morning (08:00-09:00) and in the afternoon after the Ashar prayer (17:00-18:00). Thalib encourages all students to learn how to swim so they can be healthy and have a strong body. Martial arts are also taught to all students (*santri*).

According to Thalib, his Pesantren teaches several subjects of Islamic teachings that referred to the classical books (*kitab*) from many Salaf Muslim scholars (*ulama*). Those *kitab* include *Majmuk al-Fatawa, written by Ibn Taymiyya;Tafsir al-Sa'di, by Ibn Nasir al-Sa'di;Syarkhu al-Sunnah al-Baghowi, by Ibn Muhammad al-Farra al-Baghowi;* and *Fathu al-Madjid, by Abdurrahman Hassan Alu Syaikh.* The Pesantren's main focus comprises three divisions: *tahfidh al-Qur'an* (memorizing al-Qur'an), *tadribu al-du'at* (managing the *dakwah*/preaching), and *tarbiyatu al-nissa* (teaching the Muslim-women).

Besides focusing on his Pesantren, Thalib also routinely travels to other cities in Indonesia to give sermons. He has recently supervised a program titled "*Bimbingan Islam Intensif*" (Intensive Supervision on Islam) in several cities. More importantly, Thalib always declares that he will continue to preach (*dakwah)* Islam peacefully and in moderate ways.

Thalib has recently realized that his ideology and activism in the past was too hardline. Consequently, he is currently focused solely on dakwah and education and he is prepared for his former hardliner fellows to criticize him. Thalib wants to correct what he has done and to enter into a *ukhuwah Imaniyah Islamiyah* (brotherhood based on faith and Islam). He writes in the Salafi Magazine:

> "*I once forget that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia have a lack of understanding about Islam. Previously, I thought it was equal to my student's Islamic understanding. Consequently, I responded to the violation of the Prophet's Hadith by Muslim people as hard as the violation by my students; meanwhile they both have different levels of Islamic understanding. I recognized it was dzalim (arbitrary). For those who understand Islam, we should condemn them when they violate the rules. But for those who do not yet understand Islam we should educate them when they violate the religion. Previously I also accused the*

majority of Muslims in Indonesia as ahlul bid'ah (religious innovator) and responded them as "the real" ahlul bid'ah. It caused my dakwah Salafiyah (preaching of Salafism) to be rigid and hard for them and therefore it was not acceptable. I recognize that I had a misunderstanding with them based on what I have learned from the books (kitab) of the Salaf Muslim scholars (ulama) about ahlul bid'ah.[321]

MATAHARITIMOER'SPOST-LIMINAL JIHAD

From Islamic State to Pancasila State

MT explains that during NII members' *tilawah* (recitation of al-Qur'an) program, the mentor always gives the analogy that the Islamic state that they will build is based on the Madinah-state during the Prophet Muhammad era. Meanwhile, Indonesia is seen as a Mekkah-state that is full of infidelity and is misleading. The diametric situation of the two states (NII and Indonesia) in one land led to the opinion among NII members that hijrah is the only way to choose and to do. They refer to al-Qur'an Surah al-Balad (90) verse 10 "*and pointed to him the way of two raised things*" and also verses 18 "*These are the people of the right*" and 19 "*But those who disbelieved our signs, they are the people of the left.*"NII interprets that what is meant by two ways are two states referring to NII as the right state (*al-haq*) and Indonesia as the left-state (*bathil*).

The analogy that Indonesia is the left state (*bathil*) also referred to the era of the Pharaoh that leads his state in authoritarian ways and therefore crosses the limit, oversteps boundaries and rebels (thaghut). The Pharaoh state is well described in al-*Qur'an* surah Thoha (20) verse 24 "*Go to the Pharaoh, indeed he has transgressed*" and surah al-Qashash (28) verse 4 "*Indeed, the Pharaoh exalted himself in the land and made its people into factions, oppressing a sector among them, slaughtering their [newborn] sons and keeping their females alive. Indeed, he was one of the corrupters.*"

The analogy of Pharaoh-state and Indonesian-state can be seen in the table below.

Pharaoh State	Indonesian State
Causes the citizens to be divided	*Indonesia is divided because of multiculturalism in the form of social-conflict. Islam also is divided*

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[321] Ja'far Thalib, 2005, "Saya Merindukan Ukhuwah Imaniyah Islamiyah", in *Salafi Magazine*, 5th Edition, 2005, pp. 9-10.

	in the form of NU, Muhammadiyah, PERSIS, Ahmadiyyah etc.
Discriminates against certain group.	*The Indonesian government causes difficulties for citizens through enhanced oil prices, premiums, and selling country-assets.*
	The Indonesian military kills those who oppose to the government even for Islamic reasons, such as holding aqidah, i.e. NII's imam (Kartosuwiryo) who was sentenced to death.
The pharaoh makes at least 2 damages; state law and management. They become authoritarian in running the government and their statements became law that must be obeyed by all citizens during their period.	*Indonesian government implements positive law, namely KUHP made by the Dutch the colonial. Therefore, all crimes are not punished based on justice but by so many deviants such as corruption, collusion and nepotism.*

However, as times goes by, MT has reversed his opinion about which state is the Pharaoh.

At the end of May 1998, I watch the news daily about the "transfer of power" from the President Suharto to the vice-President BJ Habibie witnessed by head of Supreme Court, Sarwata. Habibie read the Presidential pledge to become the new President. Wiranto, the General, also appeared to make sure all people that Indonesian Military (ABRI) will guarantee the safety and dignity of the former President. On the TV screen, Suharto and his first daughter Tutut were leaving the state-palace, marking the end of his dictatorship that had ruled Indonesia for 32 years. One week after the May 14, 1998 riot, the Suharto regime fell after the students protested alongside those who condemned the regime that had become corrupt and arrogant.

One thing on my mind is that none of those who contributed to the fall of the Suharto regime came from the Islamic underground organization I hadjoined for years. I wonder because in every training program in the organization to their new cadres, they always explain their vision to overtake the Suharto regime. And it never

happens. I think they are not able to do so since they are too busy with their internal affair that in my opinion is likely aminiature Suharto regime but is simply underground.

This is proof that the underground organization under the banner of Islam, are only a group of people who try to make money from their members. They always hide from Suharto regime Intels, but they have done nothing to coup the regime.

What makes me curious is that the underground organization still exists until now with the same activities. Nothing changes. I think the organizations' elite are trying to find other new sacred arguments for their members after the fall of the Pharaoh. I really hope that their cadres will uncover as soon as possible the hypocritical visions and activities among the organization's elite. I am pleased to help them all on this matter.

MT now sees that NII analogy about the Indonesian leader as the Pharaoh is no longer justifiable. Under the Suharto Regime, the Government of Indonesia oppressed many Muslim groups to maintain his status quo. But for MT, after the regime fell in 1998, Indonesia had given more than ample room for Muslim groups to express their ideology and activism. In contrast, after looking at the deviant-behavior of several NII leaders, MT considers them as the real Pharaoh.[322]

NII's New Mission & Strategy

NII always uses Islamic teachings as sources of legitimacy for their jihad. They operate on the basis that the state is equal to religion (Islam) and there is no state without religion. NII convinces that establishing a state is important due to the opinion that without state, religion (Islam) is meaningless. To establish a state, NII focus on 3 main important things: strong leadership (the *imam*), militant-members (*bai'a*t/oath) and financial support (tax, *infaq, shodaqoh* and even *fa'i*/money from the robberies, etc.).

Another important thing about NII is their secret-underground and closed nature regarding member recruitment and organizational structure, even though regarding the development of educational institutions they are now publicly open as shown

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[322] Mataharitimoer, *Interview*, Bogor, December 2010.

by Pesantren al-Zaytun in Indramayu, West Java led by Abu Toto, also known as Syaikh Panji Gumilang.

Therefore, NII actually has two different faces. The first face is NII's hidden agenda to totally change the Indonesian Republic into an Islamic state. It includes several opinions of Islamic teachings that are different from the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. For example, praying 5 times a day, fasting during Ramadhan month is not obliged since the Islamic state has not yet been established, and even allows stolen money with violent-ways from other Muslims and considers this money *fa'i*. The second face looks more moderate and friendly in that NII's jihad takes the form of dakwah and education, as evidenced by the educational Pesantren al-Zaytun, a large Islamic school (*madrasah)* ranging from kindergarten to higher education.[323]

Regarding the second face, MT recognizes that nowadays there is a shift in NII's recruitment tactics and targets, saying it is increasingly targeting university students, seeking to expand their educated youth base. MT says:

> *The recruiters from NII nowadays targets smart and rich students from renowned universities. It works to attract the attention of new students experiencing post-high school jitters. They pretend to offer these students a new paradigm of freedom.*

The NII recruiters also used to be easily spotted based on their attire but this became more difficult to identify when the group was forced to go underground. MT explains:

> *The female recruiters, for example, do not always wear the hijab (head-veiling). And the female targets are not always veiled. For men, in general, their trousers are worn above the ankle. They sport beards and skull caps. They do not get along with most college students and they do not talk much publicly.[324]*

MT also explains NII's different strategy, stating that in the past, recruiters would look for recruits exclusively at mosques and in prayer halls.Nowadays, it extends to the public area such as malls, music shows, etc. Consequently, it is quite difficult to block the covert movement of such a group since people cannot forbid students to hang out with them or develop their minds.

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[323] Dewi Triana, 2012, *Mengapa Aku Memilih Negara Islam?*, Jakarta:
[324] Mataharitimoer, *Interview*, Bogor, December 2010.

According to MT, NII also tweaked its rhetoric to make the group more palatable to younger recruits. While in the past, NII once used religious provisions in the Constitution (*UUD/Undang-Undang Dasar*) to justify the establishment of an Islamic state, nowadays the NII recruiters are less aggressive about pressing the idea. MT recalls:

> *Nowadays, the topic of their preaching is not always about the Islamic state. The NII recruiters elaborate on and show concern toward the implementation of Islamic law (Shariah) in an increasingly pagan society.*

Besides targeting students, the NII recruiters in Lampung are also allegedly targeting residents in rural areas. It is reported that several young people from the area were reported missing. Some victims claimed they had joined a discussion on religion, which argued that the Indonesian laws were against al-Qur'an. They also said they were inaugurated as members of NII. According to MT, the decision to target students in rural areas was made on behalf of security reasons as NII recruiters assume that the area is far from the reach of massive police investigations. Therefore, they feel more secure to develop the NII network in these areas.

From Underground Extremist to Moderate Muslim Writer

Mataharitimoer published his poems and fiction in Journals of Culture *Refleksi dan Dialog* from 1996-1998. His poems were also read by the host of Deltryco Radion FM in East Jakarta under the weekly program, "Poems and Songs" from 2004-2005. His fiction has been read by the host of Community Radio (Fishermen) Muara Kamal in North Jakarta.

Mataharitimoer is recently known as a blogger and book author. MT started blogging in 2004. He wrote about his experience with NII under the alias/pen-name "Mataharitimoer" and was approached by a publisher a year later. His first book *Jihad Terlarang/Fordibben Jihad* was released in 2007. He said that writing a book about his journey in NII and the reason why he chose to leave gave him closure. After this, he published additional books about social life.

In 2008, drawing confidence from the experience of having his voice heard, MT gathered together a group of former NII members and established the ICDW (Indonesian Center for Deradicalization and Wisdom). The ICDW collaborates with the Pesantren Darul Ulum in Bogor to provide scholarships for children whose parents are active or former members of NII. MT explains:

> *Since the parents have detached themselves from worldly goods, they have no income or occupation. The children are left uncared for and the ICDW assists them especially with their children's education.*

MT is also nowadays a part-time teacher at the Islamic school *(madrasah)* owned by the Pesantren Darul Ulum in Bogor, West Java. His wife, a doctor, is also working in the Pesantren's health center. He sometimes gives speeches in public seminars, especially about his experience in NII and his new interpretation about jihad after leaving NII. He shares:

When giving a speech in a seminar, I explain that what NII has done recently is a deviation because they do many things to harm the image of Islam. They think that only their group is representative of the truth and Islam. They hardly accept criticism and rely more on violence than dialogue to spread their message. This runs in contrast to Islam as a religion that aims to spread love to the world (rahmatan lil'alamin).

When I asked him about jihad and his previous aspiration for the Islamic state, MT answered that Jihad does not always mean war or joining a jihadist group. He prefers to conduct jihad peacefully in his recent ways by writing and education. He also no longer has aspirations for NII's conceptualization of an Islamic state. He says as long as the state does not oppress its Muslim people, all citizens have to support it and he sees such freedom for individual Muslim groups in post-Suharto Indonesia. He ends our interview with a short statement:

> *What the NII has recently done is nowadays no longer justifiable. I think my decision to leave it was right.*

DISCUSSION

NEW INTERPRETATION OF JIHAD:
FROM SALAFI-JIHADI TO PURE-SALAFI

After describing Abas, Imron, Thalib and MT's life story narratives of the post-liminal jihad, it is important to look at how their new interpretation of jihad has shifted from Salafi-jihadi to a pure-Salafi interpretation of jihad. However, MT has shifted from a new interpretation of Jihad like the majority of moderate Muslims in Indonesia.

Pure-Salafis and Salafi-Jihadis share a similar determination to restore the purity of the faith. They both regard themselves guardians of that purity and as the one group of Muslims who will gain access to heaven after the Prophet's warning, according to a Hadith, that the community will split into 73 factions and only one of which will find favor with Allah.[325] However, they differ on four key issues. (1) One as noted is whether it is permissible to rebel against Muslim governments, as pure-Salafi says no while Salafi-jihadists say yes; (2) Second, both differ in terms of organization whereby Salafi-jihadists claim that in order to achieve their political goals they require a level of organization that to pure Salafis, smacks of partyism; (3) Pure-Salafi tends to define the concept of jihad in broad terms along the lines of taking whatever actions are necessary to improve one's own faith while Salafi-jihadists defines it as a battle; finally, (4) Both group's prefer different tactics and acceptable methodologies for achieving their aims, particularly with respect to Jihad.[326] Abas, Imron and Thalib clearly share new interpretations of jihad that are in line with pure-Salafi.

In the case of Abas and Imron, unlike their former groups, the JI clearly hold that Salafi-jihadist interpretation of jihad, Abas and Imron are shifting from such interpretation. When criticizing BB1, for example, they both agree that in the absence of a true commander of the faithful worldwide, any jihad can only be defensive (*dafai'i*), rather than offensive, but they have radically different notions of what constitutes defensive. For pure-Salafi, a defensive jihad is permissible when Muslims are under attack and the faithful have the capacity to fend off attackers.

But Ali Ghufron has a different opinion. The older brother of Ali Imron, who was already executed for his role in the BB1, wrote

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[325] The prophet Hadith says "My (the Prophet) Ummah will get divided into 73 factions and each one will go to hell but saved one and that one is the real follower of the Prophet"

[326] ICG, 2004, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism & Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, Brussels: Asia Report No. 83 Southeast Asia, 13 September 2004, pp. 25-26

in prison "*The Bali Bomb Jihad: A Defence.*"[327] Of coure, his opinion of jihad is clearly in line with the ideology of Salafi-jihadi held by his group, JI. According to Ghufron, the best form of defense is attack. The aim of jihad, moreover, is not simply to protect other Muslims, but also to destroy any obstacle in the way of upholding Islam and to strike fear into the hearts of all enemies of Allah, among who should be included all hypocrites, idolaters, and *kafirs*. He terms those who have the power to create fear, *irhabiyyun,* and notes that the best English translation of this is terrorists.[328]

Ghufron also writes that there are many other reasons some pure-Salafi explain their reluctance to go to war, including that the blood of many Muslims could be shed without achieving any clear objective. For him, all these reasons amount to putting higher priority on personal opinion than on the hadith, which mandates jihad. However, even if almost all the people on earth refuse to wage war, there will always be a vanguard (*thoifah mansuroh*) who will go to war and who are the closest of all the ummat to the Prophet himself. The Salafi jihadis, including those who fight in Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Philippines, Ambon and Poso—and by implication BB1—are part of that vanguard. Ghufron defines pure-Salafi as the group that bases its understanding of Islam, and especially the issue of *aqidah* and within that,*tauhid,* on the Qur'an and hadith according to the understanding of the Salafi ulama including Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibnu Qayyim, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab, Abdul Aziz bin Baz, Muhammad Solih Uthaimin, Nashiruddin Albani, Muqbil al-Wadi' and others. But he dismisses such people as sufi-Salafis. If the prophet had waited until all his followers were steeped in knowledge, he says, they never would have defeated the kafirs in Medina. To treat jihad as something only the educated can attempt is therefore an innovation (*bid'ah*). Jihad should be seen as much an obligation for Muslims as prayers, alms, fasting, and the pilgrimage; it is a means to acquire religious knowledge, not contingent on it.

Abas and Imron both share that in the situation of defensive jihad, what should be of concern is that the intermediate goal is not violent jihad but only preparation *(*I'dadiyah), or even education (*tarbiyah*) and purification (*tashfiyah*) and that only Muslims with the requisite level of understanding should embark on jihad. Abas claims that the early JI period (1993-1999) under the leadership of Abdullah Sungkar JI shifted focus from the (Islamic) state to society. The focus was attention to education and dakwah (preaching). The JI postponed addressing other

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[327] Ali Gufron, April 2003, *Jihad Bom Bali: Sebuah Pembelaan,* the handwritten manuscript dated April 2003 appears to have been written as a defense plea but it was never actually used in court. ICG had a copy.
[328]*Idem*

agenda items to see first how society responded to the dakwah; this was, however, the era before the JI engaged in terrorist attacks under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

Abas and Imron's new interpretation of Jihad are to some extent in the mold of non violent JI factions. It is not that armed jihad in specific circumstances, but that it is allowed under certain strict conditions, such as on the battlefield in defense of Islam and that civilians should not be targeted. When Abas was asked if the al-Qaeda fatwa had not emerged, would he still have been part of JI network, training soldiers to go to kill the infidels somewhere in the world, Abas freely and tellingly admitted, "I think so, yeah."[329]

In Ja'far Thalib's case, the Ambon conflict brought the pure-Salafi and Salafi-jihadis in Indonesia more generally into direct confrontation. As noted, Thalib secured approval from some of the most revered Salafi scholars in the Middle East to send fighters to wage jihad in defense of their beleaguered brethren in the Moluccas. By 2000, fighters backed by senior JI members and representing a Salafi-jihadi perspective were also on the ground, and it was not long before the 2 groups clashed verbally, and in a few cases, physically. The pure-Salafi saw the struggle not only as a defensive jihad but as a way to protect the state from Christian separatists. Meanwhile the Salafi-jihadist saw Ambon as a part of a broader jihad against Christian/Western interests. Beginning in May 2000, with a fairly amateurish attempt to target Christian churches in Medan in avowed vengeance for the killing of Muslims by Christians in Ambon, JI began a chain of bombings that eventually led to Bali in October 2002 and the Marriot Hotel in August 2003.

Duringthe eruption of violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, following so soon after the Ambon conflict, sympathy for the Salafi-jihadi approach seemed to be more apparent. However, it is interesting to note how resistant by and large the Salafi network was to approaches by jihadist groups. The period of the most intensive JI recruitment in Indonesia, 2000-2002, coincided with the period of greatest solidarity within the FKAWJ, whose members were so doggedly opposed to anything that smacked of political organization. Therefore, while JI leaders put a high premium on the indoctrination of new recruits into the pure-Salafi manhaj, those recruits were more likely to be either young men from families affected by the violence, or from those associated in the past with DI or its various offshoots, or from other organizations that had provided some kind of community; youth mosques, Jamaah Tabligh, student organizations, but rarely pure-Salafi Pesantren. A former JI member confirmed to ICG that

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[329] Kumar Ramakrishna, 2009, *op.cit.*

Salafi-jihadist schools were poor sources for recruits, but there is interesting documentary evidence as well. In 1999, the central java *wakalah* (administrative division) of the JI produced a detailed list of 368 religious leaders in the province whom they had approached to see if they had any inclination to support JI activities. Only 8 on the list were strict Salafi-jihadi, and only one showed any interest.[330]

In the case of Mataharitimoer/MT, it seems he became more moderate compared to Abas, Imron and Thalib. He shares that he no longer has an aspiration for the Islamic state as he previously had. He totally rejects the use of violence in jihad by referring to his opinion that Islam is a religion that is open to innovation and that jihad has many interpretations. He thinks that in a peaceful state like Indonesia, regardless of what the people are and despite religious ideological differences, we should try to cooperate and walk hand in hand, instead of humiliating each other. MT also refers to al-Qur'an surah al-Hujurah saying that God has created different genders, ethnicity, races and nations so that human beings would acknowledge and respect each other, not divide and fight one another.

MT confidently accepts the Indonesian state despite the fact that it is Pancasila rather than Islamic-based state. He argues the state already follows Islamic principles and gives ample room for Muslims to express their religious views. Furthermore, MT explains that Islam cannot be compared to Pancasila since the latter is only a tiny part of the people-government interaction. Pancasila is only one of many solutions for an Indonesian state led by an authoritative leader. It can be in line with Islam. Pancasila is "Islamic"since it appreciates and guarantees the plurality and the needs of people such asequality, justice, brotherhood and welfare. However, MT recognizes that whatever it is, the Pancasila state, Islamic state etc., such success depends on the honesty and kind-heartedness of human beings.

Based on the above explanations, it is clear that the potency of violent-jihad from former Muslim extremists continues to exist. They just shifted their jihad ideology from Salafi-jihadi to pure-Salafi because of the situation and condition that forces them to recognize that it is unjustifiable to conduct violent jihad. However, as the ideology they still keep violent-jihad in their mind.

Abas's comments that if there was no 1998 he possibly would stillbe part of NI network is pungent and reflects the significant limitations of co-opting the good extremist approach. He and Imron, and for that matter the non violent JI factions, have not

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[330] ICG, 2004, *op.cit.*

eschewed armed Jihad but merely recognize restraints on its implementation. The right to employ armed violence in pursuit the Islamic state in Indonesia—the historic goal of the DI and then also JI—remains a potential instrument to be employed at the right time, the proper time, against America or against the Indonesian government. It is thus very important to recognize that the deradicalization program run by the Indonesian police where the good extremists engage bad extremists in debate, even if they are successful in compelling JI extremists to rethink their position on Jihad, seems to be purely mitigatory in nature.

Although Abas and Imron maybe sincere in their mission, whenever they meet potential JI recruits to open their minds, there are limits as to how far the mental opening can go. There is every possibility, after all, that given some future concatenation of events and circumstances, JI extremists would quite simply resume their violent ways and perhaps even joined by their DI cousins, should their leaders decide to declare hostilities. The real problem of the JI charismatic group, which included Abas and other non-violent JI factions, is that they remain radical in their heads, which is to varying degrees, they think, feel and act in accordance with the stock us-versus-them, good-versus-evil, the JI world view that makes them all, to differing extents, to be walking time bombs. Co-opting the good extremist option not only does not even remotely begin to address this latent problem, but it is powerless to prevent future cohorts of young Muslim from charismatic groups as well as the wider extremist groups in Indonesia, from being socialized within various ideological spaces into the binary, black and white world of JI, to an even more violent JI variety. Employing co-opted good extremist in a creeping deradicalization exercise represents simply ideological containment: the strategy encourages the acceptance of restraints on armed jihad, or better, a nonviolent path towards the goal of an Islamic state in Indonesia. This begs the larger question, however, of whether even non violent approaches to an Islamic state can be seen as optimal position from the binary worldview perspective. The answer is no; deeply-rooted xenophobic us-versus-them dynamic would almost certainly animate an Islamic regime based on the JI principles. This should not be surprising, given the strong uncertainty-avoidance cultural outlook that Arabized modernism in particular has bequeathed to the JI itself. The upshot of all this is simple; dealing with the root problem of the strong uncertainty avoidance orientation at the core of JI is beyond the pure view of short term, primary cognitive immunization efforts. Instead it requires complementary, longer-range, secondary cognitive immunization measures, directed not only at the JI charismatic group, but at the wider extremist groups in Indonesia in general. The aim must be to reduce the longer cognitive vulnerability of young Muslim men—future Ali Imrons, if you like—to the virulent JI views of the world. The

stock solution is to encourage critical thought aimed at opening up their worldviews through various modalities.[331]

NEW JIHADIST IDENTITY

According to Najib Azca (2011), quoting Poletta and Jaspers (2001), if identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation (as shown in the introduction and engagement of Jihadist to the Muslim extremist group), they also help explain people's exodus from such group. Azca explains that Jihadists take different paths during their imprisonment or its aftermath. Each of them lost their basic human freedom of physical mobility under the exercise of power and authority by the state, and this led to pressure on their identity, which had previously been defined based on their attachment and commitment to violent jihadismand loyalty to their groups. Furthermore, Azca explains that such pressure brings about 3 possible effects for violent Jihadists. Those include: identity-enhancement, meaning the attachment and commitment of jihadists to violent jihadism and their groupincreases, identity-shift meaning that this attachment is altered and identity-confusion meaning that the individual becomes confused.[332]

Following their experience with an investigation and later jail, Imron, Abas, Thalib, and MT altered their ideological convictions by publicly confessing, correcting their previous violentjihadism, and, eventually, in the case of Imron and Abas helping the police in the deradicalization program, in the case of Thalib not only going back to focus on his Salafi Pesantern but also sometimes cooperating with police (i.e.participating seminars and discussions facilitated by the police), and, in the case of MT, establishing an NGO named ICDW in which he independently created programs to help his former NII fellows to leave the group and to give support in the post-NII membership periods. This represents some sort of an identity shift.

According to Najib Azca (2011) borrowing Klandermans (1997: 102-103) he said that in the categorization of active defection, it can be seen that one is resigning one's union membership instead of resigning as a union activist.[333] For Abas and Imron, even though they both left their status as JI members behind and criticized JI's ideology and strategy on violent Jihad, both Abas and Imron continue to claimto be jihadists.

In Thalib's case, he recognized the dissolution of the LJ and argued that such a violent-jihad group was not needed based on the edict (fatwa) from his Salafi mentor, but thatLJ's umbrella

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[331] Kumar Ramakrishna, 2009, *op.cit.*

[332] Najib Azca, 2011, *op.cit.*

[333]*Idem*

FKAWJ in which Thalib is also a leader continues to exist and has even become a bigger group. With this position, Thalib easily claims himself to be a jihadist.

In the case of Mataharitimoer/MT, he left his status as a member of NII and even criticized NII's ideology and strategy vis-à-vis Jihad, but MT did not continue to claim he is a jihadist.

Therefore, Abas and Imron have shifted their social movement identity away from organizational identity as JI activists in the case of Abas and Imron and NII activist in the case of MT, to activist identity as a jihadist. For Thalib, the transformation has been a bit different. He has shifted his social movement from organizational identity; as the LJ activist to another organizational activist (the FKWAJ activist) of course both are jihadist groups with the same ideology but different strategy. Meanwhile, the case of MT is totally different from Abas, Imron and Thalib. MT has shifted his identity from organizational identity as an NII activist to a non-jihadist activist.

The above explanations also confirm Guobin Yang's (2000) observation saying that the degree of personal-identity change may vary with the depth of the liminal experience. Such experience varies in depth because social movements like extremist Muslim groups are not liminal to the same degree. The relative liminality of extremist groups implies that they do not transform identities equally. He assumes that the degree of personal transformation depends on the extent to which jihadists are freed from previous structural conditions and on the depth and intensity of the new experiences of jihadists. The stronger the contrast between pre-participation structural embeddings and the leveling effects unleashed by the group, the greater the liminal effect and the more profound the transformative power of jihadists. Most biographical studies on the impacts of post-participation in jihad groups fall into two categories; immediate and long-term impacts. Studies about immediate impacts in post-jihad participation show that the experience of being involved in jihad means that they still tend to become more committed jihad activists. They steadfastly hold on to their jihadism but use different activities to express their commitment than what they would have if they had stayed with the extremist group. However, work about long-term impact show their Jihad ideology becomes weaker and they tend to assimilate into normal life.[334]

For Abas, during his liminal period in the JI, he was the leader as well as trainer of the violent Jihad group but he previously had opinions about the interpretation of defensive and offensive

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[334] Guobin Yang, 2000, *op.cit.*

Jihad. In the post-liminal period, he had served a temporary jail sentence but has since returned back to society and is intensely involved in helping the police. Therefore, as long as he cooperates with the police, it seems that he will maintain his disengagement from JI, his previous group. In the immediate impact, what makes him different is the shift from violent jihadism, the Salafi-jihad to the less-violent jihadism of pure-Salafi. However, 11 years after the police captured him in 2003, he still claims himself a jihadist. Therefore, in the case of Abas, deradicalization will be the long-term impact.

During Imron's liminal period in JI, he was an operator of a violent Jihad group but Imron sometimes doubted the activities of the group and had been violent only in the name of group solidarity and respect for his older brother, Ali Ghufron, who was also the senior member in the group. Since he is now serving a life sentence in jail, it seems that Imron will easily maintain his disengagement from his previous group, JI. Like Abas, what makes Imron different in the immediate impact is his ideological transformation, from violent to less-violent jihad. Until now, 10 years after he was captured by the police in 2004, he still claims himself a jihadist; for him, deradicalization will also be along-term impact.

In Thalib's liminal period with LJ, he was the leader and the commander. Both the establishment and the dissolution of LJ were based partly on the edict (fatwa) from his Salafi mentor in the Middle East. The dissolution of LJ was also allegedly the result of pragmatic motives, between fatwa and political-economic privilege. In the post-liminal period, he was temporarily in jail but was recently was released back to society. He sometimes cooperates with the police. Therefore, as long as he does not receive any further fatwa to conduct violent jihad and his cooperation with the police is sustainable, Thalib's disengagement from violent-jihad-group can be ensured. In the immediate impact, what makes him different was the shift from Salafi-Jihadi to pure-Salafi. Since FKAWJ, the umbrella of his former violent jihad, the LJ, continues to exist and 12 years after the LJ was disbanded in 2002 Thalib still claims himself jihadist, deradicalization will also be the long term impact.

In the case of MT, during his liminal period with the NII, he was likely a sub-leader if NII's structure was based on MLM (Multi-Level-Marketing). He left the NII intentionally after becoming disappointed with the group and seeing that the Indonesian state had previously intended to work with NII. He has returned to society and no longer makes claims to be a jihadist. As such, he has shifted his ideology from violent to moderate jihad. For MT, therefore, disengagement and deradicalization are the intermediate impact.

Sarlito Wirawan Sartono, a psychologist working with the Indonesian police force's deradicalization program says it can take up to 3 years to convince someone not to act on their violent jihadism. At this rate, it would take decades to even talk to 1 year's supply of recruits from the extremist Pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) and the prisons. Sartono also claims that the program he works with also has an 80 per cent success rate. He says attacking the violent-jihad ideology head on simply did not work because the extremist imams still hold such sway. He says:[335]

> *I am not replacing anything. I leave their beliefs but I say do not do this and this [...] do not start hurting people [...]. Then we bring in the wives, family and say "How about helping each other? [...]. It is step-by-step process and it takes at least 3 years. It is not an easy job.*

Furthermore, Sartono explains that deradicalization must be based on the premise that terrorists were not mentally ill, but rather rational actors motivated by a genuine desire to change society. As a result, the key to reforming them was not ultimately through punishment but through moral suasion. Therefore, after several discussions with extremist Muslims, he concludes that discussion will not be effective at the ideological level, but effective at the applicative-operational level. For examples,the discussion about killing innocent people who do not attack Islam, about killing women and children, about the decision whether Java and Bali can be considered as a jihad zone of war, etc. Sartono recognizes that although low-level terrorists show signs of interest in new ideas, once they returned to their group their belief in violent jihad was usually reaffirmed. He suggests that bringing terrorist to see the impact of their violent attacks, including how devastated the families of Muslim victims were, seem to be effective in changing their mindset of violent jihadists.[336]

The adaptation of the extremist Muslim network's sub-culture is also crucial. Sartono, quoting Kumar Ramakhrisna, mentions five core elements of sub-culture. They include an intense sense of existential identity anxiety. Members of extremist Muslim groups tend to be gripped by the fear of extinction as a religious group identity in the face of westernization, secularization, nationalism and other generalized cultural threats. Second is a pathological propensity for black-and-white categorical thinking. Third is a strong sense of moral entitlement derived in part from their self-

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[335] Michael Bachelard, 2012, "J is for Jihad", in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 October 2012.
[336] Sarlito Wirawan Sartono, 2010, Interview, Jakarta

image of utopia as a pious community divinely elected to further social justice in the land. Fourth is the respect for seniors since extremist Muslim groups reflect the large power orientations. Fifth is the mimetic impulse to wrest away the power, status, and prestige that the infidels (kafir) are perceived to possess and claim these attributes for Muslims. Sartono urges that the appropriate strategy and method for the implementation of deradicalization must be mainly based on those sub-cultures, so that the initial process of deradicalization, namely having trust and good relations with Muslim extremists could be strongly built.[337]

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[337] Sarlito Wirawan Sartono, 2010, *Interview,* Jakarta.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE TRANSFORMATION
OF JIHAD

In this chapter, I conclude by briefly reviewing my research findings by revisiting the main arguments of this dissertation. Rather than summarizing the life histories of the Muslim extremists portrayed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I will discuss the contribution of this dissertation by explaining several empirical findings regarding the perspectives of several former Muslim extremists. Finally, I will try to build on the theoretical contribution of this dissertation to the cultural approach of the study of deradicalization.

Empirical Findings: The Voices of Former Muslim extremists

This dissertation enriches the academic study of the intersection between violent and non-violent jihadism and activism in three ways: (1) by comparing former Muslim extremists from different contexts and groups; (2) by exploring the jihadist trajectories of former Muslim extremists from pre-liminal, liminal and post-liminal jihad; and (3) by giving a voice to the actors (former Muslim extremists) about their personal narrative of jihad and its transformation.

While many researchers such as Zifirdaus Adnan (2008) and Najib Azca (2011) have focused on what occurs in the process of deradicalization, this dissertation focuses instead on the meaning of deradicalization for several former extremist Muslim groups with different contexts and groups. As I discussed throughout this dissertation, especially in Chapter 1, a review of several de-radicalized Muslim cases clearly shows that they do not have a common profile and that a wide range of reasons exist for their defections. Nonetheless, governments could learn many lesson from studying these varied contexts and groups. There are, in short, not one but many radicalization pathways and similarly also not one but many deradicalization pathways. Greater common factors—largely part of a cultural milieu—may compel some Muslim extremists to disengage or deradicalize. A shared history of conflict (either internally or externally), may be highly suggestive markers of possible deradicalization, but only up to a point. As I have pointed out, the case of Bagus Budi Pranoto, also known as Urwah, who re-joined the violent-jihad group after a break from Jihad in jail, needs further study about possible-recidivism among former Muslim extremists.

Much research has focused on the "surface" causes, for example Zifirdaus Adnan (2008), and the effect of violent jihad groups on

the post deradicalization, such as in Najib Azca (2011). This dissertation has used a different approach by looking at the shift in jihadism and activism starting from pre-liminal, liminal and post-liminal jihad. Therefore, this dissertation recognizes certain assumption about the complexity of violent jihad trajectories with the interesting phrase "*The devil, as they say, is in the details (and also the angel).*" The level of detail in this dissertation makes it possible to explore the transformation of jihad from the actors' perspectives and to reach different types of conclusions than what can be found in the cultural approach in the study of deradicalization. The current scarcity of fieldwork derived data and its analysis does not merit a firm conclusion, though it can be assumed that the trajectory of jihad until its transformation will follow similar patterns, at the very least in terms of shared interpretations of jihad and jihadist identities.

Finally, while most research on the topic has applied a "secondary-sources approach," including influential work by Petrus Golose (2009), Amanda Johnston (2008), Paul Pendelton (2009), etc., this dissertation tries to apply the primary-source approach by giving voice to the actors (former Muslim extremists) through their personal narrative of jihad in order to understand deradicalization. The Muslim extremists who narrated their jihad transformations are very-well known for their jihad ideology and activism. Yet, to some extent, questions remain about subjectivity of personal narratives. However, as Allesandro Portelli (1991: 51) explains, the reliability of oral life historiesis that oral sources are credible but have different levels of credibility. The importance of oral testimony may lie not in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism and desire emerge. Portelli also emphasizes the importance of meaning in the subjectivity of oral life history and therefore he indicates there is no false oral life history. The uniqueness of oral life history is that it tells us less about events than about their meaning. The unique and precious aspects oral sources possess in equal measure are the narrator's subjectivity. It is as much the business of history as are the more visible "facts." What several former Muslim extremists believe about their previous jihad ideology and activism, following Portelli's argument, is indeed a historical fact, as they believe it as much as what really happened.

Theoretical Findings: Cultural Approach of Deradicalization

The contribution of this research has been to follow theoretical development in the literature of a cultural approach in the study of deradicalization. This research has applied the study of deradicalization through a combination of life-history approaches and other cultural aspects related to the transformation of jihad.

In dealing the two approaches, I applied three stages of jihad borrowing as well as combining the theory of process model by John Horgan (2009) and the concept of liminality from Arnold van Gennep (1960) and Victor Turner (1969). I also borrowed the theory of pull and push factors by Tore Bjorgo (2000) to look deeply at the motive, events and situation behind the transformation of jihad. I argue that the process and experience of Jihad until its period of deradicalization and disengagement is a subjective but complex phenomenon. As such, the reasons for joining extremist group may be different from the factors that influence continuing involvement in the group, engagement in violent acts and disengagement from the group and or deradicalization their violent jihad ideology. Regarding the decision to disengage from extremist group and deradicalize extremist ideology during the transition period, I argue that it is because of either reasons, conditions, repercussions or a combination of these.

However, it begins with three endogenous processes: strategic calculations, political learning, and *weltanschauung*(s) revision(s). **First,** the process is based on rational-choice calculations and cost-benefit analyses. **Second,** the process is a product of socialization and interaction with the "other." The leadership will update its beliefs and reassess its behavior due to the behavior of their interaction partners. **Third**, the process is based on perceptional and psychological factors. It is a process in which the leadership of extremist Muslim groups modifies its worldview as a result of severe crises, frustration and dramatic changes in the environment. Regarding the transition period of Jihad, I argue that such transitions occur in the so called liminal-situation in the period of Jihad. Therefore the transformation means a cultural-survival for former Muslim extremists. In the radically disjunctive group of the Islamic movement, the nature of liminal transition becomes paramount to survive culturally. Liminality marks a period of alteration for Muslim extremists: a process of becoming, being inscribed by a new identity and initiated into a new power.

I also tried to formulate what constitutes the post-liminal jihad, after the transformation of jihad, for several former Muslim extremists in Indonesia in regards to their violent jihadism ideology and activism. I borrowed the theory of post-liminal by Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner, the colorful interpretation of jihad in Islam and the theory of personal identity changes by Najib Azca and Guobin Yang. I found, generally, post-liminal violent jihadists in Indonesia end up in prison, either for a life-sentence or a temporary sentence, and during this time, the Muslim extremists join deradicalization program run by the Indonesian police. However, individual deradicalization and the disengagement of jihadists are not always related to such

programs. Additionally, in the Indonesian context, most cases of post-liminal violent-jihadists bring about new interpretations of jihad and a new identity for the jihadist. In regards to the new interpretation of jihad, generally when violent jihadists reach a post-liminal jihad, their new interpretations of jihad most often shift from the Salafi-jihadism to pure-Salafi interpretations of violent jihad. It means to some extent they are only shifting from violent to less-violent jihad. They still hold and believe in violent jihadism but have strict rules for its application as well as implementation. There are only a few violent-jihadists who shift from violent-jihad to moderate and even non-violent jihad. If it happens, it results from a personal reflection and not because there is external persuasion, as the case of Mataharitimoer, formerly of NII, shows. Based on these findings, I conclude that the transformation of jihad does not guarantee that the potency of religious extremism will no longer exist; instead it proposes that it will continue to exist since Muslim extremists only shift their belief in jihad because of the situation and conditions they found themselves in, which forced them to recognize it is unjustifiable to conduct violent jihad.

In regards to the new identity of jihadist after their transformation of jihad, I found two impacts; immediate and long-term impacts. I argue that the immediate impact in the post-participation jihad show that the experience of involvement means that they still tend to become more committed to be a jihad activist. They claim themselves as jihadists, and continue to believe strongly in jihadism. They have, however, given jihadism a new meaning. In this case, the deeper the knowledge and experience of violent jihad, the more difficult it is for former Muslim extremists to be deradicalized. However, research on the long-term impact show that their Jihad ideology declines and there is a greater tendency for them to reintegrate in society.

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POST-SCRIPT

**WAKING UP THE SLEEPING-TIGER:
ISIS & RADICALIZATION OF MUSLIMS
IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA**

By: Suratno

My dissertation is about deradicalization and the disengagement of Muslim extremists in Indonesia. I began this research in 2010 and finished it in 2013. As such, this dissertation did not address the issue of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS that has gained global attention since early 2014. To fill the gap, in this post-script I try to explain and examine the radicalization of Indonesian Muslims in both supporting and joining ISIS, from those who are either in Indonesia or already in Iraq and Syria. This post-script focuses on the origin of ISIS, the supporters of ISIS in Indonesia, and the profile of Indonesian fighters who have traveled to Iraq and Syria. Finally, it concludes with a discussion about how Indonesian fighters reach Iraq and Syria, especially their routes and networks, the narrative of Indonesian supporters about ISIS and then the disengagement of several ISIS fighters.

THE ORIGIN OF ISIS

The organization calling itself the Islamic State (IS, also widely known by the older name as ISIS/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and the Arabic acronym DAISH/*Daulah Al-islamiyah fi al-Iraqi wa al-Shuriah*) has emerged as a major force in the struggle for the future of Iraq and Syria. ISIS' rise to global attention resulted from its capture of large areas of both countries since early 2014. The original predecessor of ISIS was *Jamaah al-Tauhid wa al-Jihad*/JTJ, which was formed in the terrorist training areas of western Afghanistan and relocated to Iraq in 2003 by a fugitive Jordanian extremist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.[338] In October 2004, he swore allegiance to the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden,

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[338] Abu Musab al-Zarqawi also known as Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalayleh and syaikh of the slaughterers was born in Zarqa Jordan on 20 October 1966. He run a paramilitary training camp in Afghanistan and became known after going to Iraq and being responsible for a series of bombing, beheading and attacks during the Iraq war. Al-Zarqawi established *Jamaah al-Tauhid wa al-Jihad*/JTJ in 1990s and led it until his death in June 2006. In late 2004 he joinedal-Qaeda and pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. After this, JTJ became *Tanzim Qaidah al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn*, also known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In September 2005, al-Zarqawi declared all-out war on Shiites in Iraq after the Iraq government offensive on insurgents in the Sunni town of Tal Afar. He is also responsible for the 2005 bombing of three hotels in Amman Jordan. Al-Zarqawi was killed in a targeted killing by a joint US force on 7 June 2006 while attending a meeting in an isolated safe house in Hibhib, a small village of Baqubah. See Craig Whitlock (8 June 2006), Ál-Zarqawi's Biography, *Washington Post,* Retrieved 23 April 2010.

after which the organization was consistently referred to as AQI/*Al-Qaeda in Iraq*. In January 2006, AQI changed its name to ISI/Islamic State in Iraq after merging with several smaller groups. Since 2011, ISI has been engulfed in civil war and saved itself from extinction by fleeing to Syria, although it re-emerged in Iraq by 2013. In the same year, ISI also emerged as an important fighting force in Syria. At this point, ISI changed its name to ISIS in order to reflect its interest in both Iraq and Syria.[339]

Some of Syria's armed Islamist opposition initially welcomed ISIS' support, but its extraordinary brutality and struggle to dominate the opposition soon produced a substantial backlash among anti-government group. ISIS also publicly claimed to have established authority over and correspondingly absorbed the large and powerful *Jabhat al-Nusra* Front, a major al-Qaeda affiliate already fighting in Syria. However, al-Nusra responded they had not been consulted on a merger and would not submit to ISIS. While their ideologies are close, both groups are not the natural allies they might initially appear to be. Al-Nusra is dominated by Syrian fighters who view their first priority as the defeat of Bashar Assad's regime; meanwhile ISIS has a stronger Iraqi and international leadership, and is more oriented to a global agenda than its rival and for this orientation ISIS changed its name to IS (Islamic State). In January 2014, ISIS provoked serious infighting against al-Nusra in Syria Raqqa, Idlib and Aleppo provinces. In February 2014, problems between ISIS and al-Nusra (al-Qaeda) reached a crisis point when Ayman al-Zawahiri[340] released a statement disassociating al-Qaeda from ISIS. Despite this affront, ISIS expanded its power by seizing territory already under control of al-Nusra and other rebel groups. In Iraq, ISIS's initial plan to capture territory was directed at Ramadi and Fallujah. All four Iraqi army divisions stationed in northern Iraq collapsed instantly when faced with ISIS assault and ISIS seized Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq after Baghdad. At that time, ISIS had more than 5000 fighters in Iraq and claimed to be planning to seize Baghdad, though this threat was not considered to be credible since Baghdad, a city with more than 7 million people, was strongly ruled by the Iraqi

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[339] Andrew Terril, 2014, "Confronting the Islamic State: Understanding The Strength and Vulnerabilities of ISIS", in *Paramater 44 (3)*, Autumn 2014.

[340] Ayman al-Zawahiri was born in Cairo Egypt on 19 June 1951 is the current leader of al-Qaeda and senior official of extremist groups which have orchestrated and carried out attacks in North America, Asia, Africa and Middle East. In 2012 he called on Moslems in kidnap Western tourists in Moslem countries. Since the September 11 attacks, the US State Department has offered US$ 25 million reward for information leading to al-Zawahiri's capture. He is also under worldwide sanctions by the United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee as a member or affiliate of al-Qaeda. See John Pike, 2012, *Ayman al-Zawahiri*, in www.globalsecurity.org, Retrieved 13 December 2012.

government with the support of the US army and its allies. Following the route of Iraqi security forces, on 29 June 2014 ISIS declared to the world an Islamic caliphate in areas it controlled and Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi[341] was declared a caliph.[342]

ISIS IN INDONESIA

When the Syrian conflict became the new battleground for global jihad, Indonesian extremists eagerly welcomed the development. They tried to legitimize jihad in Syria by constructing narratives that frame the conflict as a sectarian war between Sunni and Shia, a prelude to the last war between good and evil that signifies the end of time. These narratives are propagated through book publication and Syria-related charity events and seminars across the country, as well as myriad extremist websites and social media. Despite their shared interest in promoting Syrian jihad, Indonesian extremists immediately took sides as the rift emerged between al-Qaeda (al-Nusra) and ISIS. In general, the violence-now extremists side with ISIS while violence-later groups side with al-Nusra. That said, ISIS has initially attracted some of the senior extremists, notably Abu Bakar Baasyir, Abu Husna, etc., who later took a different opinion. Their sympathies may have been influenced by their fellows, in particular Aman Abdurrahman,[343] one of Indonesia's most influential extremist ideologues and a vocal promoter of ISIS.[344]

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[341] Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi also known as Ibrahim Awad al-Badri was born in Samarra Iraq on 28 July 1971 is the leader of ISIS which is composed of Extremist groups in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Northeast Nigeria, etc. He has been proclaimed by his followers to be a caliph. For more than a decade until 2004, al-Baghdadi lived in a room attached to a small local mosque in Tobchi a poor neighborhood in Baghdad. However, he obtained a BA, MA and PhD in Islamic studies from Islamic University of Baghdad. On February 2004 al-Baghdadi was arrested by US forces-Iraq near Fallujah and detained at Camp Bucca detention center but in December 2004 he was released as low-level prisoner. A number of media stated that al-Bahgdadi was interned from 2005 to 2009. On 16 May 2010 he was announced as leader of AQI (later on became ISIS) following the death of predecessor Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. As AQI leader, he was responsible for 28 August 2011 bombing at the Umm al-Qura Mosque in Baghdad that killed prominent Sunni Ulama Khalid al-Fahdawi and 23 attacks in south of Baghdad during March-April 2011. Following the death of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011, al-Baghdadi released a statement threatening violent retaliation for his death and it was followed with a series of attacks. He remained leader of AQI until its formal expansion into Syria in 2013 when on 8 April he announced the establishment of ISIS. After ISIS, over time there have been a number of report of his death or injury, however none has been verified. See Anonymous, 2014, *Profile: Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi*, in www.bbcnews.com, 5 July 2014.
[342] *Idem*.
[343] Aman Abdurrahman is an influential Salafi-turned-Salafi Jihadi scholar and Arabic linguist who was the prolific translator of the writings of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. However, he has dissociated himself from al-Maqdisi since the Jordanian cleric disappointed of ISIS. Most of Aman's writings are available on his website millahibrahim.wordpress.com. he was arrested twice;

By late 2013, the issue of ISIS versus al-Qaeda in Syria had become hot issue in Pasir Putih Prison where many extremists are serving their sentences. The Block D inmates who had been influenced by Aman Abdurrahman, including Abu Irhab, Beben Khairul Rizal, Abu Yusuf and Sapta became committed ISIS supporters. They tried to influence other prisoners by distributing Aman's translations of pro-ISIS materials. These inmates made a special effort to influence the senior figures so that there would be a follow-on effect outside prison. For example if they could bring Baasyir over to the pro-ISIS side, then maybe all JAT (*Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid*) members and other admirers would follow. Surprisingly, Abu Umar, who might have been predicted to be among the most extreme, was not ready to commit himself. Aman Abdurrahman frequently telephoned Baasyir on his mobile phone to engage him in discussion and explain why the criticism of ISIS from respected ulama was wrong. The same method was used on Abu Husna, since he was so close to Baasyir.

Furthermore, after a global declaration of the establishment of ISIS as a caliphate on 29 June 2014 with Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi as a caliph, euphoria associated with extremist groups grew. Three days later, on 2 July 2014, Baasyir and 23 other ISIS supporters took an oath of allegiance to the ISIS and the caliph in Block D prayer room. An ISIS flag was smuggled in for the occasion by the wives of one of the inmates wearing it inside out as a headscarf. In the end, Baasyir's decision to take the oath did not bring in as many others as the extremist ISIS group had hoped. Several key figures among the undecided were not swayed by Baasyir's action including Abu Umar, Wak Geng, Hari Kuncoro, etc. After Baasyirpledged his loyalty, Pasir Putih prison became an issue in the media, and officials began to watch Aman and his friends in Kembang Kuning prison more closely.[345]

However, on 30 June 2014, Aman Abdurrahman immediately swore an oath (*Baiat*) of loyalty from his prison cell. Three days later on 5 July 2014, several terrorist suspects held in Kelapa Dua took a similar oath. Their action was considered daring since none had been sentenced at the time. Generally the detainees tend to be well behaved because they know they can get heavier sentences when their trials come up if they are not. Iskandar, also known as Abu Qutaibah, led the oath. He is a member of

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first for facilitating a bomb-making class in 2004 and secondly for his involvement in the 2010 jihadi training camp in Aceh.

[344] Nayhat Nuraniyah, 2015, "How ISIS Charmed the New Generation of Indonesian Militants", in www.mei.edu/content/map/how-isis-charmed-new-generation-indonesian-militants, 09 January 2015 (Accessed in October 2015)

[345] IPAC, 2015, Support For Islamic State in Indonesian Prison, in *IPAC ReportNo. 15*, 19 January 2015

FAKSI[346] from Bima, West-Nusa Tenggara and another follower of Aman Abdurrahman. Iskandar was arrested in December 2013 in Bima, accused in MIB (*Mujahidin Indonesia Barat*/ Western-Indonesia Fighter) under the leadership of Abu Roban who was killed by Police in Central Java in May 2013. Iskandar also had received a share of the result from Abu Roban's robberies and had helped arrange training for his men with MIT (*Mujahidin Indonesia Timur*/Eastern-Indonesia Fighter). At that time, there had been a plan to establish a joint MIT-MIB camp in Bima, although it never materialized. However, Iskandar arranged for several members of his religious discussion forum in Bima to train with Santoso in Poso. Iskandar maintained his extremist views in detention and persuaded other extremist suspects there to support ISIS. He also maintained communications with friends through his mobile phone and reportedly having regular conversation with Aman Abdurrahman who also had a phone in Nusakambangan prison. On 20 July 2014, Iskandar called some of his followers in Bima and urged them to support ISIS and the caliphate. That same day, a few dozen of them met at Istiqomah Mosque and pledged their loyalty to the new caliph. The mosque was known for hosting extremist teachings and it was not only where Iskandar taught when he was in Bima but also the meeting place for Aman Abdurrahman's followers there.[347]

Furthermore, on 7 July 2014 M Fachry who was inspired by a report that Omar Bakri Muhammad had sworn allegiance to al-Baghdadi the day before, convened a Multaqad Dawiy meeting at UIN (*Universitas Islam Negeri*/State Islamic University) Jakarta in its mosque in which Fachry stated that al-Bahgdadi had met all the conditions for establishing a caliphate and that there was no reason for Muslims to hesitate any longer about declaring their support. Hundreds did so, and similar allegiance ceremonies were held in Malang, Solo, Makassar, Bengkulu, Lampung, East Kalimantan and elsewhere. By the end of August 2014 an estimated 2000 people had sworn oath. Not everyone knew what they were attending; some received text message, but had a little idea about that the program would end with an introduction ceremony. The vast majority of those 2000 will neither seek to go to Syria or have any interest in violence but the numbers are indication of the appeal that the idea of a caliphate can generate in a devout public.[348]

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[346] FAKSI (*Forum Aktivist Syariat Islam*/Forum of Islamic Sharia Activist) was established in early 2013 with M Fachry as the head and Bahrumsyah as Secretary-General. FAKSI's primary goal is to get the public to realize the importance of setting up an Imarah Islam and a caliphate. Its tools for doing so are al-mustaqbal.net, social media and open discussion forums called Multaqad Dawiy.

[347] IPAC, 2014, The Evolution of ISIS In Indonesia, in *IPAC Report No. 13*, 24 September 2014.

[348]*Idem*

PROFILE OF INDONESIAN ISIS FIGHTERS

From Study Abroad to ISIS: An Adventurous Jihad

Long before extremist group sent anyone to ISIS, an Indonesian had joined and died as a suicide bomber in Iraq, Wildan Mukhallad. He is a very young man, born on 6 January 1995, from Solokuro Lamongan, the same village as the trio of Bali Bombers, Ali Ghufron, Amrozi and Ali Imron. Wildan was also a 2011 graduate of Pesantren al-Islam in Lamongan, the school owned by the brother's extended family. Wildan moved to Cairo Egypt in July 2011, at the age of sixteen, to live with an older brother who worked there. His greatest goal was to attend University of al-Azhar in Cairo, which he entered after getting an equivalency diploma from an al-Azhar-linked high school. He had no affiliation with the extremist group before he left. As the conflict in Syria heated up in 2012 and Egyptians were leaving to join the anti-Assad Mujahidin, Wildan decided to go as well. In late 2012, he disappeared. According to his al-Azhar friends, who have since returned to Indonesia, he told people he was going back to Java, but in fact he left for Turkey, crossed into Syria and joined a group Katibah al-Muhajirin in Aleppo. The group had been formed by foreign fighters, mostly from the Caucasus and Central Asia, and was led by a man named Abu Umar al-Shisani. Because he was still a teenager and had no military experience he was not sent into battle. Instead he worked initially as a porter of arms and ammunition but also took part in military training. As his dedication became apparent he was assigned to the "police," directing traffic in a rebel-controlled area, and then moved to a contested border area. In 2013, he was finally given the green light to take part in the fighting. Around the same time, his organization Katibah Muhajirun merged with two groups to form Jaish al –Muhajirin wal Anshar. In May 2013, the rift between ISIS and al-Nusra exploded into the open, with smaller organization choosing between the two. It reached Jaish al-Muhajirin wal Anshar as well, splitting in between the two. Wildan chooses the pro-ISIS faction. He then had to choose between the two training camps, combat forces or suicide bombers. Wildan chose the second. On 10 February 2014, his family received word that he had died in Iraq, in a suicide bombing that probably took place in January 2014.

Similar to Wildan Mukhollad, there were also Indonesian students in Turkey becoming independent ISIS fighters, namely Yazid Ulwan Falahuddin and Wijangga Bagus Panulat. They both contacted ISIS foreign fighter through social media when studying at Imam Hatib School in Kayseri Turki. Prior to this, they both attended Indonesian-Turkish boarding school in Central Java. Both Yazid and Wijangga were not known to have any prior experience with extremist group but later joined ISIS.

From JI To ISIS: A Second-Choice Jihad

Abdul Rauf was previously a member of the Ring-Banten JI group under the leadership of Imam Samudra. He was one of the men imprisoned for his role in abetting the 2002 Bali Bombing. Rauf had been released in 2011 after serving more than 8 years in prison. He had been a model prisoner and on his release he had no interest in violence in Indonesia. He was by all accounts remorseful and convinced that violence against civilian in Indonesia was wrong. When he was brought into contact with Imam Samudra before the 2002 Bali Bombing, he believed he was going to be sent to Ambon or Poso to fight. When he was released he was a regular visitor to Nusakambangan to visit his fellow Rois and on one occasion Rauf expressed a desire to help fellow and oppressed Muslims and his first choice was to help the Rohingnya in Myanmar to avenge violence against Muslims there. Rois told him how he could get to Syria instead and helped him to connect with people who knew the travel routes and contacts. In early 2014, Rauf left for Syria. He was killed in May 2014 in Ramadi Iraq. Yes, Rauf is known to have fought with ISIS but he had reportedly left for Syria more because he was committed to fighting on behalf of fellow Muslims than because he believed deeply in ISIS' jihadism. If the JI channel has accepted him as he previously had been associated with Imam Samudra before the 2002 Bali Bombing, he might have chosen that route. However, it was easier to get to Syria via the ISIS channel and that seems to be why Rauf chose it.

From FAKSI to ISIS:
Getting Approved Then Brought Family and Follower

ISIS normally requires that would-be foreign fighters obtain a recommendation from someone already with its force in Syria or Iraq. One Indonesian trusted by ISIS in this regard is Salim Mubarok Attamimi. He was born in Pasuruan East Java on 25 August 1972 from an Arabian descended family. Before marriage, Salim lived with his parents selling fresh cow's milk over there. After that, he moved to Kampung Ampel Malang with his wife and children. Salim has gone twice, first from mid-2013 to early 2014 and then again in March 2014, Salim left with his family (two wives and more than five children) and followers in a group of about twenty. On arrival, Salim took the name Abu Jandal Al-Yemeni. He also has appeared in ISIS propaganda video and his recommendation is said to be immediately accepted. For example, he appeared in a video posted on YouTube on 25 December 2014 warning Indonesian police, military, Banser of NU, etc., that he and others would come back to Indonesia to "massacre you one by one" for refusing to apply for Islamic law. Salim also said in the video that he would

welcome Indonesia's participation in the US-led coalition against ISIS so that he and other fighters can confront the security forces directly.[349] Salim was previously a member of FAKSI from Malang and was active in advocating the establishment of Sharia throughout Indonesia. With his excellence in the Arabic language, Salim quickly developed a wide-reaching network within ISIS and helped facilitate arrangements for other Indonesians coming to join ISIS, including five of his students in Malang.[350]

DISCUSSION

Journey to Iraq-Syria: Route & Network

Of the approximately 8000 foreign fighters from 74 countries believed to have joined the Syrian conflict,it is unclear how many of them are Indonesian. Up to the end of 2015, the Indonesian government estimates it is more than 800, andmore than 50 of them were reportedly killed. The call to join ISIS has elicited and enthusiastic response. Several supporters of ISIS in the Indonesian media recognize that the existence of ISIS is likely waking-up the sleeping tiger (*Membangunkan Harimau Tidur*), meaning that ISIS facilitates their desires to conduct the "real" jihad as well as to implement Sharia both purely and completely. Most fighters who come from Indonesia are linked to existing groups. However, others are initially independent fighters who are radicalized through the internet or their fellows and family members. The fighters often have to cover their travel expenses but sometimes the groups also help them to get money as well as to organize their journey to Syria. Total travel cost including flight to Istanbul, local transport to Syria's border and two days accommodation along the way are estimated to be from $1000 to $1500. The groups also help to obtain a recommendation from an existing ISIS member, which is apparently a pre-requisite for enlisting in ISIS.

There are two major routes that Indonesian fighters tend to take when travelling to Syria to join ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra. **First,** and also most typically, they cross through Turkey since Indonesian citizens are eligible for a visa-on-arrival. One common route is to fly from Jakarta to Istanbul and then travel over land to Reyhanli, a town near Turkey's border with Syria. From there arrangements are made to cross the Syrian border. **Second**, others have taken a more indirect route, travelling from Indonesia to Malaysia and then departing from Kuala Lumpur, often with Malaysian identity papers to Doha, Qatar. Then they travel to Istanbul and finally go by land to Reyhanli. Once

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[349] See www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOfcFXLKE0
[350] See "Lima Warga Malang Angkat Senjata Bergabung ISIS", in *Tempo*, 9 Agustus 2014.

Indonesian fighters arrive at the border, someone from ISIS or al-Nusra picks them up and transports them to safe houses on the other side before joining either ISIS or al-Nusra camps.[351]

Regarding the existing groups, they include FAKSI/*Forum Aktivis Syariah Indonesia*, JTJ/Jamaah Tawhid wal Jihad, Ring Banten of the JI, MIT (*Mujahidin Indonesia Timur*), etc. MIT, Indonesia's most active extremist group, has reportedly sent a few of its members and alumni of its militia camps to Syiria. The Poso-based-group leader, Santoso,[352] swore allegiance to ISIS's Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi in July 2014. The travel of MIT-affiliated extremist to Syria has been facilitated by Siswanto, a former fighter during Poso sectarian conflict and active promoter of Aman Abdurrahman's teaching in his hometown Lamongan of East Java. FAKSI and JTJ are closely related, as both follow Aman'steaching.[353] Besides, aspiring extremists are travelling to Syria by way of several other channels. Some join with JI as part of its humanitarian arm namely the HASI/*Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia*, for a month long tour providing relief and medical assistance. While on the tour these individuals slip away. Most have joined al-Nusra From. However, when ISIS split from al-Nusra, a portion of those fighters left it for ISIS. Others have made it to Syria after performing the umra (the little haj/pilgrimage), taking a boat from Yemen through the Suez Canal to Latakia in Syiria. Others—most notably alumni of the Pesantren Ngruki in Solo—have used Facebook to connect with fellow alumns studying in the Middle East. Nine alumni of Ngruki have been documented as having joining the fight, leaving from boarding schools in Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan, etc., where they had been completing follow-up studies. Several were attending al-Iman a Pesantren in Sanaa Yemen that has been especially vocal in its support for Sunni fighters in Syria and thus provided the necessary conduits to travel there.[354]

ISIS Narratives in Indonesia

In Indonesia, debates between ISIS and al-Qaeda supporters have taken place online. For example, extremist news website arrahmah.com, owned by a former member of Jamaah Islamiyah/JI's al-Ghuroba cell Muhammad Jibril, runs stories that discredited ISIS. On the other hand, websites such as al-mustaqbal.net, shoutussalam.com, etc., manned by individuals

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[351] Julie Chernov Hwang, 2015, There and Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria, in *thejakartapost.com,* 27 January 2015.

[352] Santoso is the field commander of JAT (Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid), the successor of JI.

[353] Nayhat Nuraniyah, 2015, "How ISIS Charmed the New Generation of Indonesian Militants", in www.mei.edu/content/map/how-isis-charmed-new-generation-indonesian-militants, 09 January 2015 (Accessed in October 2015)

[354] Julie Chernov Hwang, 2015, There and Back Again: Indonesian Fighters in Syria, in *thejakartapost.com,* 27 January 2015.

close to Aman Abdurrahman relentlessly counter arrahmah.com and other mainstream media portrayal of ISIS. Extremist pro-ISIS also dedicates their websites, Facebook pages and Twitter feeds to vocalizing support for ISIS. This pro-ISIS media campaign tends to highlight three key issues; the caliphate narrative, the ISIS battleground achievement, and ideological affinities.

First is the caliphate narrative. ISIS supporters have spread the narrative that their new caliphate, the Islamic State, matches the prophecy of Prophet Muhammad. A Hadith from the prophet is often referenced, which explains that Islam unfolds in five stages; (1) the era of the Prophet Muhammad;(2) the era of a caliphate that applies the Prophet's way (interpreted as the first four caliphs, known as the rightly-guided caliphs/*khulafaur al-rasyidin*;(3) the era of kings that bite (from the Umayyad dynasty to the Ottoman Empire);(4) the era of dictators (rulers of the post-colonial Muslims states;and, lastly, (5) the era for therestoration of the caliphate. According to this narrative, the ISIS caliphate marks the beginning of the fifth stage of Islam. It is argued that while the ISIS caliphate might not be the prophesied last caliphate of Mahdi, another Hadith suggested that an Islamic caliphate with a black banner army would emerge long before the Mahdi himself emerges, paving the way for his victory. Thus, ISIS is believed to be the embryonic black banner army that will help the Mahdi defeat Dajjal the anti-Christ. The testimony of some Indonesians aligning themselves with ISIS seems to suggest a genuine belief that they are not joining a terrorist group like al-Qaeda but a caliphate as part of Prophet Muhammad'sprophecy.

Second is the ISIS battleground achievement. Some extremists see ISIS as better than al-Qaeda because it is closer to victory than any other extremist group. Such a viewpoint might seem purely pragmatic but it is also inspired by the jihadi concept of *Qital Tamkin*, an armed struggle that seeks to seize territories wherein Islamic law is applied; it emphasizes establishing governing institutions and economic capabilities in the conquered territories as opposed to merely destroying enemy objects. This idea was introduced in Indonesia through the translated works of Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and grew in popularity as it became apparent that the Osama-bin-Laden-styled Qital Nikaya method that stresses repetitive attacks to weaken the enemy without immediately trying to replace it with an Islamic government, which was copied by the Bali Bombings and Noordin Top, had only caused massive losses to JI. Among local extremists who idealize Qital Tamkin, ISIS, with its rapid advances in parts of Syria and Iraq, has been widely viewed as a heroic movement. Of course, other extremist groups also value Qital Tamkin and the JI seeks to achieve the same goal, but incrementally over a longer term. There is also political reasons

for other groups' hesitancy to back ISIS, namely that ISIS's self-declared caliphate is not blessed by al-Qaeda's senior leadership. JI was once linked to al-Qaeda, and many within JI retain a high degree of respect for, and spiritual attachment to, al-Qaeda's current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Ideological factors also matter, as other extremist groups disagree with ISIS's hard-core excommunication doctrine, which the group has used to justify its killing of non-ISIS Sunni extremists.

Third is an ideological affinity. The current debate echoes Indonesian extremist earlier debate over the proper scope of Takfir (the act of labelling other Muslims as Kafir/infidels). It startedas a debate among detained extremists over whether or not they could cooperate with police in order to have their prison sentences reduced, but it later developed into a larger discussion about whether Muslims who work for the enemy, for example for secular government like Indonesia, can be labelled kafir/infidels. JI and al-Qaeda are in favor of apostate labelling of the state security apparatus only at the institutional level or Takfir Aam, not individually, on the ground that individuals can still be swayed to the extremist side as long as they remain Muslims. ISIS supporters such as Aman countered this argument and raised the case for individual excommunication or Takfir Muayyan to be applied indiscriminately to Muslims who do not overtly support the implementation of Islamic law. Hence while al-Qaeda supporters cursed ISIS as extreme Khawarij[355] for killing al-Nusra fighters, Aman and his pro-ISIS supporters saw the killing as no less than principled application of Takfir Muayyan. In other words, ISIS has behaved according to principles that Aman and like-minded leaders support but have thus far been incapable of enacting locally. As such, their support for ISIS seems to be driven by a deep sense of ideological affinity that goes beyond mere pragmatism or shared overacting religious narratives.[356]

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[355] Khawarij is a derogatory term referring to the earliest hardline Islamic sect that was responsible for assassinating the fourth caliph, Ali bin Abi Thalib.

[356] Nayhat Nuraniyah, 2015, "How ISIS Charmed the New Generation of Indonesian Militants", in www.mei.edu/content/map/how-isis-charmed-new-generation-indonesian-militants, 09 January 2015 (Accessed in October 2015)

Disengagement of ISIS Fighters

In August 2014, several Indonesians who had fought with ISIS returned home citing disillusionment with the organization's tactics. Disillusionment is among the most common factors leading someone to disengage from extremist organizations like ISIS. A fighter motivated to disengage due in part to disillusionment may be disappointed with a movement's tactics, its leader, their own role or the ideology upon which the group was founded. In this instance, the returnees cited their disillusionment with the way in which ISIS departed from the Qur'an's rules of war, they were particularly disturbed to discover that they would be fighting and killing other Muslims. Those who joined ISIS were motivated by a desire to assist in building the caliphate, to fight in battle at theend times, as some have fought in Syria, or to fight in a legitimate jihad as their elder brothers who fought in Afghanistan had done some decades earlier. What may have been less clear to them was that they were entering a civil war in which their target would be fellow Muslims.[357]

In December 2015, Bahrumsyah, an Indonesian ISIS fighter, was reportedly killed by ISIS for attempting to escape. He felt disappointed after watching the brutality of ISIS fighters to kill their fellow Muslims in Syria.[358] Unlike Bahrumsyah, Ahmad Junaedi from Malang of East Java was ableto return to Indonesia safely. Junaedi, who was previously selling Bakso, first joined ISIS because Salim Mubarok informed him about a humanitarian mission with largesalary by joining ISIS in Syria. Mubarok also persuaded Junaedi that he would be placed in safe area away from the war zone. However Junaedi later on felt disappointed to see he only got a lower salary in Syria. He was charged with helping officers complete security checks and was only paid a salary of $50 per-month (equal to Rupiahs 600,000). This was much lower than what he had made in selling Bakso in Indonesia (Rupiahs 2,500,000 per-month). Besides, Junaedi also felt bored with his job in Syria. When he explained his willingness to return Indonesia, Mubarok was totally rejected and they had a long debate about his return. However Junaedi finally returned to Indonesia but is now facing a trial in the Indonesian courts since he violated the constitution by joining ISIS. A similar story comes from Abdul Hakim who returned to Indonesia after almost two-years of working with ISIS. He travelled to Syria with Salim Mubarok. Hakim was then placed in a public kitchen at anISIS camp to be a chef, cooking food for ISIS fighters. He got salary about $80 per-month or (equal to Rupiahs 1,000,000). Hakim felt bored with his job witness numerous brutalities at the hands of

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[357] Julia Chernov, 2015, *op.cit.*
[358]*Idem*

ISIS fighters causing him to decide to return home to Indonesia. Although he is now facing the trial, he praises God for returning safely and he will take the lesson as a blessing in disguise (*pelajaran dan hikmah*) from his experience in Syria.[359]

According to Julie Chernov (2015), it is imperative that the Indonesian intelligence together with foreign intelligence especially in Southeast Asia maintain open channels and parallel capacities. Perhaps most importantly, the Indonesian government must provide a mechanism for disengagement and reintegration upon the fighters' return. Trying returning fighters in court, as the Belgians have done, or stripping fighters of their citizenship as the British have pondered, would only exacerbate feelings of alienation. Programs that foster reintegration offer returnees opportunity to conceive of their post-jihad life and priority activities, as well as to develop post-jihad networks of friends and family.[360]

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[359] See "Tukang Bakso Simpatisan ISIS Kecewa di Bayar Murah", in www.cnnindonesian.com, 27 January 2016
[360] Julie Chernov, 2015, *op.cit*.